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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Thailand has experimented several times with democratic government since 
the advent of a Constitutional Monarchy in 1932. On each occasion democratic 
civil rule has been terminated by militarists ostensibly impatient with 
the indecisiveness or instability of the fledgling government and anxious 
to exert firmer control on the nation's business.
In 1958 a junta headed by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat took power with 
national development featuring prominently in their declared policy. 
Maladministration of the Civil Service was seen by Sarit as a barrier to 
the achievement of development goals; to overcome this problem he took 
steps toward reform of public administration. As the major instrument 
for this purpose, advisory committees were established with charters to 
examine the structure, operation and purposes of the Civil Service and 
to report on reforms which might be beneficial to the government's targets 
for national development. This pattern of administrative reform in 
Thailand has continued as each military regime since Sarit's has appointed 
similar advisory committees.
In Thailand there is a long tradition of military dominance of both 
political process and public administration. The politicans have never 
had enough time to establish efficient democratic government and 
administration; the military always had the capacity to execute a 
coup d'etat. The military has been a strong organization characterized 
by centralization, professionalism, nationalism, institutional pride,
2 .
and a high degree of organization.1 To disguise other reasons 
behind their seizure of political power, the military'leaders liked 
to be seen as the only ones who could solve the fundamental economic and 
social problems confronting the country. They have established
2themselves as the political ruling group —  a 'military oligarchy'.
At the same time, most of the members of cabinet have been recruited from
career officials, thus, Thailand deserves the term 'bureaucratic polity',
3used by F.W. Riggs. The government's policies in administration, social 
and economic development planning required the improvement of its 
administration and development of adequate administrative machinery with 
competent administrators.
Generally, military regimes usurp power after a divisive and turbulent 
political period, ostensibly in order to restore order dealing with inter­
national tensions and to proceed with economic development and nation 
building. Some military regimes have supported administrative reform 
whereas democratic regimes have not; the crucial difference seems to lie 
in the attitudes of the key leaders. The military governments which have 
sought legitimacy and hope to fulfil their promise to replace a directionless 
government with an effective but non-democratic government have made use 
of the expert civilian administrators and technocrats who specialized 
in organization, personnel administration, manpower planning and treasury 
matters. Technocrats in the Thai government sphere have been the bright 
young men who hold advanced academic degrees and come from, or have 
connection with, the academic community. Like the Filipino technocrats, 
they are modern, rational, and pragmatic individuals rather than 
conservative, political and ideological; therefore, they are thought 
to be more capable of introducing and advancing socioeconomic development
4plans. Both the military government and the civilian administrators
3 .
have found the technocrats to be useful in the pursuit of national
development. Administrative reformers may exercise considerable
influence on military governments because of their knowledge, personal
qualities and the confidence which the rulers have in them to remedy
maladministration. A major purpose of the reformers is to establish
the administration which will function with efficiency and economy leading
5to national development. Innovation in a bureaucratic system is notghighly valued and it may be regarded as undesirably disruptive.
Reformers find great difficulty in dealing with the internal dynamics of 
bureaucratic behaviour: the bureaucrats appreciate reforms that benefit
themselves such as expansion of the organization or promotion, and they 
naturally resist change or reform aimed at reducing staff, reducing their 
powers or abolishment of the organization.
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM
In the field of government and public administration, the term
'administrative reform' has acquired widespread usage and recognition.
Caiden defined it as 'the artificial inducement of administrative
7transformation, against resistance'. To him, administrative reform 
has three distinguishing features —  moral purpose, artificial transformation 
and administrative resistance. The moral purpose derives from an objective 
to improve the present system by ridding it of defects, by improving 
behaviour and by curing administrative faults. It is artificial 
transformation in that a change is imposed on an existing arrangement, 
creating in its place a new system. The third feature, administrative 
resistance, arises because there is opposition within the system to 
change; reform needs to be backed by power or authority either through 
existing channels or imposition of authority.
4 .
To Yehezkel Dror, administrative reform means, 'directed change
Qof main features of an administrative system'. Drorviews administrative 
reform as a directed and conscious activity rather than the unforseeable 
result of mostly uncontrolled independent factors.
A.F. Leemans gave the definition of administrative reform as
'reorganization of the machinery of government which is marked by wide
9scope and high intensity'. His idea is the reorganization of the 
machinery as a whole and its various sub-systems. The machinery of 
government, a highly complex system, is composed of many sub-systems 
such as the Cabinet, governmental departments, varieties of government 
agencies and services. Because administrative systems are by nature 
very conservative, reformers must have power or influence if they hope 
to achieve their objectives; usually the administrative reform advisory 
committees are appointed to give advice to the chief executive of govern­
ment. It appears that revolutionary changes in administration are 
very rare. There are at least four assumptions in reform implementation: 
firstly, the government has recognized the need to reform, secondly, the 
government has appointed experts to propose remedies for maladministration, 
thirdly, the government-backed experts are able to conduct full inquiries and 
publicize their findings and recommendation, and fourthly, the experts 
have the capability to do the job."*-0
William Siffin has noted, 'administrative reform cannot take place 
only within a bureaucratic system, it must be matched by environmental 
changes and those changes must be relatively basic: they must include
the effective manifestation of fundamental values that will challenge the 
continuing relevance of the bureaucratic status quo'.'*''*' Administrative 
reform depends upon political modernization, e.g., upon democratic
5 .
government where policies effect the aspiration of representative pressure
groups and other agencies of the populace. It is necessary to have a
highly developed policy making system for good administrative reform,
12which will bring a better administrative system.
REFORM STRATEGY
Once the need for administrative reform is perceived and appropriate
goals have been set, it is necessary to determine the strategy. Hahn-Been
Lee categorizes reform strategy as either incremental or comprehensive
13based on the scope and pace of application. An incremental strategy
proposes a series of small changes none of which might individually
excite attention but which taken in sequence lead to the goal of reform.
At the other end of the scale a comprehensive strategy applies an across-
the-board approach to reform, seeking a total attainment of the objective 
14in one move.
Lee is quick to point out the difficulty both strategies have in
retaining their initial character. Incremental strategy eventually
reaches a stage where the overall reform goals become politically visible;
further steps in the sequence require political support which usually
results in the development of a broader strategy. Similarly, the comprehensive
strategy normally features several incremental components. Thus Lee
sees a 'continuum of reform strategy' with the incremental strategy
15at one end of the range and comprehensive at the other.
Caiden cites 3 approaches to reform:
1. Simultaneous announcement and implementation
2. Five-Year Plan
3. A complex long term reform plan comprising several lesser 
plans and a number of stages and level of actions, the whole 
being continually updated to changing circumstance.
6 .
Objectives may need to be camouflaged to deceive potential
opponents or to gain support whilst the reform is implemented. Goals
may even need to be modified when opposition cannot be otherwise
overcome. Caiden proposes a continuing reaction to changing
circumstances i.e., an ever-changing reform strategy which evenutally
17achieves the best result permissible in the prevailing environment.
Lee provides a matrix as a useful tool for determining the optimum
reform strategy. His variables are leadership and time and each may
be favorable or unfavorable to reform. By 'time' Lee means the
social environment and political structure pertaining in the society.
Where both variables are favorable a comprehensive strategy is indicated;
where both are unfavorable reform should not be attempted. When one
variable only is favorable an incremental strategy is suggested. Caiden
also draws attention to the value of initiating reform in a social
18and economic climate conducive to success.
ADVISORY COMMITTEES
As the scope of government involvement in the affairs of society 
widens, governments increasingly rely on expert advice for the 
development of policies, or of their mode of implementation. Usually 
the appropriate ministry in the civil service can provide this advice, 
but it may be that the issue concerns more than one Ministry, or impact 
on particular areas of the private sector, or is especially complex 
or sensitive. In such cases the government may see advantage in 
establishing an advisory committee with members drawn from interested 
bodies in both the public and private sectors and expert in the 
particular field of consideration. As Wheare noted:
7.
Advisory committees have as one of their valuable 
functions the linking of the scientific expert 
inside the civil service and with his colleagues 
outside the service and ensuring that the best 
advice is available to the government from both 
sides.
There are other reasons for the creation of advisory committees: 
T.B. Smith cites a 'therapeutic role' —  advisory committees enable 
the government to dispense patronage to deserving supporters. Where 
an issue is very sensitive politically, the establishment of an advisory 
committee to examine the matter may serve as a device to allay public 
concern and at the same time delay the need for a decision until a 
more propitious time.
There are many types of advisory committees. Smith identifies nine 
types:
1. Committees of a General Advisory Nature
2. Scientific and Technical Advisory Committees
3. Special Clientele Committees
4. Specific Task Advisory Committees
5. Task Force/Commission on Broad Issues
6. Public Conferences
7. Intergovernmental Advisory or Consultative Committees
8. Geographic Based Advisory or Consultative Committees
9. Interdepartmental Committees^O
The use of advisory committees is not confined to democratic 
governments; although the U.S.A., U.K. and Australia each make use of 
them on a large scale. Autocratic regimes, and especially those 
headed by military junta, are perhaps even more dependent than popular 
governments on expert advice.21
The Administrative Reform Advisory Committee established in 
Thailand by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, and reestablished by 
succeeding military regimes, has some of the features of several of 
these types identified by Smith, but differs sufficiently in important
8.
ways from all to be considered a separate class. All the Thai Committees 
had a specific though wide ranging task —  to examine the Civil Service 
and recommend reforms to improve efficiency and effectiveness.
In time of rapid growth of public administration, goverments need 
expert and technical assistance in improving administration to help 
achieve a properly balanced growth and to facilitate the efficient 
provision of services in appropriate areas of priority. On the 
surface, then, the advisory committee method would be beneficial.
Maheshwari cited the PEP Report's four virtues of committees —
regularity, comprehensive personal contact, convenience and formal 
22commitment. To these can be added other requirements —  a successful
advisory committee is more likely to be one which is supplied with clear
objectives by the government, which has ready access to government at
the top level, unilateral control over a sufficient number of experts
to conduct the necessary examination, status in the eyes of those
examined, a skilled, respected, decisive chairman, and which has a
balance in its membership between bureaucrats/academics and experts
from the private sector. Also important is the size of the committee;
it should be not so large as to be unmanageable, yet not so small as
to restrict its range of understanding of the questions to be faced.
Wheare observed that a large committee can be effective only if it
separates into sub-committees. The full committee convening to
discuss the reports of sub-committees or to discuss matters of 
23principle. Multiple advisors are useful only if they bring to their 
task a variety of experiences and talents and do not engage in collusion. 
Equally it is essential that each member follow an independent line 
of thought uninfluenced by the beliefs of his colleagues. The
9.
committee may be badly used or wisely used. The government may 
employ the advisory committee as simply a means of legitimizing, for 
example, a military government. It can be used to enhance the power 
of chief executive as Franklin Roosevelt used the Brownlow Commission.
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND ADVISORY COMMITTEES IN THAILAND
The development of administrative reform advisory committees
in Thailand was begun by Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat's government in
1959 and this practice has continued in every regime except the
democratic ones. After Sarit initiated a military coup d'etat on
20 October 1958, the National Assembly was dissolved, martial law
introduced, and a new Cabinet composed of nine civilian and five
military career officials under the premiership of Sarit was established
25on 10 February 1959. Sarit's regime had a desire for modernization
and especially encouraged economic development. A few days after
his coup, Sarit appointed many advisory committees such as an
Advisory Committee on Monetary Matters and Finance, on Foreign Affairs,
26on Research, on Law, and in Economics.
Defying the politicians* Sarit, an avowed anti-democrat, believed
democracy to be inefficient and unsettling for Thailand and a threat
27to development and security. Under Sarit, the Constitutional
Assembly was directed to draft a new Constitution, but took around
28ten years to do so. It can be argued that Sarit chose not to use 
his absolute power to hasten finalization of this task because he 
believed it was necessary to lay the foundation of the economy and
29new society before the establishment of a democratic constitution.
10.
The government could not rely upon its bureaucracy as an instrument
capable of translating policy and programs into reality. Sarit's
regime was the first to attempt a wholesale 'modernization' of the
country. It is significant that his government had declared its intention
to reform administrative machinery to serve the revolutionary purposes;
he saw that the administrative process must be adapted to meet the
need for efficient administration in general and for effective social
mobilization in particular. The report of a mission organized by the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request
of the previous Thai government, recommended that a program of
30administrative reforms should be developed. Sarit's government made 
progress in reforming the bureaucracy to suit its new responsibilities. 
This progress stemmed from the effects of an increasing number of 
young, competent and forceful officials working under the guidance 
of senior officials who in turn influenced the regimes. Sarit offered 
these younger officials high offices and gave them opportunities to 
recommend policies. Sarit also established as part of the modernization 
program, the Educational Council, National Research Council, National 
Economic Development Board, Advisory Committee for Administrative 
Reform and other agencies.
When Sarit, as leader of a reforming elite, set up the Administrative 
Reform Advisory Committee in 1959, he had as a primary purpose the 
reorganization of the government. In 1962, the representative of the 
Office of the Civil Service Commission proposed that the Advisory 
Committee should set staffing patterns to be implemented in those 
departments which had been reorganized. This would complete the 
reorganization task and be useful for budget analysis by the Budget 
Bureau. The Advisory Committee agreed and since then, its major tasks
11.
have been reorganization and the determination of staffing patterns.
The later regimes appointed many advisory committees to study other 
sub-systems, reporting on or effecting: (i) changes in the administrative
system to improve the efficiency of public servants; (ii) planning and 
policy in natural science; and, (iii) conduct of work duplication 
surveys or reporting on inefficiency in the governmental organizations.
Each of the six military regimes (and two caretaker regimes, Sanya 
Thamasak government, which was appointed by King Bhumipol) established 
an Advisory Committee for Administrative Reform. The elected, civilian 
governments of M.R. Seni Pramot and M.R. Kukrit Pramot showed no 
interest in the re-appointment of the Advisory Committee for Administrative 
Reform. They were concerned with substantive reform such as land reform 
and public housing and health programs that impress their followers 
and the mass public. Kukrit's program for administrative reform was 
the decentralization of power to Changwad (provinces) and Tambon (village) 
Council in his Tambon Development Fund Program. Although he appointed 
many personal advisors, he downplayed their importance. When 
questioned by a reporter as to the need for the large number of advisors, 
he replied that they were there to look after the garbage bins.
THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study aims to examine the advisory committee system for 
administrative reform in Thailand. It will concentrate upon advisory 
committees for administrative reform in the military regimes from 1959 
to 1979. Aspects considered are:
1. The political and administrative climate 
necessary for the establishment of numerous 
advisory committees for administrative reforms, 
and the reason for non-establishment of such 
committees during democratic regimes.
12.
2. Purpose of the advisory committees.
3. Reform strategies utilized by the advisory 
committees.
4. The role played by 'technocrats', 'politicians' 
and 'group representatives' on the committees.
5. Effectiveness of the advisory committee system; 
did effective reform take place or were the 
committees designed to pacify important interests?
6. Recommendations and results of the committees.
Because some of the documents containing the 
recommendations of committees were classified 
'secret' and later destroyed, this study can be 
done on specified recommendations only. Some 
recommendations in each regime will be studied, 
but the whole of the recommendations in the Thanom 
Regime III (17 November 1971-17 December 1972) 
which introduced more drastic reform than the 
other regimes, will be examined.
7. Reasons for the success or failure of the committees.
8. The role of the administrative reform advisory 
committees played in political and administrative 
processes in the military regimes.
The study develops a 'profile' of the committees and pattern or 
membership and draws conclusions as to the effectiveness of advisory 
committees in achieving reform in the Thai bureaucracy.
This research is designed to inquire into the Thai administrative 
reform advisory committee system from Sarit to Kriengsak Regime I and 
no endeavour is made to cover reform outside this period, or elsewhere 
than in the bureaucracy or administration, or by other means such as 
installation of the 'Classification System' in the civil service. 
However, throughout the study does review administrative reform under 
military regimes in Pakistan, Indonesia and South Korea and in the 
democratic countries U.S.A., Australia, U.K. and Canada. Throughout 
this study, the term Advisory Committee for Administrative Reform is 
used even though the names of the committees have varied in different 
regimes and though the designation in Thai language differs slightly
13.
such as Advisory Committee for Administrative Reform to the Prime Minister 
and Advisory Committee for Administrative Reform to the Revolutionary 
Party; provided committees had the same purposes, the same name will 
be used# Similar practice is applied to the sub-committees.
The advisory committee established by Sarit to examine government- 
run commercial enterprises, elsewhere known as the Advisory Committee 
on Government Organization, is termed the Advisory Committee on Public 
Enterprise in this study, to more clearly reflect its purpose. 'Seni 
regime' means his elected government in 1975 and 1976.
METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH
Both documentary research and field work are used in this study. 
Documentary research included works dealing with the theory of public 
administration, particularly concerning advisory committees and the 
Thai Civil Service, Acts, Laws, and Regulations. A large number of ,the 
reports of the successive Thai Advisory Committee were examined. The 
Royal Thai Government Gazette proved a fruitful source of information; 
another source frequently used was the minutes of the National 
Legislative Assembly.
Difficulty in obtaining data from the Thai bureaucrats was 
experienced; these resulted from documents being classed 'secret' 
and from poor record keeping, especially concerning the period of some 
of the military regimes.
Interviews were granted the writer by two ex-prime ministers, 
those of the elected governments, M.R. Seni Pramot and M.R. Kukrit 
Pramot; Mr. Bemchana Atakorn, a member of the Advisory Committee; and
14.
by a Deputy Director-General of the Office of the Civil Service 
Commission, Mr. Samran Thavaragyooth; two Deputy Secretary-Generals 
for Political Affairs in the Secretariat of the Prime Minister, Mr.
Arthit Urairat and Mr. Meechai Ruchupan; the Director of Position and 
Pays I, Mr. Suthep Thammaphibal; Professor Amorn Ragsasat of the 
National Institute of Development Administration; and, the Director 
of Advisory Board and Committee, Sub Lt. Pramote Sutabutr.
In researching this paper, the writer is cognizant of the benefits 
deriving from her previous employment as a Personnel Analyst and as 
a staff member of a Sub-Committee for Administrative Reform.
The following chapters provide a review of major attempts at reform 
in selected countries and a description of the development of the Thai 
administration system, its problems and the role played by the 
Administrative Reform Advisory Committees since their inception. There 
is a dissection of a 'typical' committee, appraisal of selected 
attempts at reform, and finally a presentation of conclusions reached 
by this study.
Chapter II presents a summary of recent enquiries into public 
administration in four democracies, U.S.A., Australia, U.K., and 
Canada and three authoritarian states, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Korea.
The democracies selected for study provide examples of reform under the 
presidential and the parliamentary systems of government whilst the 
authoritarian states are chosen as countries using administrative 
reform as an adjunct to national development.
Chapter III describes the modern Thai administrative system and its 
problems. There is a summary of historical developments from the reign 
of King Trilok in the mid 15th century, including the Chakri Reformation 
towards the end of the 19th century, the transition from absolute to
15.
Constitutional Monarchy in 1932, the accession to power of the various 
military regimes, and the brief interludes of democratic government.
In Chapter IV, the role of Administrative Reform Advisory 
Committees is examined and an overview presented of Committee activities 
under successive military regimes from Sarit in 1959.
Chapter V discusses the legal framework of the Committees, sketches 
the profile of a 'typical' committee, describes the provision of support 
staff, the cost and functions of an advisory committee and the procedures 
adopted in the examination of a department.
Five case studies are presented at Chapter VI. The first of these 
examines the establishment of the Office of the Accelerated Rural 
Development in 1966 and the reforms proposed by successive advisory 
committees through to 1979. Another case study deals in similar fashion 
with the Office of Youth Promotion and Coordination Committee. There 
were drastic reforms of the administration under the Thanom III regime, 
and these form the basis of another case study. The remaining two 
studies review the examination by the Advisory Committee of the Customs 
Department and of the Department of Aviation in 1973.
Chapter VII, draws conclusions on the value of the Advisory Committee 
as an instrument for administrative reform in Thailand. Reasons 
underlying their establishment are discussed and the nature of reform 
measures proposed by the Committees are analysed. The influences operating 
on a Committee, including political direction, departmental pressure and 
those inherent in the Committee structure, are explored. Finally, this 
Chapter presents a judgement as to the effectiveness of the Advisory 
Committee in carrying its designed role under the various military
regimes.
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CHAPTER II
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN DEMOCRATIC 
AND AUTHORITARIAN COUNTRIES
INTRODUCTION
Before examining in detail administrative reform strategy in Thailand, 
it is useful and informative to assess reform strategies in several democratic 
and authoritarian political systems and to explore the use of advisory 
committees on administrative improvement in those countries. The democratic 
countries to be examined are the U.S.A., Australia, the United Kingdom and 
Canada. Military dominated countries to be assessed are Pakistan, Indonesia 
and Korea.
The assessment on this thesis of administrative reform in these nations 
must be brief and cover only the major points. However, the information 
provided does enable a comparative assessment with the Thai experience and 
lead to a deeper understanding of the process of administrative reform in 
Thailand.
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM UNDER DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT
As the term implies, administrative reform is designed to improve 
the machinery of government, usually by changes to existing structure and 
practice. To an extent, the mode of approach to reform varies according 
to the type of government in power, therefore it is useful to review 
attempts at reform under democratic governments and compare these with 
those conducted under military or autocratic regimes.
The U.S.A., Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada are chosen for 
review in this paper as representatives of developed, stable democracies 
with large civil service structures. Although a number of enquiries into
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government administration have been held in each of these selected countries, 
only the more important are considered here. These enquiries had a number of 
features in common, three being of particular importance: they were open to
public comment and their findings were published; 'outsiders' played a 
dominant role in the enquiries; and the approach to reform was comprehensive 
in scope.
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The need to organize the U.S. federal bureaucracy along efficient lines 
was long recognized by those who had regular dealings with the Executive 
Branch of Government. Attempts were made in the 19th Century to initiate 
action leading to improvements in the Civil Service, by establishing enquiries 
into aspects of administration; but, although worthwhile proposals were made, 
governments failed to follow through with their implementation.
From 1900, a number of U.S. Presidents following their election 
encouraged administrative reform by establishing committees, commissions 
and task forces to examine the working of the bureaucracy. Under President 
William H. Taft, the Taft Economy and Efficiency Commission reported in 1912 
and 1913 on ways to improve administrative procedures and methods. Franklin 
D. Roosevelt established the Brownlow Committee to examine administrative 
management, and its report in 1937 proposed structural reforms which 
effectively centered more executive power in the Office of the Presidency.
By the end of World War II, public awareness of the shortcomings 
of government administration had grown to the extent that the Lodge-Brown 
Act in 1947 proposed to establish a Commission on Organization of the 
Executive Branch of the Government was passed unanimously by both 
houses of Congress. This body, popularly known as the 'Hoover Commission',
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after its Chairman, ex-President Herbert Hoover, consisted of 12 members —  
four chosen by the President, four by the Vice President and four by the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives. Each of the sets of four 
comprised two men from public and two from private life; the Chairman 
was selected by the members from among their number. Six of these 
members were Democrats and six Republican.
The problems of the Executive Branch which the Commission was to 
study arose mainly from its immense size —  600,000 persons in the late 
1920s, over 2 million in 1949 — and from the fact that it had never-been 
examined and organized on a businesslike basis. These two factors fostered 
duplication and overlap of functions, and guaranteed a high cost penalty 
for services. 1
The Commission was empowered to examine the organization of the
Executive Branch and to make recommendations designed 'to promote economy,
efficiency and improve service, by limiting expenditures, eliminating
duplication and overlap, consolidating similar functions, abolishing
unnecessary services and defining and limiting executive functions,
2services and activities. Power was not given to comment on the 
appropriateness of the existence of an agency; the Commission's task
3rather was to find ways to improve the working of existing agencies.
A total of 24 studies were undertaken using task forces and contract 
research institutions. On 5 February 1949 the Hoover Commission submitted 
its Report to both Houses of Congress. There were 273 recommendations 
in the Hoover Report, proposing clear lines of administrative command, 
improved budgeting methods and procurement processes among other things.
An example of the recommendations directed towards improving chains of 
command is that concerning the organization of the Department of State.
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It was proposed that the existing organization be altered to relieve 
the Secretary and Under-Secretary of responsibility for the myriad minor 
activities and to permit them to concentrate on major issues of policy.
The reorganization proposed the creation of two positions of Under­
secretary and the formation of an Operations Committee of top officials, 
to reduce the workload falling directly on the two top officers by 
coordinating and controlling workflows. In broad terms the new structure 
was to be hierarchical, replacing the existing 'parallel' control 
arrangement. It was also proposed to amalgamate the two personnel
services —  the Foreign Service and the Department Service into one service
4under the Secretary of State.
The Hoover Commission found 'serious weaknesses in the internal
5operations of the Federal Government in the fiscal field'. Archaic
financial procedures had been perpetuated for decades and were now
totally inadequate. The budget indicated neither accurate forecasts
£
nor past accomplishments. Thirteen recommendations dealing directly 
with budgetary reform were made; recommendations in other areas also
7often had budgetary connotation. The philosophy of the Commission's 
budgetary proposals were embodied in Recommendation No. 1, which, 
called for the refashioning of the Government's budgetary concept by the 
adoption of a 'performance budget'. Under this proposal, attention would 
be focused on outputs i.e. on what services, and facilities, were to 
be provided for the money allocated; rather than on inputs such as 
number of staff employed, and amount of stores purchased.
Basic causes of deficiencies in supply administration were enumerated 
in the Report. Failure to recognize the importance of the supply 
function and the consequent inadequacy of the procurement organization 
headed this list. To attack the problems affecting supply, the Hoover
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Commission o u t l i n e d  a p ro p o se d  new s y s te m ,  r e q u i r i n g  t h e  r e p e a l  o f  t h e  
many e x i s t i n g  s t a t u t e s  and t h e i r  r e p l a c e m e n t  w i t h  l e g i s l a t i o n  a p p l y i n g  
t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  t h e  Armed S e r v i c e s  P ro c u re m en t  Act o f  1947 t o  buy ing  
by a l l  a g e n c i e s .
Seven y e a r s  a f t e r  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  R e p o r t  more t h a n  72% of  t h e  
r e c o m m e n d a t io n s  o f  t h e  Hoover Commission had been implemented  e i t h e r
g
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y  or  by l e g i s l a t i o n .  O b v i o u s l y ,  s u c c e s s i v e  g o v e rn m e n ts
a c c e p t e d  t h e  v a l i d i t y  o f  many o f  t h e  p r o p o s a l s ,  and l a r g e  s a v i n g s  a r e
g
b e l i e v e d  t o  have  r e s u l t e d  from t h e i r  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .  L a t e r  s t u d i e s  
c a u s e d  a r e a s s e s s m e n t  o f  some o f  t h e  r ec o m m e n d a t io n s ,  and ,  f o r  e xa m p le ,  
t h e  s e cond  Hoover Commission abandoned t h e  p r o p o s a l  t o  merge w a te r  
r e s o u r c e  de v e lo p m en t  f u n c t i o n s H o w e v e r ,  in  g e n e r a l ,  t h e  R e p o r t  was 
w e l l  r e c e i v e d  and l e d  t o  i m p o r t a n t  r e f o r m  o f  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e .
One o f  t h e  c r i t i c i s m s  made o f  t h e  l e g i s l a t i o n  s e t t i n g  up t h e  1947 
Hoover Commission was t h a t  t h e  t e r m s  o f  r e f e r e n c e  were vague and t h e  
C o m m is s io n ' s  s cope  d i d  n o t  p e r m i t  s t u d y  o f  and comment on t h e  wisdom 
o f  gov e rn m e n t  p o l i c i e s .  T h i s  was r e c t i f i e d  when, in  r e s p o n s e  t o  f u r t h e r  
g ro w th  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  Korean War, t h e  Cong res s  s e t  
up a s eco n d  Hoover Commission i n  1953 w i t h  powers  t o  examine and 
r e p o r t  on p o l i c i e s  a s  w e l l  a s  governm ent  s t r u c t u r e .  C om pos i t ion  o f  
t h e  Commission was a lo n g  s i m i l a r  l i n e s  t o  t h e  e a r l i e r  a g e n c y ,  w i t h  
12 members i n c l u d i n g  Hoover a s  Cha i rm an .  I t  came i n t o  be ing  w i t h  t h e  
s i g n i n g  o f  t h e  law by P r e s i d e n t  E isenhower  on 10 J u l y  1953.
The t e r m s  o f  r e f e r e n c e  b r o a d l y  r e p e a t e d  t h o s e  o f  t h e  1947 e n q u i r y
b u t  i n c l u d e d  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  t a s k s  o f :
E l i m i n a t i n g  n o n e s s e n t i a l  s e r v i c e s ,  f u n c t i o n s  and 
a c t i v i t i e s  which a r e  c o m p e t i t i v e  w i t h  p r i v a t e  
e n t e r p r i s e ;  and . . .
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Relocating agencies now responsible directly to the 
President in departments or other agencies. ^
These additional powers conferred exceptional authority on the
Commission. All twelve members were eminent in public life or in the
academic world, and five including Hoover had been members of the first
Hoover Commission. Capitalizing on the experience of the earlier Hoover
Commission it was decided to use the Task Force approach to their work,
and so 18 Task Forces were set up. Around 200 men served on these
Task Forces, most without compensation and many met their own expenses.
All were exceptional people and they included college presidents, deans
of law and medical schools, distinguished civil servants, a former
Chief Justice of a State Supreme Court, other judges, State Governors
or former Governors and senior, distinguished ex servicemen, amongst
many others. The Task Forces were given autonomy by the Commission and
12each hired professional help as required.
Altogether the second Hoover Commission made 39 reports to the
Congress. Macneil and Metz describe these collectively as 'the most
thorough and objective examination of the workings of our federal system
13since the founding of the Republic'. The tenor of the Commission's 
reports was exposure and condemnation of a system replete with 
extravagance and waste, due to the system itself, not the employees 
within it. Bureaucratic methods suitable to small government had not 
been revised to keep pace with Federal administration growth. The 
administration was so composed as to favour sections of the community 
at the expense of the population as a whole. Overlap and duplication 
of functions were common
A specific recommendation intended to improve the level of advice 
on administrative matters available to the Chief Executives sought the
24.
formation of a pool of 'Higher Civil Servants' on which the President could
draw should he perceive a need. Senior officers from any department would
be eligible for selection, and similarly this superior class could be put
15to work in any agency of the President's choosing. Elevation of the 
influence and power of a group of civil servants in this manner, however, 
was contrary to politicians' attitudes to the civil service in the U.S.A.
Another recommendation of the second Hoover Commission called for the 
appointment of a Presidential 'staff officer', whose task would be to help 
the President to understand and prepare action on problems as they arose in 
both political and administrative spheres. Eisenhower adopted this 
suggestion to a degree when he appointed a Secretary to the Cabinet, and 
also by his use of Mr. Adams. ^
Reacting to what it saw as an administrative takeover of some 
judicial functions, the second Commission made several proposals in 
this area including one recommending the establishment of an 
Administrative Court of the U.S. This Court would consist of three 
sections, dealing with tax, trade and labor. Although the subject of 
much attention, this proposal was not taken up, being opposed by those 
who are wary of excessive judicial interference in the regulatory process.1
In another suggestion concerning regulatory bodies, the second 
Hoover Commission viewed Independent Regulatory Commissions (IRC) from 
a different vantage point to that of its predecessor. Whilst the 
1947-49 Commission aimed to increase centralization and responsibility 
for IRC chairmen, the later Commission concentrated on the isolation of 
judicial functions. The main outcome was the retention of the
President's authority to reorganize IRC's, with congressional approval. 18
25
It was as a result of the Report of the second Hoover Commission
19that the new Department of Health, Education and Welfare was created.
Continuing the work of the first Hoover Commission in improving the
organization of federal budgetary control, the second Commission
recommended that responsibility for budgetary accounting and reporting
lie with the Bureau of the Budget. Congress has since tacitly
acknowledged the leading role of the Bureau in these matters; in
line with this recommendation, an Office of Accounting was established
in this bureau, and an assistant director was brought from private 
20sector.
In their reviews, both Hoover Commissions considered administrative 
reform from the perspective of the President who constitutionally was 
head of the Executive Branch. Their recommendations were aimed at 
providing the Chief Executive with an administration with a higher status 
in the eyes of Congress and the public and clearer lines of command, more 
responsive to his requirements. They can be said to have achieved 
considerable success in their reforms.
AUSTRALIA
From time to time, Australian governments have conducted enquiries 
into the civil service. The McLachlan Commission of 1918-20, and the 
economies commission of 1919-20 undertook wide-ranging examination of 
public administration, resulting in fundamental changes to the structure 
and the management arrangements of the civil service. However for the 
most part, enquiries have been restricted to specific areas or aspects 
of administration. Caiden attributes the demise of the full-scale enquiry 
largely to the effectiveness of the reforms implemented as a result of
26.
the McLachlan and economies commission reports. Another contributing 
factor on the years from 1949 to the late 1960s might have been government 
recognition of public disinterest in matters politic engendered by the 
comforts of full employment and a growing economy.
Amongst the enquiries into specific aspects of public administration
were those of the Bailey Committee which reported in 1944 on the
promotions system, and the Boyer Committee which reviewed recruitment
standards and processes in their report of 1958. More recently, the
Fraser Government in 1976 established an enquiry under Sir Henry Bland,
to investigate duplication within the federal civil service and between
that service and its State counterparts. Although more than a dozen
reports were received from the Bland Committee; none have been made 
22public. At present the government is considering the findings of 
the Lynch Committee, established in November 1980 composed of senior 
Ministers to seek ways of eliminating waste, effecting economies and 
reducing staff in the civil service. All those enquiries were restricted 
in scope.
Demand for a comprehensive enquiry into the public service 
grew until in 1974 a Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration was appointed by the new Whitlam Labor Party 
Government. This enquiry was to be the first comprehensive 
examination of the federal public service since the McLachlan 
enquiry more than fifty years ago and was initiated against a 
background of government dissatisfaction with the performance of public 
service departments in discharging the tasks allocated by the responsible 
Ministers. It was believed, especially by government backbenchers, that
27.
senior public servants were purposely impeding the processes of reform 
set in motion by the Government.
Five persons were appointed to the Commission with the distinguished 
economist and former Governor of the Reserve Bank, Dr. H.C. Coombs, as
Chairman. Nearly all were public servants or former public servants,
23none was a parliamentarian. The Commission was directed to enquire into
and report on the administrative organization and services of the Australian
Government paying particular attention amongst other things to the
purposes, functions, organization and management of Australian
Government Departments and agencies and to the coordination of
administration and policy, and to the structure and management of the
Australian Public Service. The Commission was directed to make recommendations
for improving efficiency, economy,adaptability and industrial relations and
24the despatch of public business. To accomplish its work the Coombs'
Commission set up Task Forces to examine specific areas of administration;
each Task Force worked through a Commissioner to the Commission. In all
there were eight special working groups formed; the Task Forces on Science,
on Efficiency, on Health and Welfare, on Regionalisation and on Economic
Policy, the Advisory Committees on Trade Unions and on Business, plus
the Working Group on Aboriginalisation. The Commission sought public
discussion of all matters being enquired into, by arranging meetings
and seminars; submissions were canvassed from interested persons and
25organizations, both within and outside the public service. In July 
1976 the Report of the Coombs' Commission was presented to the 
Governor-General.
The Report concentrated on the inadquacies of the bureaucracy, 
and outlined principles for reform. Aspects of special concern were
28 .
t h e  r e s p o n s i v e n e s s  or  o t h e r w i s e ,  o f  s e n i o r  o f f i c i a l s  t o  t h e  demands o f  t h e i r
p o l i t i c a l  m a s t e r s ,  t h e  i n e f f i c i e n c y  o f  p u b l i c  b u r e a u c r a c i e s ,  t h e  l a c k  o f
r e s p o n s i v e n e s s  o f  o f f i c i a l s  t o  community n e e d s ,  and p rob lem s  a r i s i n g  from
26t h e  employment  p r a c t i c e s  o f  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e .  I n s o f a r  a s  t h e
a c h ie v e m e n t  o f  e f f i c i e n c y  i s  c o n c e r n e d ,  t h e  R e po r t  a rg u e d  t h a t  t h i s
would r e q u i r e  p r o p e r  fo rw ard  p l a n n i n g ,  w i t h  a known and s u f f i c i e n t  s t a f f i n g
and fu n d in g  b a s i s  and a c l e a r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  Government  g o a l s  i n  each
p a r t i c u l a r  a r e a .  Forward p l a n n i n g  c o u ld  n o t  r e s t  on t h e  p r e s e n t  sys tem
o f  a n n u a l  b u d g e t s ,  b u t  r e q u i r e d  a sys tem  o f  fo rw a r d  e s t i m a t e s ,  c o v e r i n g  
27
3 y e a r s .
The Commission p ropose d  t h e  g r e a t e r  d e l e g a t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t y  t o
d e p a r t m e n t s  wh ich ,  t a k e n  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e  i n d e p e n d e n t
a c t i o n  imposed by a d o p t i o n  o f  a sy s tem  o f  fo rw a r d  e s t i m a t e s  was e x p e c t e d
t o  improve a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  and e f f i c i e n c y  w i t h o u t  weakening t h e  r o l e  o f  
28
M i n i s t e r s .  L e g i s l a t i v e  c h a n g e s  t o  t h e  P u b l i c  S e r v i c e  Act were e n v i s a g e d ,  
t o  p e r m i t  t h e  d e v o l u t i o n  o f  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o  Permanent  Heads.  D e p a r tm e n t a l  
b o a r d s  were t o  be e s t i m a t e d  t o  s h a r e  t h e  t a s k  o f  d e c i s i o n  making ,  
r e s p o n s i b l e  M i n i s t e r s  becoming in v o lv e d  i n  t h e  b o a r d s '  d e l i b e r a t i o n s .
Other  r ecom m enda t ions  p r o p o se d  t h a t  a l l  p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n s ,  n o t  o n l y
Government M i n i s t e r s ,  be g i v e n  a c c e s s  t o  p u b l i c  s e r v a n t s ,  a l t h o u g h
m e a s u r e s  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  p u b l i c  s e r v a n t  f rom be in g  d i s a d v a n t a g e d  by t h i s
29
recommendat ion  were a l s o  i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  R e p o r t .  Care was a d v i s e d  in  
e n s u r i n g  t h a t  d e v o l u t i o n  o f  a u t h o r i t y  d i d  n o t  l e a d  t o  i t  becoming o v e r ­
c e n t r a l i z e d ,  a s  t h i s  would d i s a d v a n t a g e  t h e  p o o r e r ,  l e s s  o r g a n i z e d
30
community g r o u p s  who had no r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  lobby a t  t h e  c e n t e r .
The R e p o r t  d i d  n o t  p r o p o s e  any r e s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  b u t  
s u g g e s t e d  t h e  c i v i l  s e r v i c e  m igh t  m o n i to r  i t s  own p e r f o r m a n c e  and c o n d u c t
29.
internal reforms as necessary. The services' lack of tolerance towards 
risk-taking and subsequent mistakes was noted, and a step towards
O  1modification of this attitude was proposed.
Discrimination in the public service was a theme the Coombs' Commission
examined. They found evidence of effective discrimination in career
opportunities against women, Aborigines, migrants from non-Anglo Saxon
Countries, and physically handicapped persons. It was seen as the
Government's role, through the public service, to take the lead in countering
32this discrimination. R.S. Parker views the broad nature of the terms 
of reference as ensuring that many of the Commission's recommendations 
will be general and well-known 'solutions' to the problems studied. He 
also notes the self-centered response of the Government, some senior
33public servants, and a major public service union to the recommendations.
He states 'the interests which would benefit from thoroughgoing continuation 
of the Commission's work are for the most part diffuse and politically 
weak; those which might be threatened or have nothing directly to gain 
are specific and strong
This seems to sum up the results of the Commission's labours: 
since the establishment of the Committee a change of Government, 
and the attitudes of officials and unions have neutralized much of 
the potential for reform contained in the Report.
THE UNITED KINGDOM
In the U.K. during the late 1950s and early sixties, expressions of 
dissatisfaction were levelled at the Civil Service by a body of concerned, 
informed opinion. Professor Chapman, in his book British Government
Observed (1963), put the view that the higher levels of the Civil Service
30.
35were out of touch with community thinking. 'The Administrators', a
pamphlet based on the work of a group of Fabians, argued that reform
of the Administrative Class was a prerequisite to the implementation of
36policies aimed at modernizing to nation. The Labour Party, in its
Manifesto for the 1964 elections declared their intention to overhaul
37the 'philosophy of the past' which governed public administration.
The Estimates Committee, in 1965, suggested an enquiry into the
structure, recruitment and management of the Civil Service. It
proposed that this enquiry be constructed along the lines of the Plowden
Committee, with membership from both within and outside the Civil Service,
38and that the Committee should report the findings of its examination. 
Subsequently the Wilson Government set up the Fulton Committee in 
February 1966 and their report in June 1968 recommended major changes 
in the structure of the Civil Service.
The Fulton Committee comprised Lord Fulton, one time Principal 
Assistant Secretary at the Ministry of Fuel and Power, two industrialists, 
two permanent heads of government departments, two academics, two MP's, 
one trade unionist, a senior scientific advisor to the Ministry of 
Defence and the Economic Advisor to the Treasury. The Fulton Committee 
examined 600 Civil Servants, conducted a survey of staff and commissioned 
research from both inside and outside the Service.
The Fulton Report cited six main failings in the Civil Service; in 
summary:
1. The Administrative Class was too 'generalist'.
2. The system of 'classes' impeded the Service.
3. Specialists were discriminated against.
4. There were insufficient skilled managers.
5. Contact between Service and Community was inadequate.
6. Personnel management and career planning were inadequate.
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The Report recommended the establishment of a new Civil Service
Department under the Prime Minister's control, the revamping of the grading
structure, and the setting up of a Civil Service College to provide
40administrative and management training, amongst other things. Immediately 
after publication of the Report, the Government announced its decision 
to establish a Civil Service College. Later it was expanded to 3 centers —  
London, Sunningdale and Edinburgh. By 1971, a scheme providing unified 
grading for the Administrative, Executive, and Clerical Classes was put 
into effect. This should facilitate promotion through the ranks for those 
deserving of it. New entry arrangements have been introduced. The 
creation of the new Civil Service Department should have the most far- 
reaching effect on the Service as it is expected to function as a 
continual monitor inside the Service, obviating the need for ad hoc 
enquiries such as those by Royal Commissions.
This new Department absorbed and expanded on the functions of the 
Pay and Management Group of the Treasury. Its permanent Secretary,
Sir William Armstrong, was Head of the Civil Service, in line with the 
Fulton recommendations. Ultimate responsibility for the Department 
rests with the Prime Minister, however the day-to-day running is the 
concern of another Minister.^1
Among the recommendations of the Report was the proposal that studies 
be conducted into the benefits of establishing public corporations to 
provide some of the services then handled by the Civil Service. At the 
time of publication of the Report, the Government was already in the process 
of 'hiving off' the Post Office, which became a public corporation in 
1969 under the terms of the Post Office Act. A public corporation formed 
as a result of the Fulton Report was the Manpower Services Commission,
32
established in 1973 under the Employment and Training Act to take over 
the employment and industrial training functions of the Department 
of Employment and Productivity. The aim was to bring together and 
revitalize the functional agencies.^
CANADA
Since 1945, Federal and Provincial Governments in Canada have employed 
a number of Royal Commissions and Task Forces to conduct enquires into 
aspects of public administration. The choice of this method of administrative 
reform reflects the dual influence of Britain and the United States of 
America on that country. Whilst many of the enquiries were limited to 
narrow fields of study, at least one was given a wider-ranging charter.
This was the Royal Commission on Government Organization, established by 
Order in Council of the Governor-General on 16 September 1960, pursuant 
to the provisions of Part I of the Inquiries Act, chapter 154 of the 
Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952.
Popularly known as the Glassco Commission, after its Chairman, J. Grant 
Glassco, its task was 'to enquire into and report upon the organization
4 3and methods of the departments and agencies of the Government of Canada'
and to make recommendations on such changes in the organization and
methods of administration of the government as will 'promote efficiency,
44economy, and improve service in the despatch of public business'. The 
chairman was assisted by two Commissioners F. Eugene Therrien and Watson 
Sellar. Their investigation in eighteen fields are as follows: manpower
in the government service, financial control and accounting, paperwork and 
office systems, real property management, procurement and material 
management, transportation, communication, economic analysis and statistics,
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legal services and procedures, scientific research, service to the public, 
medical and hospital services, education services, public information 
services, lending and insurance activities, administration of the department
of national defence, enterprises in competition with private buisness,
45and federal-provincial joint acitivities.
The Commission's Report was presented to the Government on 18 July 1962, 
less than two years after commencement of the enquiry. Kernaghan credits
the Glassco Commission with the 'revolutionary changes in the internal
46management of the federal public service' which occurred in the decade
following presentation of their Report. In particular, Kernaghan cites the
areas of organization, personnel and finance as notably affected by change
in this period. Amongst an array of recommendations was one drawing attention
to the unequal representation of the French speaking population of Canada
47in its public service. In 1966, the Pearson Government announced a new
policy on bilingualism which it was hoped would rectify the public service
bias which favoured English-speaking Canadians. The Glassco Commission,
reporting on the executive structure of government, acknowledged the
ascendency of political factors over administrative interests in
determining the organization of that structure. It also made the point
that 'the organization of government, no less than the policies it pursues
must reflect the order of importance, in the minds of the public, of the
48problems requiring attention'. Another reform in the Personnel 
area are the removal of the right of appeal against the transfer of 
another officer to a position of equal salary, the acceptance of the 
concept that a civil service career need not be confined to employment 
in a single department, the rationalization of staffing policy and the
introduction of manpower planning and development."
34.
The role of the Public Service Commission was dramatically affected 
by the Glassco Commission's Report. Four of its personnel management 
functions were transferred to the Treasury Board Secretariat: those
dealing with job classification, establishment control, and the staff 
association consulting role on pay and conditions. Another two 
personnel management functions were lost, the pay research function 
going to the Public Service Staff Relations Board and the management 
consulting function to the Department of Supply and Services. The 
Public Service Commission also delegated some staffing authority to 
client departments.
The Glassco Report received general acclaim in Canada but it also 
had its detractors. One was T.H. McLeod, who in his paper to the 
Fifteenth Annual Conference of the Institute of Public Administration 
of Canada, in September 1963, criticized the acceptability of a Royal 
Commission as an instrument for change in public administration. He 
put the view that outsiders to the public service, as were the Glassco 
Commission members, could not be expected to fully comprehend the spirit 
and environment of the service and so were unlikely to devise workable 
proposals for improvement of the public administration. McLeod 
noted the dynamic nature of public administration, which led to the 
need for continuing reappraisal of 'solutions' to administrative problems, 
and he saw the one-time approach of a Royal Commission as not only 
unlikely to provide solutions but in fact as injurious due to the 
interruption to any corrective measures which were in process.
...the Royal Commission approach to administrative 
reorganisation creates an irreparable breach in the 
course of a process which to be fully effective must 
be continuous and single. 51
The Commission's Report according to McLeod contained:
...many references to the concept of planning, but 
no discussion of how the planning process are built 
into the administrative structure. 52
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V. Seymour Wilson noted that the Glassco Commission was followed by
the placement of a number of its senior personnel in .strategic areas to
influence the policy process, thus converting the researcher into a
practical and reforming administrator. Seymour sums up the net affect
53of Royal Commission as the achievement of incremental reform.
SUMMARY
This study has considered enquiries in four democracies: U.S.A.,
Australia, U.K. and Canada. The pressure of informed opinion provided 
the stimulus for the establishment of each of the enquiries reviewed.
This body of opinion could be political, professional or public, or a 
combination of these, in nature. Membership of the committees of enquiry 
generally was representative of a wide range of political thought, and 
comprised eminent, learned, experienced persons led by a chairman who ranked 
high in public esteem.
Professionalism stamped each of these enquiries: a planned approach
was adopted using task forces, and the services of research agencies 
where necessary, to conduct studies into specific areas; expert opinion 
was called upon as required, the views of the civil service, of interested 
bodies and of the public in general were sought and considered. The range 
of each enquiry was comprehensive, but its duration was kept as short as 
possible.
In each case the committee published a full report on its findings 
and although recommendations might propose a radical departure from 
then current practice, governments adopted a majority of the committees' 
suggestions, the recent Australian enquiry by Dr. Coombs being an exception
to date in this regard.
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ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AND ADVISORY COMMITTEES IN MILITARY DOMINATED COUNTRIES
This paper now reviews administrative reform under military regimes 
in developing nations. Three countries are selected —  Pakistan, Indonesia 
and Korea. On achieving power the military government in each case was 
confronted with economic chaos and an inadequate administrative apparatus.
In the case of Korea these were the legacies of a recent destructive war 
and a corrupt civil government; for Pakistan and Indonesia, the problems 
represented the usual bequests of retiring colonial powers.
PAKISTAN
Background
On 15 August 1947, as a result of the partition of 'British' India, 
the new nation of Pakistan came into being. The nation consisted of 
two provinces, East and West Pakistan, situated at either side of the former 
British India, and separated by a distance of 1000 miles. Agriculture 
formed the principal economic support for the population of nearly eighty 
million. The small size of the holdings and the primitive farming 
methods, resulted in a meagre return, indicated by the very low 
national per capita income —  less than $ 60 - which placed Pakistan 
amongst the poorest of nations. Society was stratified into an 
educated wealthy minority, a very large sector of subsistence farmers, 
labourers and other poor groups; with the Army, the public service 
and a commercial class occupying the middle ground. In West Pakistan, 
Bengali was the principal tongue. This latter province supplied most of the
food for the nation.
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Religion provided a strong unifying factor —  Islam was the
motivating force behind partition. Other forces centred on the Army and the
public service. Both inherited their structure, procedures, language and,
to an extent, their attitudes from the British colonial regime. Another
colonial legacy was the penchant for government committees of enquiry
into aspects affecting national development, including especially the economy,
agriculture, and public administration. For eleven years after emergence
54in 1947 Pakistan was governed by politicians from elite-based parties.
The 'Great Leader' Mohammed Ali Jinnah, was Governor-General and, effectively, 
chief executive until his death in September 1948. Liaqat Ali Khan took 
up the reins and as Prime Minister, endeavoured to provide continued 
strong leadership. In the eyes of the people he lacked the stature of
Jinnah and the first indications of political intrigue and corruption
55became evident. In October 1951, Liaqat Ali Khan was assassinated.
From this point the political and administrative situation deteriorated.
Riots occurred, the rupture between the two provinces worsened, and 
the Assembly fought with the Governor-General. It was in these 
circumstances that a State of Emergency was declared in October 1954 by 
the Governor-General, permitting the formation of a new Cabinet which 
included as Minister of Defence, the Army Commander, Ayub Khan. Within 
a year this crisis passed and government reverted to the control of 
the Constituent Assembly. However, political maneuvering increased, 
resulting in the collapse of successive Cabinets, and finally in the 
proclamation of martial law on 7 October 1958.
General Mohammed Ayub Khan took the controlling position of Chief 
Martial Law Administrator. His regime set about to 'clean up the 
mess',attacking amongst other things, corruption in the administration. 
Martial Law Regulation No. 62 was published in January 1959 providing
38.
57for severe punishment of public servants found guilty of corrupt practice. 
By the end of June 1959, 1662 officers had been found'guilty.
Although the Martial law period ended on 8 July 1962, the newly 
proclaimed (1962) Constitution legitimized one-man rule by placing 
all political functions —  legislative, executive and judicial —  into 
Ayub's hands. Ayub Khan retained control of authority until displaced 
by General Yahya Khan on 25 March 1969, when martial law was again 
promulgated. This period concluded in 1971 with a return to civilian 
rule following civil war between the provinces and the emergence of East 
Pakistan as the independent state of Bangla Desh.
Ayub Khan initiated other reform measures in the public sector.
There was no reduction in the rate of establishing commissions or
committees of enquiry; if anything, the rate increased during this
period of Martial Law. One of the most important entities from the
viewpoint of the public administration set up under Ayub Khan was the
Administrative Reorganisation Committee chaired by G. Ahmed. Among
the recommendations submitted in its report of 29 January 1961 were
5 8several of considerable significance to administrative concepts.
The Pakistan Administration
The creation of the Pakistan administration was 'a notable
achievement, since there were no records, few other physical assets, and
59very little executive talent transferred from India'. At partition,
95 of 1157 officers in the I.C.S. opted to serve Pakistan. A further 
62 officers mostly British or Army, joined them. ^  This nucleus of 
157 officers represented the total policy makers and managers 
available to the new nation. They formed 'the Civil Service of Pakistan',
the apex of the national bureaucracy.
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The structure of the Pakistani administration was complex. It 
included central services and provincial services. Holding the 
highest status were the 'All-Pakistan' Services, namely the CSP and 
the Police Service. Amongst other Central Services were a number with 
superior ranking and of these the two most important were the Establishment 
Division and the Federal Public Service Commission. The latter conducted 
examinations for entry to the service and was in charge of recruitment 
generally. The Establishment Division appointed officers from the 
lists put together by the Federal Public Service Commission; it held the 
most powerful position in the public service and operated as part of the 
President's Secretariat.
Each province formed its own provincial public service, and all three,
the central and two provincial services set their own scales of remuneration
and conditions.^1 Reference to any source elicits a far from favourable
picture of the bureaucracy. Pakistani administrative procedure followed
along the lines set up by the British. Unfortunately the aims of the
colonial power had been to maintain law and order and collect taxes,
and little else. This was hardly a satisfactory model for a developing
nation. Professor Gorivine saw the need for radical change in mentality 
6 2among officials. The First Five Year Plan, 1955-1960, viewed the
inadequacy of the nation's administrative apparatus as 'the most serious
single impediment to development'. Feldman refers to the inheritance of
a 'deeply-ingrained system of corruption and jobbery' throughout public
6 3life and the public services.
The 'Ahmed Committee'
Commissions and committees of enquiry continued to be established 
by Government. Between 8 October 1958 and July 1962 —  the first period
of martial law —  11 reports by such entities were finalised. One of these 
was of the greatest importance to the public servicethis was the Report 
of the Administrative Reorganisation Committee, prepared under the Chairman 
ship of G. Ahmed.
The Committee was the first established under the new conditions of
martial law. It was set up on 12 December 1958 by Cabinet Division
Resolution No. Cord, (i)-8/101/58. G. Ahmed, then Chairman of the Planning
Board was to chair the Committee; there were six members who all held very
senior positions in Government Service: N.A. Faruqui, cabinet secretary;
H .A . Majid, finance secretary; Hamid Ali; health and social welfare
secretary; M. Ayub, director of the Pakistan Industrial Development
Corporation; James Hardy, establishment secretary; and Mumtaz Hasan,
a member of the Planning Board. Secretary to the Committee was S.S. Haider
64head of the O&M Wing of Establishment Division.
The report of the Committee, presented 29 January 1961 was the most 
comprehensive of all the 28 reform papers prepared between 1947 and 1962. 
Recommendations of the Committee sought to effect fundamental improvements 
in the administration.
Broadly, the proposed reforms required the devolution of decision­
making powers to a wide range of ministerial and departmental officers, 
and the elevation of the authority of technical officers vis a vis their 
previous subordinate role to the generalists. In more detail, the 
recommendations were as follows:
1. The Budget was to be used as a tool for continuous 
planning, and Ministers were to be authorised to control 
spending within their budgetary allocations.
2. Attached Departments were to be given increased autonomy, 
their heads being delegared increased financial and 
administrative powers.
41
3. A pool was to be established of experienced administrators 
drawn from all superior services; this pool would then 
provide senior executive staff to the key ministries of 
Finance, Commerce and Industry, thus reducing the previously 
almost exclusive participation of CSP officers in high-level 
policy forums.
4. A central Transport Ministry was to be formed allowing the 
integration of a wide range of transport activity under one 
umbrella.
5. A 'Section Officers Scheme' was to be introduced, whereby 
middle management would be given decision making powers in 
a range of matters which previously had to find their way 
laboriously to the executives at the top.
6. The continuing need for the reorganization of the administrative 
instrument was recognized and to be met by the establishment
of a standing Organisation Committee responsible for the 
ongoing survey of administrative requirements. Supplementing 
this activity, the O&M Wing was to be strengthened.65
The Ahmed Committee Report apart from proposing sweeping conceptual 
changes was also unique in that it was made publicly available. An 
official press release summarising the Report was given out on 26 January 
1961.66 Subsequently, the full Report was printed and distributed in 
1,000 copies/*7
Results of Ahmed Committee Proposals
The Standing Committee on Organisation was established as recommended,
and implemented the proposals on a continuing basis. At least one observer
Professor Gorvine, was not impressed with the effectiveness of their
application. He viewed the Economic Pool as a useful creation widening
the career prospects and experience of a range of officers from the
superior services, but failing to dilute the privileged status of the
CPS. Professor Gorvine saw the decentralisation of financial controls
as superficial in their effect, much depending on relationships between
individual officers. The Section Officers Scheme was seen to have an
immediate streamlining effect on the decision-making processes, but this
6 8effect was short-lived.
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Professor Gorvine offered some thoughts on the fundamentals of
administrative reform —  to be successful, administrative reform should
grow out of or be associated with economic and political reform, and the
establishment of the Martial Law Regime had a far greater impact on
administration than any of the reports of the numerous reform
c o m m i s s i o n s while pressing for reforms in all the important aspects
of national development, Ayub Khan reserved his greatest support for
those reforms affecting the economy. Economic development in the 1960's
was dramatic, but failed to uplift the living standards of the poor
classes who formed the bulk of the population. In fact, the increased
prosperity of the already-wealthy and the upper-middle classes served
70to further alienate the populace from the establishment.
Thus one of Gorvine's prerequisites for successful administrative 
reform, concommitant economic and social change, was not present.
INDONESIA
Background
Indonesia experienced enormous administrative problems after the 
cession of sovereignty by Holland in 1949. An archipelagic country of 
several thousand islands, with a population at independence of around 
100 million, administration would have been a considerable task for an 
established, trained bureaucracy directed by a capable government. 
Indonesia had neither. The colonial power had no policy or program to 
train the indigenous civil servants in policy of managerial matters, 
perhaps because up until the end the Dutch had no intention of 
relinquishing control of their colony. In October 1940 there were 
around 220 Indonesians occupying senior positions out of a total of
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over 3,000 such positions in the bureaucracy. Under Japanese
occupation 1942-1945, the local civil servants fared only marginally
better, with opportunity to act in higher positions being given some
Javanese in 1944 and 1945. The governments from independence exhibited
mismanagement and corruption. Increasingly ineffective government
resulting from ever-changing coalitions of self-seeking parties and
corrupt administration led to the disillusionment of the population in
democracy and facilitated a gradual takeover of the reins of power,
7 *3starting in 1957, by Sukarno supported by the Army.
The period 1959-1965 is generally regarded as the era of 'Guided 
Democracy' i.e., autocratic rule by the President supported by the 
military and the Communist Party. However., the gradual loss of democratic 
rights which introduced this period began in 1956.
The Commission for the Retooling of the State Apparatus
In apparent recognition of the need to reform and improve the 
administration, Sukarno set up a 'Commission for the Retooling of the State 
Apparatus' in 1958. Its purpose was to develop the concepts of honesty 
and neutrality in public servants, to improve organization and to replace 
incompetent officials. The attempt at reform failed largely because 
Sukarno, wary of the development of a power base which might challenge his 
dominance, replaced this Commission with a succession of other bodies, 
replacing the Chairman each time.7  ^ 'Guided Democracy' proved a bigger 
failure than the previous liberal democracy and ended in 1965 with the 
abortive coup of 30 September. Within two days of this attempted takeover 
by the Communists and their sympathisers, the Army began to reduce Sukarno's 
powers and by 1968 he was replaced as President by General Soeharto.
The nation was effectively under military control from October 1965, and
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did not return to parliamentary control until after the elections in 
July 1971. A serious approach to administrative reform began in 1966.
Guidelines and authority for the reform measures were given by laws, 
especially No. XIV/MPRS/1966 which dealt with the setting up of ad hoc 
commissions of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly to 
investigate Institutions of State, and TAP No. LXI/MPRS/1968 which 
listed the five duties of the Cabinet, the fifth being 'to continue to 
improve and to clear the State Apparatus in its entirety from the 
central administration down to the Regions'.
Problems within the Apparatus, i.e. the Administration, in 1966 were 
cited by President Soeharto in his address to the People's Consultative 
Assembly on 12 March 1973:
- there was excessive political subjugation of the administration 
to the extent that it was no longer objective;
- growth in the bureaucracy was not planned;
- discipline and standards were eroded;
- the process of control was paralysed by the blurring of the 
roles of the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary;
- corruption was rife and open; and
75- the apparatus was extravagant, self-indulgent.
Soeharto also referred to the need for better wages for civil servants, and
76for remuneration based on merit. The inability of governments to pay 
civil servants a decent wage, had led to extensive 'moonlighting' by 
bureaucrats who needed the second income to support a fair living 
standard.
In the address, Soeharto stated that administrative reform must be
based on a strategy for overall improvement of the State Apparatus; it
must be continuously exercised according to plans. Reform of the
structural organization must be complemented by personnel improvement. An
77esprit de corps must be developed and management upgraded.
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The Ampera Cabinet, June 1966 - June 1968
At the fourth session of the People's Congress, June 1966, amongst the 
several important decrees issued was one, Decree No. X/MPRS/1966, which 
concerned administrative reform. It required the Chief Executive to:
...evaluate all existing administration organisations 
in the government for the purpose of finding out: first,
whether there was a real need for such organisation and 
second, whether their creation and continued existence ^
were in accordance with the provision of the constitution...
Initial action pursuant to this decree was taken by de facto Chief 
Executive, General Soeharto who dissolved all the agencies which had been 
improperly established, e.g., were outside the constitution.
The 'Ampera' ('Message of the Peoples' Sufferings') Cabinet was 
formed as a result of another decree of the fourth session and amongst 
its tasks was one concerning its own structure. In an endeavour to 
reform faults of the previous cabinet the Ampera was to be '...simple in 
structure, effective in operation and efficient in the utilization of 
natural resources...'.
To commence reform of the apparatus the Ampera Cabinet established 
a number of commissions:
1. Personnel Reform Commission
2. Administrative Reform Commission
3. Public Enterprises Reorganisation Commission
4. Legal Code Reform Commission
5. Planning Commission
6. Monetary Commission
7. Foreign Capital Investment Commission.
In their studies the reform commissions considered structure, functions, 
workloads, procedures and manpower aspects including staffing numbers, 
position classification and salary scales. The Sukarno legacy of 
administrative chaos was so complete that the task of the commissions 
was one of the defining new establishment rather than endeavouring to 
reform the existing structural and functional mess.
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The objective was to establish simple structures manned by a merit 
oriented career service employing simple systems and effective 
reporting techniques. The new organisations were to feature sound 
financial management and their activities were to be coordinated.
The Development Cabinet
The reform commissions had commenced their immense task when at the 
fifth session of the People's Congress, 21-30 March 1968 Soeharto was installed 
as President by Decree No. XLIV/MPRS/1968. The Ampera Cabinet was dissolved 
and replaced by a 'Development Cabinet' whose task included continuation of 
the administrative reform efforts of the Ampera Cabinet. Soeharto 
established all reform activities. A comprehensive strategy was again 
employed with the entire machinery of government at all levels, examine 
from the view point of effectiveness and efficiency. The new Minister 
called for advice from all available fields of government expertise.
In effecting reform the role of administrative training for the 
civil servants was acknowledged and officers through all career levels 
were selected to attend courses coordinated by the National Institute 
of Administration.
The importance of applying O&M principles throughout the civil 
service agency was also recognised; as was the value of consultation 
services.
In Soeharto' s address to the People Consultative Assembly on 12 March 
1973, the President cited improvement in public administration in the 
following aspects:
a. structural
b. procedures
47.
c. personnel
d. financial
e. the administration of equipment and supplies
f. statistical administration
g. administration of state enterprises
h. the study and promotion of the science of public 
administration. 80
He noted that the hundred ministries existing in 1966 were now reduced
to 23. Referring to item g. above the President stressed that the role
of the administration in regard to national development enterprises was
now the provision of guidance rather than intervention as used to be the 
81case. The improvement in. financial stability he credited to the 
introduction of balanced budgets.
There is evidence that in one important field, corruption, reform 
measures failed completely. O.H. Lee writing in 1979 states that:
...instead of diminishing the corruption in the 
Indonesian societies, it can even be shown that 
nowadays this pestilence has become worse. The 
cases of corruption have become more and more 
scandalous, while the money involved is reaching more 
and more astronomical figures. 82
From the foregoing it is evident that the Indonesian reform measures 
met with a degree of success. This achievement was undoubtedly assisted 
by the existence of four conditions:
1. the administration was so disrupted, so poorly led and 
disorganised that any reform measures must have resulted 
in an improvement;
2. the populace, well aware of bureaucratic ineffectiveness 
and corruption, gave strong support to government reform;
3. the national leadership both supported and directly 
influenced the implementation of reform; and
4. the rapid growth of the economy under Soeharto.
Soeharto in his state of the Republic Address of the eve of 17 August 
1966 pointed out that the success of the stabilisation and rehabilitation 
program of the Cabinet depended to a very great extent upon the
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8 3administrative machinery of the government. In his later (1973) address
referred to above, the President noted that inefficiency still existed in 
administration.^
KOREA
Background
Korea has had a turbulent history throughout the 20th Century. The 
peninsula was invaded by the Japanese in 1895 and governed by that 
country as a colony from 1910 until 1945. It was partitioned into 
North and South Korea following a destructive civil war from 1950-1952.
Since 1952 the Republic of Korea, occupying the southern half of the peninsula, 
has experienced the dictatorial rule of Syngman Rhee, the military coup 
of May 16, 1961 and most recently the assassination of President Park 
Chung Hee.
Throughout this century the country has been more often than not under 
military or autocratic rule. With partition in 1948 the Communist North 
gained most of the industry and pro-American South the agriculture and 
two-thirds of the population; both governments inherited administration 
whose talent and vigour had been destroyed by the long Japanese occupation.
The behaviour of the Korean bureaucracy was rooted in Confucionism
which taught obedience, conservatism, and acceptance of circumstances.
85It resulted in strong centralized uncontested bureaucratic rule.
This doctrine inhibited innovation, administrative review and change of 
any type. Compounding the problems this attitude presented to government 
was the gap left in the ranks of senior administration by the defeat of 
the Japanese. That country's policy had long been to ensure compliance
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with Japanese rule by replacing senior Korean administrators with Japanese 
counterparts, who took 95% of the top positions.
The effects of the civil war which completely devastated the Republic 
of Korea further debilitated the bureaucratic apparatus and during the 
subsequent years, corruption became rife. This was the situation when 
the military took control of the government on May 16, 1961. The coup 
was staged by the Korean Revolutionary Committee which immediately 
implemented martial law, and banned all public meetings and political 
activities. It was led by Maj. General Park Chung Hee, with the avowed 
objectives of cleansing the nation of corruption and developing the 
country economically along modern lines. In common with military regimes 
in other countries, the South Korean Junta expressed an intention to restore 
civilian rule when the country was deemed ready. To achieve the 
revolutionary changes sought to the nation's economy, the military rulers 
intended to rely heavily upon the civil service administration;
8 6consequently, the first object of reform in South Korea was the bureaucracy.
After coming to power the Revolutionary Committee was replaced by the
Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) chaired by Lt. Gen.
Chang with Park Chung Hee as Vice Chairman; on September 2, 1961 Park 
8 7became chairman. The SCNR enacted the 'Law Regarding Extraordinary
Measures for National Reconstruction'.
Personnel Administration Reform
To fashion the bureaucracy into a form suited to implement the 
revolutionary objectives, dramatic changes were made. Promotion was 
to be based on merit and not seniority; bureaucrats were to be motivated 
to introduce change; many bureaucrats were dismissed, some for corrupt
5 0 .
practice; and professional military officers were injected into the
higher administrative positions. A climate was created which it was
hoped would be conducive to rapid change. Complementing this climate a
constitutional amendment of 26 December 1962 gave the government extensive
8 8power to act independent of the National Assembly.
The Economic Development Plan
Within the wide ranging program of administrative reform were two 
measures of considerable importance:
1. the establishment of the Economic Planning Board which 
was to oversight the first Five Years Development Plan 
(1962-1966); and
2. the introduction of a Planning and Programming System 
(PPS) to the bureaucracy and the establishment of the 
supporting administrative structure.
Efforts had been made to formulate a five year economic development 
plan long before the coup took place. Both the research department of 
the Bank of Korea, and the Economic Development Council had studies under 
way when the military came to power.
The SCNR took its first steps towards a five year plan on 22 May 1961,
by setting up a Planning Commission to develop, among other things, a
89national economic plan. A number of young economics professors from 
Seoul University were recruited for this task.
At the same time Park Chung Hee, the vice-chairman of the SCNR and 
prime-mover of the coup, informally asked a Colonel Yu to put together 
a development plan for Korea. To assist in this the Colonel gathered 
together four experts aged in their 30*s to early 40's, who became 
known as the 'informal group of four'. The studies already prepared by 
the Bank of Korea and the Economic Development Council were included in 
the material examined by the informal group of four. Although not
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officially constituted, the group assumed a leading role in the further 
development of a plan, principally because of their ready access to 
Park and the SCNR. The four experts consulted with the members of the 
Economic Council, by now disbanded and merged into the overall planning 
bureau of the Ministry of Construction, with the Planning Commission of 
the SCNR, the Bank of Korea, and also with appropriate key officers of 
the Ministries of Finance, of Agriculture and of Commerce and Industry 
and with business associations. The influence of the SCNR's Planning 
Commission waned from early July due to a series of ministerial changes.
By 18 July Colonel Yu's Group drafted guidelines for the preparation 
of an economic development plan. These were, broadly:
1. Plan for an annual 7.1% growth rate through the five 
years.
2. Basic policies should derive from the Constitution and from 
the national reconstruction and economic policies 
already issued.
3. The plan may be adjus-ted annually but will be followed 
through to the end of the period.
4. Courageous administrative reforms will proceed in concert 
with the plan.
5. The creativity of the civilian sector will be stimulated.
6. A central, superior planning agency will shortly be 
established .90
While the overall planning bureau in the Ministry of Construction 
studied these guidelines, the informal group of four proceeded to develop 
their own Five Year Plan. The SCNR established the central, superior 
agency whose role would be to formulate effective economic policies, 
to provide overall coordination and strong supervision of the economic 
development program. This central agency titled the Economic Planning 
Board, EPB, was headed by a Vice-Prime Minister to ensure its authority
over the relevant ministries.
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It was to this EPB that the group of four directed their Five Year Plan,
late in July 1961. The group requested that the Plan'be considered and
comments provided by 10 August of that year. The impending deadline, the
existence of competing plans and recognition of the national importance of
the task, caused the EPB to propose that a committee be established to
decide the final plan. The SCNR agreed and a Committee of around 20
experts, including the informal group of four and representatives of the
other economic planning teams, reached agreement on a draft plan. By
30 December this plan had been considered by the Cabinet and finally
91endorsed by the SCNR.
The resulting economic growth of the Republic attests to the success 
of the regime in this endeavour; a number of factors contributed:
1. The drive for economic development came from the top, 
from the leaders of the coup.
2. The regime viewed the public administration, in its 
role as implementor, as the vehicle for carrying 
forward its program.
3. Martial law facilitated the immediate implementation 
of any orders from the regime or its administrative 
agencies.
4. The ruthless approach to administrative reform adopted 
by the military government —  a 26% reduction in the 
personnel strength of every government agency was 
ordered in June 1961 and achieved by September of that 
year —  would have rendered those lucky enough to 
retain their positions most compliant to the wishes of 
the regime.
5. The idea of an economic development plan was not new —  
at least two professional groups, the EDC and the Bank 
of Korea research economists, had been busy on a plan 
before the coup.
The Planning and Programming System (PPS)
The Korean military regime recognized the importance of the bureaucracy
to the success of the economic development plans. Introduction of PPS to
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the civil service was an attempt by the government to improve the 
administration's capacity to implement development policies.
The Prime Minister, in an address at the opening ceremonies for 
the PPS training course introduced by the National Defence College, 
observed:
...the current government wants to secure the uniformity 
of government policies and rationalize the planning, 
budgeting and management practices in order to increase 
dramatically the administrative capacity of the 
government...the policies of the SCNR can be accomplished 
only when the strong administrative capacity goes 
together with them.92
On 12 July 1961 the Prime Minister directed the Minister for 
Cabinet Administration to prepare a plan for the introduction to the 
civil service of PPS. PPS, more generally known elsewhere as PPBS 
i.e. Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, had been in vogue 
for some years in American business circles. The system was introduced 
into the U.S. Department of Defence when McNamara was Secretary, and 
acquired sufficient status for President Johnson in 1965 to direct 
that all Federal agencies adopt PPBS. The Korean military leaders were 
impressed by their observation of the system as used by the U.S. 
military forces, and believed it was to their country's advantage also 
to employ PPBS.
PPBS was based on the idea that planning, programming and budgeting 
were interrelated aspects of a single process; i.e. the efficient 
administrator planned a program of activities within his budgeted 
funds, each activity being set at a level and on a timescale suited to 
the overall program and budget. Sharkansky states 'PPB represents an 
effort at budgetary reform whose practitioners hope to substitute national 
and comprehensive decision making for the routines of incrementalism'.
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The direction to introduce PPS into the Korean Civil Service was
formalized as Prime Minister's Directive No. 1, issued at the end of
July. Concurrently the National Defence College was required to prepare
a suitable training course, and the first course commenced at the end
of July 1961. The Prime Minister himself delivered a lecture as part of this
training program. Meanwhile the Bureau of Administrative Management
within the Ministry of Cabinet Administration had prepared a plan for
the introduction of PPS throughout the civil service, together with a
draft revision of the government organization law, made necessary by the
changes associated with PPS, and on 5 August presented both to the Prime
94Minister, who agreed with them. Training of civil servants in PPB 
continued at the National Defence College, all above the level of section 
chief being required to attend the course. The Prime Minister noted 
that PPS had been introduced to the Army in response to wartime needs; 
he argued that an even greater need for the planning discipline existed 
in the area of civil administration. On 11 August 1961 the Cabinet 
approved the draft Bill, which was promulgated on the 25th of that month. 
Thus less than forty days elapsed from the direction to prepare a study 
and the promulgation of appropriate legislation. Fewer than 10 officers 
were involved in the preparation, and related areas such as administrative
research in the Ministry of Cabinet Administration were unaware of the 
95PPS study. Later in 1961, in line with the organizational changes
a Brigadier-General was appointed as Planning and Control Officer directly 
assigned to the Prime Minister, with rank between vice-minister and 
minister. He was supported by a staff of 32 men. In each ministry a 
planning and coordination officer was appointed together with a staff 
of from 10 to 20 in each case. These planning and coordinating officers 
were to serve as staff to the vice-minister or minister of their ministry,
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but were to be under the functional control of the Planning and Control 
Officer. With this organizational set-up, and with planning and 
coordinating staff trained at the National Defence College course, PPS 
was introduced into the Republic's civil service in time for the first 
Five Year Development Plan.
PPS did not achieve the success mooted. Within ministries the planning 
and programming sections have no control over the performance of line 
branches. Budgetary control has been denied the Planning and Control 
Office. Work standards are developed without input from the planning and 
programming system.
Reasons for the comparative failure of the introduction of PPS to 
the administration must include the fact that it was seen by the 
bureaucrats as an internal reform aimed at improving their efficiency i.e., 
implying a current lack of efficiency. It was pushed through in haste, 
and did not have the national appeal of reforms such as the economic 
development plan. Very importantly, Park Chung Hee did not lend his 
direct support to the task, choosing instead the Prime Minister to act as 
overseer. The strategy employed was comprehensive in that PPS was to 
be introduced simultaneously throughout the government administration in 
the event this was achieved in a formal sense, but the benefit expected, 
coordinated planning, failed to materialize. It is interesting to note 
that the introduction of PPBS into U.S. administration later was also 
to run into troubles. In 1968, Daniel J. Alesch cited a critical 
shortage of people familiar with the system and the reluctance of those 
in power to adopt a new system, as principal causes of problems.^
Later again in 1977, Allen Schick was to write of PPBS in the context of 
public administration that it died of multiple causes. He went on to 
identify these as: hasty introduction, staff unprepared, insensitivity of
new managers to budgetary traditions, inadequate support, and others.^
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SUMMARY
In each of the above countries, Pakistan, Indonesia and Korea, 
reform of the administration was initiated by military governments which 
had recently taken power. Economic chaos and administrative incompetence 
or corruption prevailed in all three countries so that measures to reform 
both the economy and public administration were taken quickly. The 
approach to administrative reform was comprehensive in each case and 
was pursued with vigour by the military leaders, especially in Korea.
A measure of success was achieved in all three countries; although, the 
attempt to introduce PPS into the Korean administrative system failed 
to meet its goals. It is noteworthy that the administrative bases 
inherited by these military governments were flimsy, and any success 
achieved by reform measures was therefore enhanced by comparison with 
the base.
It is not clear what strategy Sukarno intended to apply in his 
approach to the reform of the Indonesia bureaucracy in 1958. The title 
of the reform agency ‘Committee for Retooling the State Apparatus' could 
have implied the use of comprehensive strategy in that the whole public 
service was to be reformed although overall reform could have been 
approached in an incremental fashion. In the event the Committee was 
disbanded and re-formed with sufficient frequency to preclude the 
implementation of any strategy. The Ampera Cabinet under Soeharto 
initiated comprehensive reform between 1966 and 1968. Seven separate 
reform committees were established each dealing with a different aspect 
of government; under Sukarno the public service had been allowed to run 
down to the extent where it became necessary for the reformers virtually 
to rebuild the administrative apparatus. The commissions continuously
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reviewed their reform measures, which could be expected to result in 
incremental adjustment where beneficial. The Development Cabinet which 
replaced the Ampera Cabinet in June 1968 continued the comprehensive 
reform started by their predecessors.
In the case of Pakistan the reforms proposed in 1961 by the Ahmed 
report were comprehensive in that they sought the complete reorganization 
of 'the basic machinery for economic and social planning and implementa-
4-- . 9 8tion....
The Ahmed Committee proposed to broaden the decision-making base 
to middle range officers, and by elevating the states of technical officers 
to parity with the previously elite generalists. Although the government 
set about implementing the committee's recommendations, the extent of 
the resulting improvement has been questioned.
The administrative reform of the Park Chung Hee regime initiated 
in 1961 in Korea employed a comprehensive strategy. The size of the 
bureaucracy was reduced at one stroke by sacking 26% of personnel from 
each government agency. Similarly the attempt to introduce PPS was 
applied throughout the public service. This ruthless approach to 
administrative reform was accompanied and complemented by rapid, planned 
economic development and was rewarded by a considerable measure of
success.
5 8 .
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CHAPTER III
THAI ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AND 
THE NEED TO REFORM
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter aspects of the current administrative system in 
Thailand such as size, structure, the system of personnel classification 
and problems associated with the bureaucracy are examined. First, a 
brief summary of the major historic political and administrative reforms 
leading up to the present system is provided.
Very little change took place within the Thai administrative 
apparatus between the mid-15th century and the latter half of the 19th 
century. During this period the monarch reigned supreme, and the 
populace rendered due fees and services to the crown through the King's 
appointed servants —  the government officials acting within a feudal 
system. This feudal administrative system sufficed while Thailand was 
able to cope with its neighbours and to retain stability internally.
In the I9th century political conditions in South-East Asia 
changed rapidly as Britain and France each developed territorial 
interests in the region. Rama IV, King Mongkut, realized that the 
continued preservation of national independence depended largely on 
his ability to demonstrate effective and efficient government, so a 
process of modernization of the government administration was begun 
in his reign and broadened and accelerated by his son and successor
Rama V, King Chulalongkorn.
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These administrative reforms, known as the Chakkri Reformation, 
extended over the whole of Chulalongkorn's reign from 1873-1910 and 
reshaped much of the apparatus of government. By 1892, twelve ministries 
had been established, their heads forming a Council of Ministers with 
the role of advisor to the King. Chulalongkorn experimented with the 
number of ministries and their respective roles, and at the other end of 
the scale provided for the administration of townships and villages by the 
elected representatives of the people. He developed the three levels of 
government control: central, provincial and local. Following his death,
reform was restricted to minor changes until in 1958 Field Marshal Sarit 
Thanarat came to power by coup d'etat. Reform of the civil service 
recommenced under Sarit who recognized the need to overhaul the machinery 
of government if his modernization program was to be initiated. Thanom 
who succeeded Sarit in 1963 continued with the reform of the civil service 
until ousted on 14 October 1973. Appointed and democratic governments 
held power for only 3 years, and in October 1976 Admiral Sa-ngad 
Chaloryoo staged a successful coup, initiating another series of 
military regimes.
The current administrative system in Thailand is of centralized 
form and follows Western models. It is staffed by a professional corps 
of permanent officials who make the civil service their career. Four 
years after Sarit took power in 1958, the existing method of rank 
classification was replaced by a modified form of position classification 
in those departments subject to reorganization. It was not until 1975 
that position classification was installed throughout the civil 
service.
Two hundred and ten thousand strong when Sarit took power, the 
administration swelled to 470,000 by 1973 and 800,000 by 1979. The
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Thai administration is beset with a number of problems, including a 
shortage of trained and of qualified personnel. The competence of 
officials can be challenged, and especially damaging to efficiency is 
the unwillingness of officials to accept responsibility and make decisions. 
There are obvious weaknessses in the recruitment, placement and 
promotion systems and in the overall organization of the bureaucracy.
CHAKKRI REFORMATION AND IMPORTANCE
For over 400 years, from the mid-1400's when King Boromatrailokanat 
(hereafter Trailok) reorganized the Siamese bureaucracy, until the latter 
part of the 19th century, the role, structure and style of the bureaucracy 
changed little. Adjustments were made from time to time, but there were no 
significant departures from the main purposes, hierarchical structure and 
mode of operation of the King's administration as they existed in the 
15th century. All this was to change with the Chakkri Reformation toward 
the close of the 1800's.
Around 1450, King Trailok reorganized his administration, primarily 
aiming to improve control over his more distant territories and to ensure 
a more efficient collection of revenue. He believed that the current 
administration could be unstable when there was a transition of kings; 
the vassal states might try to separate if the new king was not strong. 
Therefore he reformed the administration by introducing the Centralization 
System and by separation of the military and civilian role within the 
bureaucracy. Samuhakalahom was the chief of Military Division and 
Samuhanayok was the chief of Civilian Division. Jatusadom headed by 
four ministers of krom (department), still performed the same functions
as in the former regimes but were renamed: krom muang or wiang (capital)
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was renamed nakornban, krom wang (palace) was renamed thammathikorn, 
krom phra klang (treasury) was renamed kosathibbordi and krom na (lands) 
was renamed kasettrathikarn.^  However, in practice each developed its 
own facilities for treasury, judicial and penal matters which arose within 
its purview, so that law enforcement and the control of resources remained 
thoroughly dispersed.
The separation of functions between military and civilian was not
successful. Later in the reign of King Narai the administration was
divided into two parts: northern territory was under Samahanayok both
for civilian and military matters, the southern territory was under
2samahakalahom both for military and civilian matters.
Adding to this dispersal was the existence of local government, 
whereby the governor administered his province through a bureaucracy 
replicating in miniature that of the central government. 'Tax farming' 
was introduced whereby agents, usually Chinese, agreed to provide the 
whole amount of the taxation levy to the King in return for the right to 
collect the taxes at the local level themselves.
Whilst the authority of the King was the basis of the whole Thai 
socio-bureaucratic system, the fact that the King employed spies to report 
on provincial government, that he had cause to exhort his officials to 
eradicate corruption in the bureaucracy, and that checks and balances 
featured prominently in the system of government, all indicate that the 
Kings' absolute power did not necessarily ensure effective government.
The impact of Western knowledge and technology in the 19th century 
had a profound effect on the structure and procedures of Siamese 
bureaucracy. King Mongkut (Rama IV) laid the foundations for 
bureaucratic change on which his son and successor Chulalongkorn (Rama V)
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was to build. Mongkut established a Government Gazette in which edicts 
were published. He realized that survival of the nation as an 
independent kingdom required, among other reforms, evidence of effective 
and efficient government. If he failed to demonstrate this, the 
colonial powers, especially Britain and France, might well use the 
inadequacy of his control as an excuse to further extend their 
overlordship in the area. Already Siam had had to relinquish territories 
in the south and the west to Britain and in the east to France.
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION
In 1873 King Chulalongkorn assumed full power. In 1874 he appointed
3a Council of State to be the advisory council in administration; he 
himself was the chairman of the Council which comprised 12 senior official
4members. His purpose in the establishment of the Council could be 
seen in the announcement of the appointment of the Council of State on 
8 May 1874 '...I think that I alone cannot administer the country to
5progress but if there are many ideas, the country could be developed...' .
On 15 August 1874 he appointed a Privy Council of 49 members to
be his personal advisors and also to perform some state functions such
as investigation, attendance at meetings of the Council of State and so 
6on.
But both the Council of State and the Privy Council did not work
7as successfully as he hoped, so he wanted to reform the bureaucracy 
by selection of aspects of traditional Thai administration and of
gforeign administration (English patterns). As he explained the 
reasons for reform: the administration by jatusadom, samuhanayok and
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samuhakalahom was not suitable for the growing administration:
...some krom (department) had too much work, some 
krom had no work and some krom had much interest 
but some krom had no interest. Because of this 
unbalance in the amount of work and interest, the 
administration had been performed without efficiency...^
The other reasons were overlapping, red tape, lack of responsibility 
and overwork in some places which caused delay.^ He had seen that 
the imperialists would take advantage of the backwardness of 
administration to colonize Thailand; if Thailand did not improve its 
administration, it might lose independence.^
The evidence of his policy of accelerated development of the 
country appeared in his letter in 1895 to Prince Damrong, Minister of 
Interior, asking him to explain the King's policy in administrative 
reform at the first meeting of the tesaphiban commissioners.
...In the past, Thailand was surrounded by the countries 
which had the similar administration and similar amount 
of soldiers. Today we have Britain at our left and 
France at our right. Our country is in the middle of 
the countries which were strictly governed and had more 
power. We can no longer live in isolation as once we 
did. In our protection of the country measures can be 
taken: friendly diplomatic relations, the maintenance
of defensive forces and orderly administration. We will 
administer the country well if we foster opportunities 
for the people to earn a living so that they are 
benefited by the government. Then they will pay the 
taxes which are the economic foundation of the government. 
Consequently, an effective administration and a 
fostering of the ways of providing for the livelihood 
of the people are the most important, the final 
purposes of the Kingdom...12
The major reform in the bureaucracy came in the 1870's under Rama V, 
and has become known as the Chakkri Reformation. Phase 1 ended in 1892 
with a sweeping reorganization of governmental structures. Revenue 
collection was modernized and a start made on the phasing out of the 
'tax farming' system. On 4 June 1873 a Revenues Office (Horasadakornphiphat)
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was established under the Horasadadornphiphat Act (1873 A.D.), staffed
for the first time in the Siamese bureaucracy by officers working fixed
13hours and receiving regular pay. Similar working and payment reforms
were effected in parts of other ministries, and even extended beyond
officials to conscript workers. A modern inducements system was thus
slowly introduced. Telegraph and telephone services were begun, and
departments established and combined as Posts and Telegraphs on 5 August 
141883. By 1897, the Royal Survey Department having been set up 12 years
15earlier, was able to publish a general map of Siam. Chulalongkorn drew 
freely on Western skills in these formative years, importing a number 
of British, European and American experts. He was also assisted by 
the talented Royal Princes, Devawongse, Damrong and Raphi. The former 
reported on British ministry and cabinet structure following a visit 
overseas in 1887. This report formed the basis of the King's plans for 
bureaucratic reorganization. Prince Damrong who had studied educational 
systems abroad, was selected by Chulalongkorn to head his most important 
Ministry, that of the Interior. Prince Damrong used this position to 
develop a new pattern of provincial government in the country, and 
was so successful that the bureaucracy in general looked to the Ministry 
of Interior as a model when innovative measures were required.
In total, the ministries established under the 'Radical 
Reorganization of 1892', published in RTGG, Vol. 5, 1892, were as 
follows:
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Lands and Agriculture
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Public Works
Ministry of the Capital
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Ministry of the Privy Seal 
Ministry of Education 
Ministry of the Palace 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Ministry of Interior 
Ministry of Military Strategy^
On 1 April 1892 there was a Royal Proclamation to appoint 12 
ministers to administer these 12 ministries and to abolish the Chief 
Minister positions Samuhakalahom and Samuhanayok.^  The 12 ministers 
were constituted as a Council of Ministers, all with equal rank.
Due to overlapping in the services in 1892 the Ministry of
Military Strategy was transferred to become a department in the Ministry
of Defence. In 1894 the Ministry of Defence was made responsible for
military affairs alone and the Ministry of Interior was responsible
for solely civilian matters (except the Kwang of Bangkok under the
18Ministry of Capital) as in the Trailok regime.
On 14 March 1896 the Minister of Lands and Agriculture resigned,
whereupon King Chulalongkorn reorganized this Ministry to be a
Department in the Ministry of Finance. Three years later (1899),
believing that the Ministry of Finance could not cope with the workload
19he established a Ministry of Agriculture.
In 1896 King Chulalongkorn observed the light workload in the
Ministry of Privy Seal so he transferred some functions of this Ministry
to the Secretariat of the King, with the other functions going to the
Council of Ministers, established on 10 January 1894 as his legal 
20advisors. At the end of King Chulalongkorn's reign, there were
10 ministries.
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PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION
In 1892 the King reformed the existing monthon to monthon
tesaphiban. Each monthon was responsible to the Central Administration
and, comprised amphoes (districts), tambons (townships) and mubans
(villages). In tambons and mubans, kamnan and puyaiban elected by the
people were responsible for administration in their areas as directed in
the Act on the Governing of Rural Districts B.E. 2440 (1897 A.D.). The
tesaphiban commissioners were appointed by the King from the Central
Administration. Existing 'Inner Lands' —  towns around the Capital —
21administration was abolished to complete the policy of centralization.
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION
King Chulalongkorn established the first local administration called
sukhaphiban (sanitary administration) on 1 April 1906 at Thachalom township
22to serve as a stepping stone towards self-government by the people.
Sukhaphiban Thachalom was successful; the Sukhaphiban Act was promulgated
23in 1908. During 1909-1913 eight further sukhaphiban were established.
In the fifty or so years between the Chakkri reformation and the 
military regimes starting with Sarit, little change occurred in the Thai 
civil service. The administration had to adapt itself to the reforms 
initiated under King Chulalongkorn and this took time. By 1958 when 
Sarit took power, the influences of western education and technology 
increasingly affected the outlook of Thai technocrats, many of whom 
had been educated abroad. The establishment of five year economic 
development plans about this time in other Asian countries, such as 
Indonesia and Korea, reinforced the desire of leading Thais to develop
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their country along modern lines, which in turn caused them to view 
government administration more critically. An overhaul of the 
bureaucracy served another purpose in that it gained Sarit support 
from the civilian bureaucrats.
MILITARY REGIMES: SARIT TO SA-NGAD
Although this study deals with the administrative reform of 
military regimes from Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat's coup in 1958 to 
Admiral Sa-ngad Chaloryoo RTN's coup in 1977, it is useful to begin by 
looking at the situation immediately prior to this period.
Sarit stepped into power during Field Marshal Phibulsongkhram's 
regime. Phibun had carried out a coup on 29 November 1951 against his 
own government which, because no force was used, became known as the 
’silent coup’. One result of the coup was that the Constitution of 1949 
providing for a Senate of men of ability was annulled and the original 
Constitution of December 10, 1932, which required a one-chamber Assembly
24of an equal number of nominated and elected deputies, was re-introduced. 
Phibun became Premier on 6 December 1951, with General Sarit and the 
Police-General Phao Siyanond wielding much influence and power.
Following the general election of 26 February 1952, Phibun was 
reappointed Premier on 24 March 1952. He retained his leadership by 
acting as a balance between Phao, the Director-General of the Police 
Department and Deputy Minister of Interior, and Sarit, the Commander 
of the Army and Minister of Defence. During the period of Phao's control, 
the role and size of the police was expanded, and a popular saying arose, 
that 'there was nothing under the sun that the police could not do'. 
Consequently, when Phibun decided to form a political party, the Seri
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Manangkhasila Party, and to run in an election which would take place
on 26 February 1957, he moved closer to Phao, who was appointed the
Secretary-General of the Party and was responsible for administering
the election. The election resulted in a narrow overall victory for
Phibun's party, with Kuang's Democratic Party obtaining the next largest
25number of seats, and the rest divided among the splinter parties.
Phibun and Kuan Apaiwong headed the Bangkok pool taking first and 
second places respectively. But discontent with frauds in the Bangkok 
election led to mass demonstrations and marches of protest. The 
Government announced a state of emergency and appointed Sarit 'City 
Peace Keeper'. Sarit emerged as a popular leader when he did not resort 
to force in coping with the demonstrations. At the end, Phibun admitted 
that there has been some irregularities and indicated he would take 
action after the appointment of a government. If there was sufficient 
evidence of irregularties, he would order a new election. The people were 
not pleased with Phibun's promise, but Sarit assured them that he,
Sarit, would do as the majority of the people wanted. Thus Sarit 
seemed to get most benefit from the demonstrations. The government was 
formed on 21 March 1957, and the promise was forgotten. In Phibun's 
new government, with Sarit as Minister of Defence and Phao as Minister 
of Interior, Sarit also was the Commander of the Army, and was supported 
by the nominated members in the Senate (military men) and also by the 
elected members of the Unionist Party.
The conflicts of interest between Sarit and Phao were so great that 
the principals resorted to extreme measures to destroy each other.
Finally, on 29 August 1957 the Unionist Party of Sarit made a deal 
with the Democratic Party to join forces in a vote of no confidence in 
Phibun's government. The major issue was an alleged insult to the King
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perpetrated by Phao and the Government. The Government was unable to
26defend this charge. The debate on this vote of the House of
Representatives was broadcast, resulting in public anger at the
Government. On 15 September 1957 there was a special 'Hyde Park' at
the Pramane Ground, at which the speakers condemned Phao and the Seri
Managkasila Party for insulting the King, and demanded punishment for
27Phao and the resignation of Phibun's Government. When the mass of
people marched from the Pramane Ground to Sarit's residence and demanded
that he take action if Phibun's Government did not resign, Sarit was
28encouraged to stage a coup.
On 14 September 1957 Sarit's military men held a meeting which he 
chaired, leading to two important demands, signed by 58 military men, 
for Phibun to consider, viz: 1. Phibun's Government must resign without
condition; and, 2. Phao must resign as Director-General of the Police 
Department.
After Phibun had received the demands, he called the Council of 
Ministers to an informal meeting where it was decided that Phibun's 
Government would not resign, but that there would be a cabinet reshuffle 
with Phao's resignation from the position of Director-General of the
Police Department; the Council of Ministers requested Sarit and his
29men to talk with them.
On 16 September 1957 Sarit, with high ranking military men, met 
Phibun at Government House. Sarit's insistence on the resignation of 
the Government as a prerequisite to succession, ruled out any hope Phibun 
entertained of compromise. Phibun closed the meeting to see the King
without prior appointment; it was said later that he planned to advise the
30King to dismiss Sarit.
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While Phibun was meeting with Sarit the Seri Manangkasila Party 
held a top secret meeting, chaired by Phao. Some members argued that the 
Government not accept any proposal from Sarit, and that, as Sarit's 
threat was rebellion, Phao should seize him for dismissal and punishment.
There was also a rumor that the police force was on the alert to
seize Sarit, and if unsuccessful, would stage a coup before midnight of
3116 September 1957. On the evening of 16 September 1957, the military
men held a meeting chaired by Sarit at which it was decided, in view of
32the dangerous situation, to stage a coup before the police did.
Realizing his position was lost, Phibun sought refuge in Cambodia and, 
later, permanently in Japan. Phao was allowed to go into exile to 
Switzerland the next day.
Sarit, who did not have political experience, was concerned that 
overseas aid to Thailand might be withdrawn if he was declared Prime 
Minister. He was particularly concerned for U.S. aid which originated 
during Phibun's period. Sarit, therefore, did not want the office and 
requested Mr. Pote Sarasin, one time Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
then the Secretary-General of SEATO, to be Prime Minister. Mr. Pote 
was appointed Premier of a caretaker government on 21 September 1957 
to keep order and supervise general elections to be held on 21 December 1957.
Before 21 December 1957, Sarit established the Chartsangkhom Party, 
and also backed the Unionist Party (headed by Sukit Nimmahaemin). In 
the general election the Unionist Party was the most successful of the 
parties, although it gained only 44 seats. In order to achieve a 
majority in the Assembly, Sarit amalgamated his Chartsangkhom Party 
with the Unionist Party, and sought and received the support of other 
parties and independent members to a total of 80 out of 180 members of
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the House of Representatives; he was also guaranteed the support of
the nominated members (121), and received a total of 201 votes from
a possible 301 in the National Assembly. With Sarit's support, his
choice, Thanom was appointed Prime Minister on 1 January 1958. Many members
who supported Sarit were displeased with the appointment of Thanom. Some
in the Unionist Party withdrew from the Chartsangkhom Party, took office
33as 'Unionists' and were neutral in Thanom's government. Sarit himself 
became seriously ill and had to go to the U.S.A. for a major internal 
operation. Thanom was in a difficult situation: H.R.H. Prince Chula
Chakrabongse noted:
The Assembly proved unmanageable, every section, 
including the nominated members, pressing for 
what they themselves wanted before giving support 
to the Government. The lack of unity between the Right 
and the Center encouraged the Left to go all out to 
disrupt the country both in Parliament and in the 
Press, as well, it was alleged, as by subversive 
preparation for a Communist uprising.34
On 30 March 1958 when by-elections were held in five provinces the 
Democrats won 13 seats, the Chartsangkhom 9, and Independents 4. Thanom's 
situation got worse. Thanom wanted to resign because of the pressure 
in the House of Representatives, especially from his own Party. He 
recalled Sarit from London, where Sarit was resting after the operation.
SARIT THANARAT (20 October 1958-8 December 1963)
Sarit staged a coup d'etat on 20 October 1958. This 1958
revolution was not an overthrow of Thanom's government, as Thanom had
35already resigned from his post on the evening of 20 October 1958.
Sarit himself was the Premier, and this period was the real beginning 
of the military regimes. There was no National Assembly, but only these
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appointed members who formed a Constituent Assembly, to draft a Constitution
and also to act as a legislative body. The Constituent Assembly chaired
by Army general Luang Suthisanronmakorn, was under the control of Sarit.
It understood that the Constitution had to be carefully drafted so that
it would serve as the basis of government for a long period of time; the
Assembly also understood that in order that Sarit remain in power, the
36document must not be completed in Sarit's lifetime. After a medical 
operation Sarit had been told that he would live only 4 years more, so he 
planned to be in power to his death. He lived longer than the doctor 
expected by about a year.
The Interim Constitution of B.E. 2501 (1958 A.D.) Article 17 gave
the Prime Minister absolute power, and later military governments
followed the practice of including this provision. It was the first
time that the Prime Minister was empowered to punish an accused
without trial, e.g. in June-July 1959 Sarit ordered the execution
without trial of peasant leader Sila Wongsin and political leader 
37Supachai Srisati.
THANOM KITTIKACHORN (9 December 1963-14 October 1973)
Sarit died of cirrhosis of the liver on 8 December 1963. Thanom, 
as a Deputy Prime Minister, succeeded Sarit on 9 December 1963. It was the 
beginning of the period of the Thanom-Praphat dictatorship which received 
support from the U.S.A.. Thanom and Army General Praphat, emerged as the 
leaders of the military power bloc which ruled Thailand. A build-up 
of the U.S. forces in Thailand was followed by an increasingly close 
relationship with the C.I.A.. Praphat used his directorship of the 
Communist Suppression Operation Command (CSOC), established in December
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1965, to coordinate military, police, and civilian counter-insurgency
operations, and his connection with the C.I.A. for the military
38foundation needed to reinforce his position.
In August 1975 CSOC was replaced by the Internal Security Operation 
39Command (ISOC). The operation of ISOC covers a large area of civil 
action, and also is responsible for organizing political programs for 
the masses both in urban and rural areas to counter leftists and 
communists. The Coordinating Committee for the Patriotic and Democratic 
Forces (CCPDF) of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) still believed that
the main enemies of the Thai people were the United States and the Thai
„ , 40Government.
Thanom's government used the threat of Communist insurgency to
justify remaining in power. As Praphat replied to the election question,
'When we have a Constitution and hold the election and this country turns
41red, will you be satisfied?'
After 10 years of drafting, the new Constitution was promulgated 
in 1968, and on 10 February 1969 a general election was held. According 
to the Constitution of B.E. 2511 (1968 A.D.), the Prime Minister and the 
Council of Ministers might not be elected members of the House of 
Representatives. Thanom was supported by his Sahaprachathai Party and 
the nominated Senators (75% of the Senate were military men), and on 7 
March 1969 was appointed Prime Minister.
As members in the Sahaprachathai Party comprised those from 
diverse political parties, they separated into cliques seeking selfish 
ends, and threatened the government's prospects of passing important 
Bills such as the Money Bill. There were conflicts amongst Ministers.
There was demand from members of the Sahaprachathai Party for cabinet 
reshuffling, and they did not want Thanad Corman, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, to be in the Cabinet.
A question on notice concerning a narcotics issue was about to be
brought forward in the Assembly by the opposition Democratic Party.
The police had detected and seized an amount of narcotic drugs in a
ship about to leave Thailand, and the drug trafficker was an important
42per son concerned with the Government. These events encouraged Thanom 
to stage a coup on 17 November 1971, claiming intensification of 
insurgency as justification. Thanom carried out the coup against his 
own Constitution, Cabinet, and the National Assembly. A National 
Executive Council was set up to rule the country while the Interim 
Constitution was being drafted. On 9 March 1972 three former deputies 
filed suit against Thanom and his 16 colleagues alleging conspiracy to 
use violence to abolish his Constitution. Thanom responded with a full 
military alert and arrested all three. On 22 June 1972, Uthai 
Pipenhaichorn received a ten-year prison term and Anan Phakpraphai and 
Bunkert Hirankarn both received seven-year prison terms, without trail.
Thanom was appointed Prime Minister on 18 December 1972 after the 
proclamation of the interim Constitution. He wanted tobe in power all 
his life and persuaded his Council of Ministers to reappoint him after 
his retirement age as Supreme Commander. This assured his control over 
all the armed forces. He tried to pave the way for his son, General 
Narong Kittikachorn, to succeed him.
Thanom did not respond to the public demand for a democratic 
constitution. On October 6, 1973, thirteen young people were arrested 
for distributing pamphlets calling for promulgation of a permanent
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Constitution within six months. Praphat announced that these people
planned rebellion and he insisted that the draft Constitution would be
finished and promulgated within 3 years from the coup: one and a half
44years had already passed. On October 13, 1973, a quarter of a million 
people rallied in Thammasat University to demand the release (without 
condition) of the 13 prisoners. Praphat agreed to their release on the 
condition that public protest must cease. The event culminated in bloodshed 
when the returning demonstrators were fired upon by police, using machine 
guns, tanks, and armored cars. The military seized Thammasat University, 
but Thanom, Praphat and Narong were asked by the King to leave the country. 
The King also appointed Professor Sanya Thammasak, his Privy Counsellor, 
the ex-judge and Rector of Thammasat University, as Prime Minister. The 
appointed Government under Sanya and democratic Government under Kukrit 
and Seni continued until 6 October 1976.
SA-NGAD CHALORYOO (6 October 1976-22 April 1979)
The Seni III Government was overthrown by Admiral Sa-ngad 
Chaloryoo RTN, the Minister of Defence who staged a coup on the evening 
of 6 October 1976. The stage was set for the coup by:
1. conflicts between the progressive and conservative 
factions of the Democrat Party and disunity within 
the ruling group; and
2. the desire for revenge of those who lost power, who 
used the military as their instrument to destroy 
the popular force.45
On 19 September 1976 Novice Thanom returned to Thailand and became 
a monk, causing the 'left wing' students to organize a protest in 
Thammasat University. The 'right wing' group 'Nawapon', founded by 
General Wallop Rojanawisut —  head of Thai military intelligence and
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trained in psychological warfare in the U.S.A., insisted that Thanom had
a right to stay in his own country. Seni announced he could not legally
deport Thanom. On 24 September, three students posting up anti-Thanom
slogans were killed, two of them being strangled by police in Nakorn
Phathom Province. The Thammasat students performed a drama depicting
the hanging of the 2 students. Photos of their play were published in
newspapers, and some people said one actor was made up in the likeness
of Crown Prince Vachiralongkorn. The performers were then accused of
committing lese majeste. The Bangkok Armored Division Radio played a
very active role in mobilizing rightist movements and village scouts
against the students. On 6 October 1976, Border Patrol Police, Marines,
and the regally-sponsored village scouts attacked Thammasat University;
the students were overpowered by the superior forces arrayed against them
many being lynched or burned alive. At least forty were killed, hundreds
wounded, and 1,700 arrested; hundreds fled into the jungle where they
46joined the Communist Party of Thailand. Seni's government could not 
decide whether or not to declare a state of emergency.
1976 OCTOBER COUP
Sa-ngad launched a coup to topple Seni's government, dissolved
the National Assembly, abrogated the Constitution, proscribed all
meetings except those of the village scouts, and imposed heavy censorship
An additional 3,000 students, labor leaders, and intellectuals were
arrested, the National Administrative Reform Council was established
47as previously demanded by Nawapon in early January 1976.
Admiral Sa-ngad Chaloryoo RTN had not planned for a coup, but 
was encouraged by his colleagues to take power. An interview with
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Sa-ngad, stated, in part:
The question of the cause of the revolution should 
not be raised; it was a small reason - the country 
could not otherwise survive...I retired from the 
service and was Minister of Defense. On 6 October 1976 
I went home for lunch, the military men said the boss 
is back, I denied I was the boss; I was retired. But 
they insisted so I had to be the Chief...48
The military, who had initiated the coup, hoped to convince the 
public that they did not seek power but wished only to rescue the country. 
So Thanin Kraivixien, a right-wing Supreme Court Justice,was appointed 
Prime Minister on 8 October 1976. The Administrative Reform Council, 
i.e. those who conducted the coup, became known as the Advisory Council 
of the Prime Minister, chaired by Sa-ngad, by Article 18 of the interim 
Constitution of B.E. 2519 (1976 A.D.). The National Administrative 
Reform Council announced a '12-year-plan' to prepare Thailand for 
democracy and civilian rule. David Elliott noted:
The 1976 coup marked an important watershed in 
the development of class struggles and military 
rule in Thailand. Whereas all former seizures of 
power by the military were in some way progressive 
(although certainly not inevitable) this one was 
not .49
The 1976 coup represents a reaction by the military and other elite 
to developments in the 1960's and 1970's which had awakened the bulk of 
the population to the possibilities of improving their lifestyle by 
political action. By means of the coup, the 'establishment' class 
endeavoured to return the nation to the political status of the 
fifties, when no one questioned the order of things.
Former Foreign Minister of the Sarit and Thanom dictatorships, 
Thanat Khoman was named civilian advisor in foreign affairs, and he 
immediately suggested the U.S. Army might be asked to return to resume
some military rights in Thailand.
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1977 OCTOBER COUP
The justification put forward by revolutionary parties for coups 
before 1977 usually cited Communist insurgency or problems in 
administration, but the cause of the 1977 coup was different. The 
military who were the Advisory Council of the Prime Minister, and 
members of the former Administrative Reform Council staged a coup on 
20 October 1977. As the chairman of the Revolutionary Party, Admiral 
Sa-ngad Chaloryoo RTN giving reasons for the coup, announced:
...the time span of democracy development plan as 
envisaged by the previous government, which comprised 
3 steps, each taking 4 years. This was too long and 
did not respond to the desire of the people, military, 
police, and civilians. It was therefore necessary to 
improve the plan by reducing the duration of democratic 
development...50
General Kriengsak, the Supreme Commander, was appointed Prime 
Minister on 11 November 1979. The Revolutionary Party was replaced by 
the National Policy Council responsible for setting state policies, 
and advising the Council of Ministers. The Council announced 12 
policies to the National Legislative Assembly on 1 December 1977, 
and that there would be a general election within 1978.
From 1932-1979, Thailand had seven military governments and eight 
civilian government. The seven military governments
were in office altogether for nearly 41 years, while all the civilian
51governments were in office for 8 years.
CURRENT ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM
The form, organization and management of the Thai administrative 
system follows Western models. Some of the modernization traces back to
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the Chakkri Reformation during the reign of King Chulalongkorn. Other
reforms were introduced recently such as the central accounting system
52installed by foreign consultants in the latter 1950s. The formal 
structure of the executive establishment is similar to the Western 
prototype with officials having duties and responsibilities hierarchically 
in a ministry structure. From information in Appendix B, the major units 
of the present organization are 14 ministries including the Office 
of the Prime Minister and the Office of the State Universities. The 
other 12 ministries are: Agriculture and Cooperatives, Communication,
Commerce, Defence, Education, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Interior,
Justice, Industry, Public Health, and Science, Technology and Energy.
From Table 3.1, there were around 800,000 civil servants, plus 200,000 
permanent employees and 300,000 temporary employees in these ministries 
in 1979. In these 14 ministries, except Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and Justice, the Ministers are responsible for the management of 74 
state enterprises. The recent statistics from CSC show the growing 
staff in state enterprises of around 198,000 in 1977, 207,000 in 1978 
and 220,000 in 1979.
It is a centralized system of government in which the bureaucracy 
takes responsibility. Throughout the changes in form of government and 
in political leadership, the public organizations have been sustained 
by a professionalized corps of permanent officials. Because of the 
socio-economic structure of the nation, the political parties and interest 
groups are feeble; consequently, in times of 'democratic' government, 
political control exercised over the administration is weak. However, 
except at the very top level, the bureaucrats possess little discretionary 
power; they perform their tasks under close hierarchical executive 
direction. In many ministries bureaucrats are the major source of
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expertise providing guidance for program development and policy
54determination within the given political guidelines. As the career
advancement of officials often is subject to capricious political and
personal influences, many civil posts at higher levels are allocated as
55a reward for partisan loyalty and service.
When Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat took power on 20 October 1958, 
the civil service had been administered under the Administration of 
the Kingdom Act B.E. 2495 (1952 A.D.), which provided for administration 
at three levels —  Central, Provincial and Local. Central Administration 
comprised thirteen ministries: the Office of the Prime Minister,
Agriculture, Communications, Cooperatives, Economic Affairs, Defence, 
Education, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Industry, Interior, Justice and 
Public Health. Each Ministry was divided into departments, a department 
into divisions and a division into sections. The Under-Secretary was 
the permanent head of a ministry; it was his duty to coordinate the 
activities of the different departments. A Director-General (assisted 
by Deputy Directors-General) was responsible for functions allocated to 
a department, and Directors or Chiefs of Sections were responsible for 
the tasks in their divisions and sections respectively.
Provincial Administration was organized into changwads and amphoes. 
The governor of each of the 72 provinces (changwads) was responsible 
for the administration of the province and its administrative sub-divisions 
(amphoes). In performing these duties the Changwad Governor, a special 
grade civil servant appointed by proclamation of the King, was supported 
by an advisory Changwad Committee, of which he acted ex-officio as 
chairman. Other members of this Committee included the Changwad Deputy 
and Chief Officials who were representatives from the various ministries.
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Local Administration, responsible for serving the needs of the 
urban and semi-urban communities was organized under' five categories
(i) Changwad Administrative Organization
(ii) Municipalities
(iii) Sanitary Districts
(iv) Bangkok Metropolitan
(v) Pattaya City
The Civil Service Act B.E. 2497 (1954), established a Civil 
Service Commission (CSC) consisting of the Prime Minister as Chairman, 
the Deputy Prime Minister as Vice-Chairman, and not less than five or 
more than seven other commissioners experienced in the principles of 
public service. This Commission was vested with responsibility to 
formulate policies on personnel management, determine the classes and 
grades for all posts, except posts filled by special class civil servants 
as determined by the Council of Ministers, and to enact rules, regulations 
and standards to maintain merit and conformity in the civil service in 
regard to 'ordinary1 (those drawing salaries from the ordinary civil 
list) civil servants. Other categories of civil servants had separate 
personnel systems and were administered by central personnel bodies other 
than the CSC. For example, teaching officials came under the Teachers' 
Council, university officials under the University Officials Commission, 
and public prosecutors under the Committee of Public Prosecutors; the 
administrative personnel of the Public Prosecution Department, however, 
came under the CSC. Municipal and provincial organization had personnel 
systems, rules and regulations very similar to those of the civil service, 
but were administered by their own laws and regulations.
The CSC was authorized to appoint a special civil service sub­
commission to carry out, on its behalf, any delegated functions. There
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were six sub-commissions: Sub-Commission on Positions To Be Filled By
Appointment from Special-Grade Officials; on Positions and Pays; on 
Civil Service Rules and Regulations; on Curricula, Examinations and 
Records; on Discipline and Appeals; and on Students Abroad. The Civil 
Service Act also designated regular sub-commissions as ministeral and 
provincial levels to perform certain functions and assist the Civil Service 
Commission as specified in law.
Under the Civil Service Act B.E. 2497 (1954 A.D.), the service was 
structured according to rank classification: officials belonging to
either fourth, third, second, first or special classes. The rank of a 
civil servant, as reflected in his class, was attached to him personally 
and was not affected by change of position. The other categories of civil 
employees such as public prosecuting employees, judicial officials, 
extraordinary civil servants and political officials were appointed to 
certain positions and were of no fixed class. The classes of the municipal 
and provincial officialsv however, corresponded to those of the civil 
servants.
Recruitment into the civil service was effected mainly by competitive 
examination but promotion of civil servants from one class to another 
class was usually achieved by selective examination. However, fourth 
class civil servants who had served for not less than fifteen years and 
who met certain requirements might be promoted to third class without 
examination by the Departmental Civil Service Sub-Commission.
Position classification in a modified form was initiated in the Thai 
civil service in 1963. The actual implementation of position classification 
took place in the Office of the Civil Service Commission, as the first 
department, on 28 April 1971, with the purpose that the new system would
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improve the effectiveness of personnel management of the civil service 
focusing on duties and responsibilities of positions as the keystone for 
personnel management. The full installation of position classification 
in the civil service after promulgation of the Civil Service Act B.E. 2518 
(1975 A.D.) occurred around three months later on 9 September 1975.
Article 32 of this Act directed that there should be 11 classes in the 
civil service system, with Permanent Heads occupying Class 11 positions.
It also directed that the CSC is responsible to allocate the numbers, 
classes, and level of all positions in the civil service. Recruitment 
is still based on competitive or selective examination or by selection.
At present, the Civil Service Commission comprises the Prime
Minister (or Deputy Prime Minister who is delegated by the Prime Minister),
as Chairman and not less than 12 but not more than 15 other commissioners
(7 of whom must be civil servants) experienced in the principles of
public service and holding or having held positions not lower than
Director-General of a department or its equivalent, who are not political
officials, Members of the National Assembly, Political Party Committee
or officers in a political party. The Secretary-General of the Office of
57the Civil Service Commission is an ex-officio member. Under the terms 
of the Civil Service Act B.E. 2518 (1975 A.D.), membership is for two 
years after which time members may be re-appointed.
The present Civil Service Act also designates regular sub-commissions 
at ministerial, departmental and provincial levels to perform certain 
functions and to assist the Civil Service Commission as specified by 
Law by acting as advisors to the chairman, Ministers, Director-Generals
and Changwad Governors.
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The CSC is authorized to appoint special civil service sub-commissions 
to carry out on its behalf any delegated functions. ' Presently, there are 
seven such sub-commissions as follows:
1. Sub-Commission on Positions and Pays for class 7 
officers and above.
2. Sub-Commission on Position and Pays for class 6 and 
below.
3. Sub-Commission on Civil Service Law and Regulations.
4. Sub-Commission on Appeals and Complaints.
5. Sub-Commission on Discipline and Dismissal.
6. Sub-Commission on Civil Service System.
7. Sub-Commission on Recruitment and Development of 
Civil Servants.
Each Sub-Commission is established for a two year term or for the 
duration of the (main) Civil Service Commission, whichever is the lesser.
PROBLEMS IN THAI ADMINISTRATION
Although the basic motive of a bureaucratic system is the rational 
and efficient achievement of goals, it is undeniable that bureaucracy 
carries within it the seeds of its own inefficiency. There are many 
problems which have tended to diminish effectiveness in the Thai public 
service. Even though there have been attempts by many military regimes 
to reform the bureaucracy, some problems of bureaucratic inadequacy 
remain unsolved.
1. Competence and ability of the bureaucrats.
Table 3.1 shows the increasing number of civil servants; Samran 
Thararayuth, a Deputy Secretary-General of the Office of the Civil 
Service Commission, pointed out that the incompetence of the civil servants 
led to the unnecessary increasing of staff; if civil servants were
90.
TABLE 3.1: NUMBER OF CIVIL SERVANTS IN THAILAND, 1973-1979
Year Number of Civil Servants Percentage increase on previous year
Increase in numbers 
on previous year
1973 473,573 - -
1974 490,384 3.5 16,811
1975 527,424 7.6 37,040
1976 575,773 9.2 48,349
1977 644,803 12.0 69,030
1978 673,532 4.5 28,329
1979 798,903 18.6 125,371
Source: The Office of the Civil Service Commission and the Comptroller's
Department.
N.B. 1. In 1979 there were also about 200,000 Permanent Employees, and
about 300,000 Temporary Employees.
2. In 1978 some officials were transferred to State enterprises.
3. In 1979 there were about 220,000 employees in State enterprises.
5 8competent, 1/3 of the existing staff could be cut out. The bureaucracy
suffers from a shortage of trained and qualified personnel; it needs
highly qualified and well-trained bureaucrats to perform difficult jobs
59in the complex public field. Every survey of public administration
before 1960 had shown that one of the chief obstacles to effective
administration was the lack of experienced and competent technicians,
6 0supervisors and managers. It is recognized that the Thai education 
system is not a creative one. The curriculum places stress on academic 
degrees; the examination system urges students to memorize; there is 
a tendency for courses to emphasize theoretical rather than practical 
aspects. All this results in officials needing in-service training to
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perform the skills which are not taught at school or at tertiary colleges.
It is also the proclivity of many Thai officials to'keep their knowledge
and information to themselves and supervisors of this type are unwilling
to train or help subordinates. Training is needed at every level —
executive, managerial and supervisory —  to develop and improve skills,
knowledge and abilities and to change those attitudes inhibiting the
transfer to others of these skills. The National Institute of Development
Administration (NIDA) arranges a seminar for executive development every
year. The venues are usually Chiengmai or Songkla, these recreational
locations being chosen in order to encourage the attendance of a large
number of trainees. For example, Executive Development Seminar programs
for 30 special class officials were held at Chiengmai on 17-18 March
1969, and a seminar for 30 special class officials and employees in
state enterprises who were equivalent to Deputy Director-General or
61Director-General was held on Songkla during 5-16 August 1969.
The in-service personnel program provided to assist new appointees 
to make a career of the civil service did not occur often in Thai 
bureaucracy. The supervisors considered that the appointees should them­
selves determine their training needs, and make their own study to be 
able to perform their functions. The supervisor usually did not 
understand the value of formal instruction for their subordinates, the 
best thing they did was the provision of some manual of work (if there was 
one) or laws and regulations to study.
However, the executives use the seminar as a forum where they can 
indignantly air the problems faced in their daily work, without receiving 
any solution to these problems from other members of the seminar. Many 
officials attend merely to seek enjoyment from sport, or from the local 
girls and perhaps to use attendance as a stepping stone to travel to
neighboring countries.
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6 22. Lack of responsibility.
Effective administration is characterized by a demonstrated sense of 
responsibility towards the implementation of government policy and in 
consideration of the public. There seems to be no single cause for 
irresponsibility. It stems from a number of factors including: (i) weakness
in the system of administration; (i i) lack of any reporting system, and 
follow-up, (iii) lack of job evaluation techniques, (iv) the socio­
economic environment, and (v) the habits of the bureaucrats themselves —  
their lack of neatness, discipline and respect for administrative 
regularity and their lack of an industrial time sense. A habit of 
passing problems upwards for decision has developed. Even Ministers 
pass serious problems to the Council of Ministers for decision, so no 
particular person bears the risk of responsibility. This behavior has 
allowed the Council of Ministers to become the most important body in 
the country. Another means used to avoid responsibility is the setting 
up of committees to handle the more complex tasks. Table 3.2 indicates 
the number of civil servants penalized for negligent performance of duties.
3. Recruitment, placement and promotion system.
The purpose of the first Civil Service Act B.E. 2471 (1928 A.D.) 
was to introduce into the public service the merit system based on 
competitive examinations for new entrants and selective examination 
for promotion. In practice, a spoils system of favoritism and nepotism 
still occurs in placement and promotion. The examination does not 
ensure evaluation on the basis of equity and merit within a reasonably 
broad area. The effect of this situation was reflected by F.W. Riggs in
his ' Sala Model' when he observed that:
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...in the prismatic model, although selection is 
based, formalistically, on examinations, the 
characteristic result is nepotism. Nepotism is 
a prismatic mode of recruitment in which 
familistic considerations dominate appointments, 
although the formal rules prescribe non-ascriptive 
tests.. .63
For example, the entrance examination announcement was not advertised 
to the public for the required period of fifteen days; in the Customs 
Department, many officers got jobs through bribery or nepotism, and an 
amount of money had to be paid in order to pass the selective examination 
with high marks. Placement within the Customs Department in desirable 
positions where officers had the opportunity to be corrupt, such as those 
located at Bangkok Airport Customs House, Sadao Customs House (in Songkla 
Province, bordering Malaysia), the Division of Exportation or the Division 
of Importation, required officers to pay the higher authorities substantial 
sums of money. Following a request to the advisory committee in 1973, the 
Customs Department was reorganized and a system of position classification 
installed. Although this resulted in the creation of vacancies at high 
levels, officers in low grades requested they not be promoted into these 
new positions. Their lower level duties enabled them to supplement their 
official salaries by selling fast or 'blind-eye* service to commercial 
houses and to the travelling public. A promotion would drastically 
reduce their income.
In 1974, when the Preventive Division of the Customs Department 
wanted to recruit an officer with a law degree the Chief of Placement 
Division suggested the Director-General appoint a qualified officer, but 
the Director-General disagreed and appointed his relative who had an 
economics degree. In the Office of the Civil Service Commission, many 
officers who were appointed to overseas posts, were 'favourites'. The 
spoils system discourages competent officials from working hard and 
leads to lower morale. A dramatic change was heralded in September 1975,
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when a Position Classification System was fully installed into the public 
service despite resistance from many officials. This system was based on 
an objective assessment of job content; staff placement followed the 
principle, 'Put the right man into the right job'. The system, however, 
did not yield the results it promised, as it is just a device in personnel 
administration, and the authorities can implement it in either a negative 
or a positive way. The Office of the Civil Service Commission held 
national competitive examinations for prospective entrants to the civil 
service with the objective of fairness, but pressure from some departments 
led to an arrangement whereby departments can hold their own examinations 
for some positions by getting permission from the Civil Service Commission. 
This circumvents the original rule and defeats its aim.
4. Organization.
Governmental organization should concentrate on the processes for
getting particular jobs done effectively; the principle is not applied
sufficiently often in Thailand. There are many ministries trying to
do similar jobs, leading to duplication of functions and staff, and
64thus to extra expense, and usually to less than optimum results.
The Community Development Department (Ministry of Interior) and the 
Office of Accelerated Rural Development (ARD— now in the Ministry of 
Interior but formerly in the Office of the Prime Minister) have similar 
responsibilities in different contexts: the Community Development
Department is concerned first with people and second with the 
infrastructure, the reverse applies with the ARD. They have the common 
purpose of community development and the improvement of standard of 
living of the people. The ARD is supported by U.S. financial aid 
and has considerable technology, it works in 'sensitive areas' where there
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is a covert Communist presence. In 1972, the Administrative Reform
Advisory Committee gave advice to Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn,
the Chairman of the Revolutionary Party, to the effect that these two
organizations should be restructured into a single department in order
to work effectively and with economy. Thanom discussed this with the
National Executive Council, which had resumed its superior administrative
role after the 1971 coup, and whilst agreeing with the advice, was
conscious that such a step might result in the U.S. Government
stopping financial aid for the ARD, so it was decided that for the time
being the two organizations should be brought within the same ministry
(the Ministry of Interior) but maintained as separate departments. In
1972 the U.S. Government gave 74 million Baht to continue existing projects
in southern provinces— Pattalung, Surathani, Nakorn-Sithamamarat —  to
65counter Communist aggression. At the present time the U.S. Government 
has ceased supplying the aid, but the two organizations have not yet been 
restructured into one department.
Education is an important policy in every National Economic and 
Social Development Plan; a lot of money is provided for this in each 
Budget. In 1966, Field Marshal Prapat Charusatien, when Minister of 
the Interior, forcibly transferred part of the function of the Department 
of General Education, Ministry of Education, to the Local Administration 
Department in his own Ministry. One effect of this was lower morale 
among teachers in the Local Administration Department, as their 
prospects for promotion were now less than those of teachers in the 
Department of General Education.
Administrative Reform Advisory Committees recognized training 
as an important device to solve maladministration in the civil service
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and consequently a training function was introduced to every department 
in the civil service. It was expected that training programs such as 
pre-service, in-service and supervisory training, and executive development 
would be conducted in every agency. But due to lack of qualified training- 
officers and techniques, training programs were not s u c c e s s f u l S u c h  
programs should be designed to impart knowledge, skills, and the 
development of those abilities required in the civil service. Especially 
important is the development of managerial skills in senior, middle, and 
lower officials and the preparation of senior and other officials for 
the assumption of a wider range of managerial responsibility after promotion. 
The Office of the Civil Service Commission has just received support from 
the World Bank to establish a National Civil Service Training Center.
The long hierarchical line which causes delays, work duplication, the 
wasting of time and resources could be reorganized. In order to get a 
passport, the applicant and witness are interrogated by at least five 
policemen, who check the application form and the resident registration 
document. There are about twenty policemen altogether in this job —  one 
is a Police Colonel —  and it may take half a day in waiting for 
interrogation. This interrogation is not useful and has served as a 
means for corruption; through travel agents' connections with the 
policemen, an applicant can get his passport without any interrogation, 
or have any criminal record not found.
5. Management.
The fact that an organization is well designed does not guarantee 
that the job will be done efficiently or economically. A well-designed 
organization requires responsible, competent, and energetic officials; 
planning, coordinating, communicating, training, evaluating, and decision-
98.
making are vital ingredients to success. In Thailand, planning for
administration has been neglected. Thai people are not used to planning
their daily lives so they have no training in planning their jobs. They
work on the tasks as they come to hand. The administrator's direction is
6 7obscured by a lack of clarity and continuity in national goals; for 
example, the Local Administration Department policy: 'Get rid of misery, 
increase happiness for the people,' is vague and provides no indication of 
how the policy might be put into effect.
A Planning Division existed in the Office of the Under-Secretary 
to the Minister of Interior, but it failed to fulfil expectations. An 
attempt to correct this defect is evidenced by Proclamation No. 319 
of the Revolutionary Party, dated 13 December 1972, establishing an 
Office of Policy and Planning the central agency in the Ministry of Interior. 
The new office was structured and staffed in accordance with its central 
planning role, with 6 bureaux and an office under a Director-General.
These were: The Central Administration Bureau, Social and Vocational
Development Bureau, Political and Administrative Development Bureau,
Public Utility and Environment Bureau, Technical Bureau, Changwad 
Development Planning Bureau and the Office of Metropolitan Traffic 
Planning. The functions and staff of the now abolished Planning Division 
were transferred to the newly created office.
Bureaucrats find purpose only from the immediate and often personal
objectives of their supervisors. Bureaucratic tradition derived from
culture, and administrative tradition play an important role in the
practice of administration; for example, subordinates are socially and
culturally conditioned to respect and obey their superiors, and superiors
6 8are obliged to give their subordinates ethical treatment in return.
With little delegation of authority, considerable rigidity of operation,
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and management by procedures, management in Thai public administration is
characterized by delays and red tape and the consequent time wasting of
clients. Now, service rating is applied in a subjective fashion, therefore
officials work hard for a few months before annual salary increases are
due in order to receive a special salary increase. Another factor causing
problems in administrative work is lack of co-ordination, officials
69being unwilling to work with other civil servants. This happens 
between ministries and within the ministries and departments themselves; 
interdepartmental relations are often strained.
Within the Customs Department, the Appraisement Division required
information on funds deposited by importers as guarantees against shipments,
or collected as duty on goods, each month. The Duty Collection Division
maintained this data but refused to provide the figures to the Appraisement
Division as this was not listed as one of its 'functions'. Consequently
the Appraisement Division must research the information for itself. As
an example of the failure of ministries to cooperate, the Board of Tax
Supervision in the Office of the Prime Minister had difficulty in obtaining
officers from the Revenue Department, Ministry of Finance to accompany
its investigators when examining company financial records. Several
revenue officers have been dismissed w7hen discovered supplementing their
70income by advising companies on tax avoidance measures. There is a 
saying: 'Coordination in the Thai civil service looks like elephants
fighting.' Communication in the Thai civil service system is a closed or 
one-way communication; as mentioned earlier, the superiors demand respect and 
obedience so the subordinates do not need to ask questions or take initiatives. 
In order to improve management, there should be open or two-way 
communication between superiors and subordinates to reduce misunderstanding.
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6. Pay plan.
Salaries in the civil service are low, which causes low morale 
and leads to slackness and poor work. Civil servants seek their second 
income from extra work outside the service and from corruption.
The Thai government has adjusted the pay plan many times but due
to budget constraints, salaries fail to keep pace with C.P.I. increases.
Research conducted in 1972 showed that an increase of 39.5% over 1967
levels was required in salaries and allowances if civil servants were
71to maintain the standard of living they enjoyed in 1967. The National 
Executive Council considered this finding in 1972, but was unable to 
provide such an increase because of budgetary constraints. It has always 
happened that, having heard the government would increase civil servant 
salaries, merchants increase the price of goods ahead of this, and the 
governments do not have an effective measure to control the price of 
commodities. This also affects the cost of living of the farmers (80% 
of the population) because the price of their product, i.e. their income, 
is static.
In the National Assembly, General Kriengsak Chomanan gave as
reasons for adjusting the pay plan for financial year 1980, the improvement
of the administrative system and the improvement of efficiency of civil
servants by relating their pay more closely to the cost of living. M.R.
Kukrit Pramot, the head of the opposition, said he sympathized with the
government, as corruption was criticized everywhere and the corruption
rate was increasing, one reason being that the civil servant did not get
enough salary, thus decreasing his efficiency and that of the whole of
the public service. This salary adjustment should have the condition
72attached that the civil servant improve his efficiency.
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The government accepts that there is corruption in the civil 
service. The pay plan for the justices is higher than that for the 
ordinary civil servants in order that judges have no need to be corrupt, 
and so to preserve justice in society. The citizen who has experienced 
the court realizes that a higher salary does not necessarily eliminate 
corruption.
73Corruption is endemic in the Thai civil service. It occurs
throughout the service, affecting all departments. All attempts by
Government to suppress corruption have failed. It is pervasive and
regenerative, its effects are nationwide, it preserves and entrenches
the inequities in Thai society. Corruption undermines discipline,
efficiency and principles. It is also supported by the traditional
attitude that an official can expect petty bribes for his quick
performance of service ('speed money'), for overlooking rules or
regulations, or for protection of an illegal business. It occurs in at
least three major activities: revenue raising activities such as taxation,
public expenditure activities such as construction or purchasing office
equipment, and regulatory activities such as licensing or granting
permits. Laws and regulations in Thailand are tools for corruption, because
the bureaucracy is partly dominated by structural 'formalism' a practice
related to the preference for solving problems by passing laws or issuing
orders without any serious concern for the method or effects of their
actual implementation. Taxation Officers in the Revenue Department are
offered second jobs in the private sector because of their knowledge of
loopholes in the Revenue Act. In November 1970 the Minister of Economic
Affairs suggested that the Government draft regulations to help prevent
74corruption which threatened foreign investment.
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Corruption involves officers at all levels, from the lowest to 
the highest, and the sums of money which change hands may be small —  
say 20 Baht ($1) for an overloaded lorry to pass police inspection —  or 
very large —  around 200,000 Baht ($10,000) to secure immigration papers.
Sarit's estate totalled 2,874 million Baht (Approximately A$ 125
million) , and Thanom set up a committee to investigate the source of this
wealth. Acting under Article 17 of the Interim Constitution, Thanom ordered
the confiscation to State revenue of 605 million Baht (over A$ 25 million)
75of this estate.
Nor is bribery the only form of the disease. Officials may 
purposely provide incorrect advice to citizens in order to render the 
unfortunate ones liable to later prosecution, which, it will turn out, 
may be avoided by a payment to the official. An example of this form 
of extortion is the case of the young man appearing for compulsory 
registration for military service in November 1974, who was advised by 
the officer in charge that he need not register until two months later.
On returning to register at the later date, he was accused of avoiding 
conscription and asked for 30 Baht ($1.50) to have the books adjusted.
The officer in charge shared this money with three fellow officer- 
conspirator s. ^
Earlier, other conscription cases to receive publicity involved
a total of 78 soldiers and civil servants in 23 amphoes (districts) .
This was in 1972, when bribes of around 20,000 Baht were accepted from
each of a number of men, mainly Chinese-Thai, to avoid military service.
The device used by those later found guilty was to pronounce the men
medically unfit for service. Money received was shared amongst those
77soldiers and officials involved.
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In Thailand it is compulsory for citizens aged 17 to 70 years to
carry an identification card. Civil servants are issued with special
'official' cards. A citizen living in the north-east, the poorest region
of the country, complained to a member of the House of Representatives
that he was unable to vote as he had no identification card. He had
endeavoured to obtain his card, but the issuing officer had demanded a
500 Baht fee (the correct fee was 5 Baht) and the citizen was unable to
78afford rice let alone pay a 500 Baht extortion.
In 1972, a Board of Inspection and Follow-up of Government Operations 
was established with the suppression of corruption as its primary task.
The Board gave every indication of performing its role resolutely —  the 
first to be imprisoned through the Boards action being a Police Colonel 
(Pramual Wanikaphan) of the Crime Suppression Division who received 25 years 
for extortion. Another notable defendant was Police Major General M.R. 
Chetchan Prawit, Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, 
accused of corruption in relation to land purchases he made on behalf 
of the Police for sites for the Public Disaster Welfare Center and the
79Police housing project. He was dismissed from the Police Department.
Many other cases were prosecuted, but when Thanom, Prapat and Narong 
were exiled, it was said they used the Board to rid themselves of those 
whose interests conflicted with their own. It should be noted that the 
Board had Thanom as Chairman, Thanom's son (and Prapat's son-in-law)
Colonel Narong as a Deputy Secretary-General, and Thanom's son-in-law 
Mr. Suvit Yodmanee as Assistant Secretary-General.
In 1976, the succeeding Prime Minister, Sanya, appointed a 
Committee under Article 17 of the Constitution of B.E. 2515 (1972 A.D.)
to investigate the estates of these three men and families. According
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to the Secretary (Mr. Sawat Uthaisi) of this Committee, the value of the
assets of those persons was: shares 355 million Baht: money in bank
accounts 60 million Baht: and other assets 1,000 million Baht —  a total
8 0of 1,415 million Bhat, around A$70 million. These assets were later 
passed by law to the State, in line with the expressed wishes of members 
of the National Legislative Assembly.
After the students' uprising, the Board of Inspection and Follow-up
of Government Operations was abolished in 1974. In its place an Office of
Commission to Counter Corruption was set up in 1975. By April 1977, 2,000
cases were presented to the Commission for examination —  10% in the form
of petitions, 20% arising from newspaper articles, and 70% contained in
anonymous letters. Apart from its role of investigating alleged cases of
corruption, the Commission was empowered to examine bureaucrats of 'unusual'
wealth. Such persons could be required to declare all their income,
assets and debts. If these sums did not reasonably reconcile, and no
acceptable explanation was forthcoming, the Commission could recommend the
Prime Minister dismiss the accused officer, and the State seize the
excess funds. The first civil servant prosecuted for 'unusual' wealth
by this Board was an ex-Budget Director (later an Economic Advisor to
Kriengsak) Mr. Buntum Thongkhaimuk. Investigation revealed that during
the 10 year period (1 January 1967 to 27 December 1976) he held important
positions in the Budget Bureau, his income earned from all sources was
7,020,993 Baht. This was 23,087,511 Baht less than his assets of
30,108,505 Baht and the accused's wealth could not be explained by
Mr. Buntum. A case for seizure of the assets by the State was recently
brought before the Civil Court. 81
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Corruption can appear the greatest national danger to those 
burdened by its costs and attendant inefficiencies, but to those in 
power Communism looms as a greater threat. Many people were murdered, 
or accused of being Communist when they were not, because they fought 
for fairness in society. The Thai government has been spending millions 
of dollars a year to suppress the Communists in the jungle. There is 
a saying in Thailand that, 'The real Communists are the civil servants'.
CONCLUSIONS
During the four hundred years preceding the mid 19th century,
Thai monarchs were able to cope with the affairs of state without 
introducing administrative reforms of great consequence. The administration 
provided a service which satisfied the ruler, therefore its organization 
remained static. Threats to national interest triggered the sweeping 
administrative changes of the Chakkri Reformation; when the need was 
present, Thai kings did not hesitate to order the most dramatic reforms 
of the civil service.
From the time of the coup d'etat which placed Sarit in power, 
successive military dictators have proclaimed their intention to clean 
up and streamline administrative processes. In fact one of the most 
repeated arguments put forward by the military leaders to justify their 
revolutionary actions has been the need to remedy maladministration.
Today, the Thai civil service retains the form given it by King 
Chulalongkorn, patterned along Western democratic lines. However, the 
service is not free of problems, many indicating fundamental weaknesses.
One such problem is the lack of responsibility shown by civil servants,
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and another is the incompetence often found among their number. Both of 
these problems have their roots in Thai tradition which inculcates respect 
for superiors, thereby encouraging officers to pass difficult problems to 
their seniors, and which regards academic qualification with more respect 
than on-the-job training. Corruption, ever present in Thailand, 
constitutes perhaps the single most important problem to be solved if 
marked improvement in administration is to be achieved and maintained.
All attempts at reform in the Thai civil service emanated from the 
top —  from the King in the late 1800s and from the military junta from 
1959 onwards. Efforts at reform during the later period were not 
publicized within either the nation or the civil service itself.
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CHAPTER IV
THE ROLE OF ADMINIS TRATI VE REFORM ADVISORY COM MITTEES
INTRODUCTION
Military regimes in Thailand, from Sarit to Kriengsak, have all 
made attempts to reform the bureaucracy. Sarit's predecessor, Phibun, 
recognizing that the success of his 'Five Year Plan' was dependent in 
large degree on the existence of an effective administration, in 1952 
directed the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to establish staffing 
patterns throughout the civil service. This first attempt at reform 
was overly ambitious in scope and not successful, and a more cautious 
approach four years later also failed.
In 1959, Sarit, having observed the failure of the CSC as an 
instrument of reform, appointed a separate advisory body to be known 
as the Administrative Reform Advisory Committee. In broad terms, this 
Committee was empowered to conduct studies of the functions, structure 
and staffing patterns of selected ministries, and to make recommendations 
to the Prime Minister on ways to effect improvement in these areas.
The majority of the attempts at bureaucratic reform emanated from the 
recommendations of the Administrative Reform Advisory Committee. However, 
the Prime Minister might not seek advice from this Committee to implement 
administrative reform of his own making.
The Ministry to be studied either was selected by the Government 
or had itself requested reform. The concept of an Administrative Reform 
Advisory Committee established by Sarit became accepted by later
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governments, so that when their charter lapsed with each outgoing 
government, they were re-established by the incoming regime. The role 
of the Committees remained basically the same throughout successive regimes.
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN 1952 AND 1956
Under the absolute monarchy period prior to 1932, each department 
recruited its own personnel and there were no rules or regulations 
governing personnel administration. In 1925 King Rama VII recognized 
that for equity in the Civil Service it was necessary to set rules for 
the recruitment of competent persons and for all civil servants to be 
managed under the same law. The first Civil Service Act was promulgated 
on 1 April 1929 establishing the Civil Service Commission as a central 
personnel agency for civil servants in all departments except the 
military and judicial. A career civil service system providing the 
civil servant with status and security was established. Recruitment 
was on the basis of ability and competence, and salaries were determined 
by rank and by the duties of the position.
A constitutional Monarchy was established as a result of the 1932 
Revolution. The Civil Service Act of B.E. 2476 (1933 A.D.) was introduced 
to express the administrative attitudes of the new form of government.
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN 1952
Phibun was placed in power by the military in 1948. Four years 
later, after the general election on 26 February 1951, he developed a 
'Five Year Plan, 1952-1957' which reflected the policies of his 
administration. To facilitate the pursuit of these policies, and in 
recognition of the problems of the expansion of administration, Phibun
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developed a program of administrative reform with three aims:
(i) the delegation of more authority to Under­
secretaries of State in their routine functions;
(ii) the decentralization of administration; and
(iii) the improvement of the quality and effectiveness of 
local government.
These aims were embodied in the Administration of the Kingdom Act, 
B.E. 2495 (1952 A.D.), which replaced its preceding Act of B.E. 2476 
(1933 A.D.). The new Act provided the legislative bases for reform by 
prescribing that administration be reorganized into three levels: 
central, regional and local. Central Administration was divided into 
the Office of the Council of Ministers and 13 Ministries with uniform 
sub-division. A Region comprised a number of provinces, each divided 
into smaller districts called amphoes, and the Regional Governor had 
reasonable authority for administration within his Region. Later in 
1956, the existing regional administration was abolished and replaced 
by Provincial Administration for which the Provincial Governor was 
responsible. He reported direct to the Ministry of Interior in the 
Central Administration. In the areas where the people had capacity to 
administer for their own needs Local Administration was implemented, 
at the municipal and at the sukhaphiban level. This was extended to 
embrace changwad and tambon levels, in 1956.
The Administration of the Kingdom Act, B.E. 2495 (1952 A.D.) 
authorized the Prime Minister to administer the Act. Therefore, 
the Prime Minister was empowered to determine the establishment of all 
government agencies. In practice, he delegated this authority to the 
CSC.2
Article 5 dictated that simultaneously with the establishment of
a government agency under the Act, staffing patterns must be allocated
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according to the quality and quantity of functions to be carried out
by the agency. Article 7 indicated that 'The establishment of Ministries,
Thabuang (the public body which was equivalent to a Ministry), departments
and public bodies which were equivalent to departments would occur under
the Act, and that the setting up of the structural organization in the
Secretariat of the Prime Minister, Offices of the Secretaries of
Ministries, Offices of the Under-Secretaries of State, departments and
public-bodies equivalent to departments would be governed by Royal
Decrees'. In 1950 the government established the National Economic
Council for national economic planning. After the Council of Ministers
had approved the Council's master 'Five Year Plan' the Sub-Committee of
the National Economic Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, developed
3the detailed annual stages of the plan.
A letter dated 12 April 1952 from the Secretary General of the 
Council of Ministers to the Secretary General of the Office of the Civil 
Service Commission, indicated that the Government was influenced by the 
World Bank to devise a 'Five Year Plan' and to improve administration 
and personnel management.
On 9 April 1952, the Council of Ministers made a decision that:
...regarding the establishment of staffing 
patterns in government agencies, authority 
would be delegated to the Civil Service 
Commission. The allocation of staffing patterns 
would accord with the provisions of the Civil 
Service Act and the Five Year Plan and would be 
carried out under the following guidelines:
1. a salary ceiling would be allocated for each 
position, for the purpose of budgeting;
2. placement of officers would proceed as 
positions and budget became available;
3. additional positions, if seen as necessary 
by a department, might be sought later from 
the CSC.4
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The supervisory positions have been stated in the Administration 
of the Kingdom Act of B.E. 2495 (1952 A.D.), and the others guided by 
the Five Year Plan. In selecting these to establish staffing patterns, 
the government was mindful of the complementary power (to establish 
individual positions) already held by the CSC under Article 24 of the 
Civil Service Act of B.E. 2497 (1954 A.D.).
The Strategy employed by the CSC
Phibun employed a complex strategy featuring global planning
and a rational approach. On 2 May 1952 the CSC set up a Civil Service
Sub-Commission on Determination of Criteria for the Establishment of
5Staffing Patterns, comprising 8 members.
This Sub-Commission produced a 'staffing patterns' form for 
departments to complete. This form sought information on several topics 
including programs, the numbers and class of existing officials and of 
the officials needed in each year of the Five Year Plan.
The Sub-Committee proposed criteria for staffing patterns —  the 
quality, quantity and expected duration of work to be performed —  to 
the Council of Ministers; these were approved 28 May 1952. Then on 
9 June 1952 the CSC appointed a Civil Service Sub-Commission on the 
Establishment of Staffing Patterns comprising 13 members to report 
directly to the Council; ten were members of the CSC, plus the Chief 
of Salary Division, the Chief of Budget Division (both in the Comptroller- 
General Department) and the Chief of the Civil Service Regulation Division 
in the Office of the Civil Service Commission; the Deputy Prime Minister 
who was the Deputy Chairman of CSC was chairman, the Chief of the 
Civil Service Regulation Division was a member and secretary.
This latter Civil Service Sub-Commission instructed representatives
of the departments in the policy of the government and in the completion
of the 'staffing patterns' forms with explanation on the need for manpower.
The departments were given one month to return these forms to their
Ministers for consideration before submission to the Civil Service Sub-
Commission for the Establishment of Staffing Patterns. Although the
Civil Service Sub-Commission set a deadline of August 1952 for return
of completed forms, only 7 from about 90 departments had complied to
7the end of December 1952.
In order to accomplish its tasks, in February 1953 the Sub-Commission 
requested the Council of Ministers to improve the strategy by establishing 
24 more members (i.e. to a total of 37 members), and by empowering the 
Sub-Commission to observe work performance within departments, to 
interview officials, to request documents or information and to call 
the representatives of the Departments for inquiries. The Council of 
Ministers approved this request on 11 February 1953. The CSC provided the 
names of 24 experienced civil servants to the Council of Ministers, but
g
the Council chose to appoint only 20 members.
The attempt to establish staffing patterns failed because it was 
beyond the government's capacity to ensure the return of the completed 
forms which constituted the data base. There were a number of contributing 
factor s:
1. The establishment of staffing patterns was based 
on the Five Year Plan which was broad and lacked 
specific objectives. It was simply an idea and 
senior officials who were concerned with its 
implementation did not know the objectives of 
the Plan. Therefore, it was impossible for the 
departments to know their new functions and the 
manpower needed, so they could not accurately 
complete the forms. In fact the drafting of the 
Five Year Plan was not finalized until 1957 after 
which it was used for budgetary purposes.9
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2. The Sub-Commission contained senior officials in 
the civil service who could not afford time for 
the special task. They attended two'meetings a 
week. It was a case of too small a staff for a 
big job. It was not possible to establish staffing 
patterns for approximately 90 departments at the 
same time.
3. Lack of follow-up from the government. The 
government failed to enquire about or to evaluate 
progress by the Civil Service Commission after 
giving its initial, broad directions. Consequently, 
the Commission was not clear as to what was expected 
of it.
4. Lack of sufficient criteria and data. Neither clear 
criteria nor sufficient data were available to the 
Civil Service Commission to enable useful planning 
on staffing patterns to proceed.
5. Lack of co-operation between the departments and 
Sub-Commission; the departments suspected that 
the Sub-Commission set out to find faults and this 
feeling inhibited their willingness to provide 
correct and timely data.
REFORM IN 1956
A second attempt to establish staffing patterns was made in 1956. 
On 19 September 1956, the Council of Ministers appointed a Committee 
for Establishment of Staffing Patterns, comprising 21 members, of whom 
12 were the Under-Secretaries of State, appointed to encourage the 
co-operation of the departments; the Deputy Prime Minister was the 
Chairman, and the Chief of the Civil Service Regulation Division was a 
member and secretary.
The Strategy Employed by the Committee for Establishment of 
Staffing Patterns
From the experience of the failure of Administrative Reform in 
1952, the Committee this time employed an incremental strategy. A 
priority list for the establishment of staffing patterns was made:
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1. Government agencies which did not have any 
staff at all (i.e. newly established agencies).
2. Government agencies which had some staff but not 
sufficient to handle the additional work resulting 
from their special tasks.
Establishment of the staffing patterns was to be based on 
standardization of the status of provinces or districts.
The Committee set up 3 procedures for the establishment of 
staffing patterns:
1. Inform the departments of the government's policy 
of decentralization. Central Administration had 
the function of providing technical assistance and 
controlling the policy. The Provincial Administration 
and Local Administration were responsible for 
executing the government's policy.
2. Delegate the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of 
Interior to determine the need for manpower in each 
provincial office by expanding plans into specific 
steps to enable staffing requirements at section 
level to be measured. The Committee appointed a 
sub-committee with the Minister of Interior as 
Chairman, plus 8 members, to consider the need for 
manpower in the provinces, and to co-operate with 
the Ministries which performed their fieldwork in 
provinces. The sub-commission had to submit its 
findings by 31 October 1956.
3. Request Ministries and departments to co-operate 
in proposing the numbers of officials which they 
could transfer to work in Provincial Administration 
and Local Administration.
These proposals had a deadline of 20 October 1956. Despite this 
more careful approach, the attempt met with only limited success. As 
a result, the additional number of officials required by Provincial and 
Local Administrations became known, but there was no further attempt 
to implement reform.
The succeeding caretaker government of Pote Sarasin abolished this 
Advisory Committee on the grounds that members had other permanent 
jobs and could not spare time to attend the meetings; and, when they
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did, they failed to prepare themselves for consultation; another basis 
was that the whole matter was a CSC responsibility."^
Whilst Phibun enjoyed a measure of success in reorganizing the 
basic structure of national administration, he was less successful at 
introducing staffing patterns. Phibun's first attempt to establish 
staffing patterns failed. The causes of failure centered on the lack 
of clearly understood goals, coupled with the application, in the 
earlier approaches to reform, of a global strategy. Other factors 
affecting the results were the employment on the advisory committees 
of senior officials who could not devote sufficient time to this 
additional duty, and the failure of departments to co-operate in an 
exercise they distrusted. The very limited success achieved by the 
second attempt (1956) resulted from acknowledgement of the above 
shortcomings and an endeavour to correct them by emphasizing an 
incremental strategy, by advising departments of the basis of the 
questionnaire, and by seeking cooperation from the departments. However, 
measured against its stated aims this second attempt also must be 
considered a failure.
Thanom, in 1958, controlled an organizational structure replete 
with overlapping functions and agencies which ought never to have been 
established. His reforms resulted in the abolition of the latter, 
the Ministry of Culture established by Phibun in 1952.
Ministries remaining were the Office of the Council of Ministers, 
and 12 others: Defence, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture,
Communications, Interior, Justice, Education, Economic Affairs, 
Co-operatives, Public Health, and Industry^!
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SARIT (20 October 1958-8 December 1963)
On 20 October 1958, the Revolutionary Party under Field Marshal
Sarit Thanarat assumed power because of 'internal communist activity'.
Sarit believed that a strong government was needed to solve the problems
confronting the country. He held the views that the Prime Minister was
13chief executive, rather than first minister. The words 'Office of
the Prime Minister' replaced the phrase 'Office of the Council of
Ministers', the Executive Office of the Prime Minister replaced the
Office of the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers, and.
the Advisory Board and Committee Division was established in their 
14Office. It was obvious that the military and civil bureaucrats were
predominant in the Executive Branch as Sarit's government comprised
154 military and 10 experienced civil bureaucrats. Sarit made a 
statement of the policy of his government at the Constituent Assembly 
on 12 February 1959:
12
...the administration in the past had presented 
many barriers to the progress of the country. It 
is necessary for the government to develop administration 
in order to execute policy effectively. The government 
considers the reform of the machinery of government 
as the first priority. The government also considers 
economic development of the country is of the most 
vital importance...16
Sarit's policy on national development covered a number of areas, 
the government having taken action on the lines recommended by the 
Mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development during July 1857 to June 1958.^
The purpose of the Mission's report was to help the government 
plan its contribution to economic and social development, and to 
advise on the forms of organization which were likely to be most 
effective in fostering those developments.
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...Moreover, as the Government has to provide 
new services, employees with the needed 
qualifications should be transferred from 
overstaffed agencies or from offices whose 
work is of low priority. To ensure that this 
is done, it is recommended that a central 
office be established to undertake the management 
analysis necessary to develop a program of 
administrative reform...Its most advantageous 
location would be in the Office of the Prime 
Minister and its work should be closely tied 
with the budget process. The necessary staff, 
both for this office and for representatives to 
be assigned to the different Ministries, would have 
been trained. This office should study the re­
grouping of government functions, the precise 
nature of work objectives and the existing 
assignment of work, and should prepare plans to 
deal with these matters...18
SARIT'S REFORM IN OTHER AREAS
Under Sarit, there was a general policy of reform, for example,
the reorganization of the Office of Prime Minister, the attempt at
financial reform, training etc. As the report pointed out; one
weakness of Thai government was the uncertain financial planning;
defence and social services expenditure had mounted without a
corresponding increase in revenue, and without measures to improve
revenue; the report also pointed to the inefficiency in financial
19budgeting, accounting and control. A Budget Procedures Act of
B.E. 2502 (1959 A.D.) was passed to give a firm legislative base for
the modernized budget operation. It contained a broad and comprehensive
statement of the power and duties of the Budget-Director, defining
the basic budget process, introducing a program budget to replace line
20item budget, and improving budget procedure in a number of ways.
Besides the reorganization of the Comptroller-General's Department in 
1959, there was an improvement in fiscal management in the area of 
accounting, auditing and disbursement.
123.
The Faculty of Public Administration, which was created in the
University of Thammasat in 1955, was inadequate in qualified personnel and
in training matters. On 10 August 1962 Sarit appointed a committee to
study the establishment of a special institution to be called National
21Institute of Development Administration (NIDA). It was opened on 
1 April 1966 to be the graduate school in administration and development.
The Training Centre in NIDA organized training courses for government 
officials, state enterprises and business organizations.
The Organization and Management Division was established on
20 February 1962 in the Budget Bureau, rather than in the Office of the
Civil Service Commission, following American practice and the recommendation
of the Mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development as above mentioned. The O&M Division had responsibility
for the examination of the administrative system of both the departmental
organizations and public enterprises, making recommendations to improve
the public service, studying the requests of the government agencies for
reorganization; the Division also was to be a member of the Administrative
Reform Advisory Committee for the Establishement of Reorganization
22and Staffing Patterns.
For the whole of Sarit's regime, there was a broad but uncoordinated 
attack on the problems of administration, on several fronts.
RESTRUCTURING AND ESTABLISHMENT OF STAFFING PATTERNS
The implementation of Sarit's policy of remedying the mal­
administration in the machinery of government, needed expertise. As 
he had seen Phibun's failure in using CSC and the Committee for the
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Establishment of Staffing Patterns as instruments for administrative
reform, Sarit instead appointed an advisory body for this task, quoting
as his authority the Act on Organiz ing the Administration in the Office
23of the Prime Minister.
Sarit set up the Administrative Reform Advisory Committee on 
18 April 1959 consisting of technocrats and bureaucrats, in which two 
members of the committee were officers of the CSC. The Advisory 
Committee had broader functions than Phibun's, which had concentrated 
on the establishment of staffing patterns. Sarit's Advisory Committee's 
functions were to establish the facts, analyze and make recommendations 
about:
1. Creation, integration, alteration or abolition 
of the structure of departmental organization, 
and functional reallocation, in the interests 
of efficiency and economy;
2. Avoidance of duplication and overstaffing in 
administration;
3. Interdepartmental co-ordination;
4. Division of work and solving the overstaffing 
problem; and
5. (later, 22 January 1963) setting up staffing 
patterns.24
It is noteworthy that Sarit secretly appointed another Committee,
with the role to put into effect administrative reforms that Sarit
himself had conceived. Bunchana Attakorn, a member of the Administrative
Reform Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee on Research, was
assigned by Sarit to study the establishment of a Ministry to be
responsible for the development of infra-structure, a task which at
that time was scattered through many departments. Bunchana studied
the administration of the NCDC of Australia and then advised Sarit to
set up the Ministry of National Development. 25
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On 28 February 1961, Sarit made a 'secret order' to appoint a
'special committee' chaired by Lt. General Prapat Charusathien, the
Minister of Interior, and other members Luang Vichitravathankarn, General
26Nete Khemayothin and Bunchana Attakorn, to study this case. This
special committee held 2 meetings (16 March 1961, 14 July 1961) and
made a recommendation to the Council of Ministers on 2 April 1963 that
the Ministry of Co-operatives be abolished, and its functions be
transferred to the new Ministry of National Development together with some
Departments of the Office of the Prime Minister and the Ministries of
Agriculture, Industry and Communications. The Government agreed and
submitted the Bill on the Reorganization of Ministries, Thabuang, and
Departments of B.E. 2606 (1963 A.D.) to the Constitutional Assembly.
The Bill was passed, and the Ministry of National Development was
27established on 23 May 1963. Its functions were to plan, coordinate
and control the development of infrastructure necessary to achieve the
First Economic Development Plan (1961-66). To carry out these functions
the following offices and departments were located in the new Ministry:
Office of the Secretary to the Minister, Office of the Under-Secretary,
Technical and Planning Office, Office of Atomic Energy and Peace,
Royal Irrigation Department, Department of Highways, Department of
Mineral Resources, Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation,
Department of Land Development, Department of Land Cooperation, Department
of Cooperative Credit and Marketing, Department of Cooperative Auditing,
and the Office of the National Energy Authority. Sarit was the Minister
of this newly created Ministry, aided by five Assistant Ministers:
Gen. Prapat Charusathien, Phra Prakardsahakorn, Sunthorn Hongladarom,
28Thanad Korman and Bunchana Aittakorn. The establishment of this Ministry
was criticized in that it resulted in overlapping of functions; the
Officers in the Ministries which transferred functions were not pleased
29but dared not argue.
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The functions of the CSC and the Advisory Committee required the 
same skills —  personnel management, and 'Organization and Management'.
The Advisory Committee reported to the Prime Minister as he was the 
Chief Executive, the Civil Service Sub-Commission reported to the 
Prime Minister as the Chairman of the CSC. Besides, Article 11(5) 
of the Civil Service Act of B.E. 2497 (1954 A.D.) directed that one of 
the CSC duties was to report to the Prime Minister in case it appeared 
that ministries, public bodies, or departments had not acted in accordance 
with the Act or had acted improperly so that the Prime Minister could 
order rectification. But the Civil Service Act of B.E. 2518 (1975 A.D.) 
which replaced the Act of 2475, via Article 8(1) directed that the CSC 
had duties to advise the Council of Ministers (and to make 
recommendations) on the policy of personnel administration and management 
in the civil service, besides the duty to report to the Prime Minister.
So the Prime Minister had two roles in dealing with personnel 
administration, one as the Chief Executive, the other as the Chairman 
of CSC. In reality, the Prime Minister used his power more easily 
in the Council of Ministers than in the CSC so by the establishment 
of the Advisory Committee as the instrument to advise on the reform of 
the Civil Service he was also helping maintain his own authority.
THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ADVISORY COMMITTEE
There were reforms in the Office of the Prime Minister, Ministries 
and Departments. Sarit wanted authority to establish departments in 
the Office of the Prime Minister to serve his policy and objectives in 
administration and gain control over the government; the Act on 
Organizing the Administration in the Office of the Prime Minister
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of B.E. 2502 (1959 A.D.) was passed empowering the Prime Minister to
establish the government agencies in his Office by Notification of the
30Office of the Prime Minister. Under such authority many government 
agencies were established in order to improve coordination of plans, 
policies and administrative activities within the public service, to 
strengthen the Office and to extend the Prime Minister's power and 
influence.
There were many new organizations, including the Budget Bureau, 
created within the office of the Prime Minister on 15 February 1959 
by the Act on Organizing of Administration in the Office of the Prime 
Minister B.E. 2502 (1959 A.D.). Prior to 1959 the finances of the 
Kingdom were managed and controlled through the Budget Office within 
the Comptroller-General's Department. This Department was under the 
Ministry of Finance. As the ineffectiveness of the financial 
administration was realized, the Comptroller-General's Department was 
reorganized on 11 November 1959 to be compatible with the new accounting 
and fiscal system, and program budget. The budget function was 
transferred to the Office of the Prime Minister, and the Budget 
Bureau was established to be a device for planning and implementation 
of the Prime Minister's policy. The Office of the Board of Investment 
and the Office of the Exportation Promotion were established for 
economic development. The National Education Council was set up 
for education planning. The National Economic Council was restructured 
to be the Office of the National Economic Development Board to make 
National Economic Development Plans. The Office of the National 
Audit Council and the Office of the Civil Service Commission were 
reorganized to work more effectively. All universities were transferred 
to the Office of the Prime Minister so Sarit could control the tertiary
education system.
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Establishment of the Office of the National Economic Development 
Board (ONEDB)
In 1950 Phibunsongkhram's Government set up the National Economic 
Council as the agency responsible for studying the economic situation 
and for advising government on monetary, finance and general economics. 
As a first step towards economic planning, a National Economic Planning 
Committee was established within the Council.
The following year, 1951, the Government formed another economic 
committee, the Thai Technical and Economic Committee (TTEC), and gave 
it the responsibility of formulating requests for economic and technical 
assistance including that sought under the Thai-American Economic and 
Technical Cooperation Agreement from the U.S. Government.
31Lack of planning affected the works of both these committees.
In July 1957 the International Bank for Reconstrucution and Development 
(IRBD), responding to a Thai Government request, dispatched a Mission to 
Thailand to conduct a study of the economic situation. The Mission 
stayed one year in the country, and submitted its findings in a report 
to the Government —  ’A Public Development Program for Thailand'.
Besides making recommendations on economic development the Mission 
included in their Report advice on the form of organization likely to 
be effective in fostering economic and social development. Any action 
on the Report Phibun may have contemplated was forestalled by the coup 
d'etat engineered by General Sarit Thanarat, on 16 September 1957.
Progress in each of the directions proposed by the Mission was 
achieved, however, when Sarit's government decided to accept the 
Report and its findings. For example, in line with the recommendation 
that a number of (specified) new departments be established, and certain 
existing departments be reorganized, the National Economic Council 
was abolished in July 1959, and replaced by the newly created National
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Economic Development Board (NEDB) as the agency responsible for drafting 
Thailand's first Six Year Plan (1961-67). The most'important objective 
of this Plan was the designing of a basic framework for economic 
self-sufficiency, at the same time retaining the rate of annual investment 
at 15% of GNP, and increasing the level of real per capita income by 
at least 3% per annum. Internal loans were to provide the major (70%) 
source of investment in the Plan, the balance being sought abroad.
Whilst the broad thrust of the Mission's Report was accepted, 
implementation differed in detail from that recommended. For example, 
the NEDB,although set up to perform the task allotted to the 'National 
Development Board' by the Mission, was much larger than that conceived 
by the Mission. The NEDB was chaired by the Prime Minister, who was 
assisted by two Deputy Prime Ministers as vice-chairmen, and composed 
of a further 45 members, appointed by the Council of Ministers from 
both the civil and private sectors, together with the Secretary-General 
of ONEDB who acted as both member and secretary. All ministers were 
advisors to the NEDB, and those ministers directly concerned with 
economic development were made chairman of the appropriate economic 
development sub-committees.
All this contrasted with the concept put forward in the Mission's
Report, which called for a small committee, the 'National Development
Board', chaired by the Prime Minister and including only those Ministers
most intimately concerned with problems of economic growth. This
committee was to be supported by a planning secretariat, adequately
staffed to formulate proposals and submit these in order of priority 
32to the Committee.
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In practice, the size of the NEDB and the diverse responsibilities
of its members militated against frequent meetings and so policy
33making fell to the Executive Committee, which met once a week. This 
Committee comprised nine educated and experienced persons including the 
Secretary-General of ONEDB.
The Office of National Economic Development Board was established
34on September 3, 1959. Mr. Buchana Attakorn, a member of the Advisory 
Committee was appointed a Deputy Secretary-General of the Office. 
Acknowledging the mutual dependence of statistical economics and 
development planning, the IBRD had recommended that the Central Statistical 
Office and the National Income Division of the National Economic Council
be controlled by the Planning Secretariat and that the National Economic
35Council be dissolved.
In accordance with this, these two bodies were transferred to the 
Office of the National Economic Development Board, along with the Economic 
Planning Office, the Economic and Technical Cooperation Office and others.
Establishment of the Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation
As the Report of the IBRD mission which visited Thailand in 1957 
noted, the Committee responsible for preparing the government requests 
for foreign aid, the Thai Technical and Economic Committee (TTEC), was 
ill-equipped for the task. It was seen to be unwieldy in size and 
lacking sufficient secretariat assistance to filter proposals seeking 
foreign financial aid.
This affected the coordination of requests in such a way that 
national priorities were unclear. The Report recommended the establishment
131.
of a permanent secretariat to perform the TTEC foreign aid function, 
drawing support as necessary from the technical services available within 
the TTEC. Thus one agency would have a continuing involvement in 
proposals for foreign assistance and could be expected to develop a 
skill in this field.^
In line with this proposal, the Department of Technical and Economic 
Cooperation was established in 1963, as part of the Ministry of National 
Development by Article 18, the Act on the Reorganization of the
37Ministries, Thabuang, and Departments of B.E. 2506 (1963 A.D.).
Its function was to obtain support, in programs of technical and 
economic cooperation, from the United Nations, the United States of 
America, the Colombo Plan, and from certain other countries and 
independent foundations and organizations, in line with the Governments' 
development policies.
The Abolition of the Administrative Inspection Department
In 1959, the Advisory Committee examined the functions of the
Administrative Inspection Department in the Office of the Prime Minister.
It was noted that the functions overlapped or usurped those of other
departments e.g. the Administrative Inspection Department contained an
Office of Land Survey whose role encroached on that of the Land
38Department in the Ministry of Interior. The Act on the Organizing 
of Administration in the Office of the Prime Minister (seventh 
amendment) of B.E. 2503 (1960 A.D.) passed by the Constituent Assembly 
acting as the National Assembly in April 1960, abolished the 
Administrative Inspection Department. The land survey function was 
transferred to the Land Department and the role of the Office of
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Petitions Committee, the subject of a specific Act —  the Act on 
Petitions of B.E. 2492 (1949 A.D.) — , previously carried out by the 
Administrative Inspection Department was now given to the newly
39established Office of the Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister.
The Establishment of the Office of the Board of Tax Supervision
Previous to the establishment of the Office of the Board of Tax
Supervision in the Office of the Prime Minister, a committee had been
set up in compliance with the Council of Ministers' resolution for
handling the suppression of tax violation. This Committee was not
able to carry out the Government policy effectively since it had not
been set up as a statutory body. Following a personal direction
from Sarit, the Advisory Committee recommended the establishment of
a Board of Tax Supervision. An Office embracing this Board was set
up in the Office of the Prime Minister by the Act on Inspecting Tax
Administration and Other State Revenue of B.E. 2503 (1960 A.D.), and
the Act on the Organizing of Administration in the Office of the
Prime Minister of B.E. 2503 (1960 A.D.). The Office of the Board
of Tax Supervision comprised the Office of the Secretary and seven
divisions: Research and Planning, Investigation, Customs Supervision,
Internal Revenue Supervision, Other Revenue Supervision, Enforcement,
40and Regional Supervision. This Board was directly responsible to 
the Prime Minister, and handled the external collection of taxation 
in all its modes, including customs and excise revenue. This role 
was separate from that of the Ministry of Finance, which has 
responsibilities for the internal operation and monitoring of taxation. 
Like the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals, the Board of Tax Supervision heard 
and decided on claims and disputes concerning tax matters. The Board 
also in special cases might be authorized to operate in the suppression
of tax violators.
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The Establishment of the National Statistical Office
The Central Statistical Office, a statistical unit serving the
various Ministries, was attached to the National Economic Council (NEC).
The Mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development recommended the Central Statistical Office be upgraded at
least in quality as the Central Statistical Office was unable 'to
conduct modern census,. sample surveys, or statistical analytical work
41without the assistance of outside experts'. The Mission proposed 
that for the planning of their statistical program, the Central 
Statistical Office should:
1. survey the available statistical materials and the 
practicable possibilities for collection of additional data;
2. survey essential needs for economic, financial and social 
statistics;
3. prepare a program of statistical priorities based on 
(1) and (2) above;
4. prepare an administrative plan for the allocation of 
statistical responsibilities among the Central Statisitcal 
Office and other government agencies; and
5. inaugurate and supervise the collection and processing 
of data to provide the kinds of statistical end-products 
desired.
When the Office of National Development Board replaced the National 
Economic Council, the Central Statistical Office, structured to perform 
the above tasks, was allocated to the new office. It comprised Promotion 
and Co-ordination Division, Census and Survey Division, Current Statistics 
Division, Mechanical Tabulation Division, and Statistical Service 
Division.
In May 1963 the Central Statistical Office was separated from the
Office of National Economic Development Board and renamed the National
42Statistical Office. It comprised 10 agencies; this establishement 
might have been too large, for in 1966 Thanom's Advisory Committee reduced
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its size to 8 agencies, and in 1979 there were still 8 agencies with 
some functional changes associated with modern technology such as 
computer processing. The eight agencies are the Office of the Secretary 
and seven divisions: Population Survey, Economic Survey, Statistical
Techniques, Field Operation, Data Processing, Statistical Reports and 
Data Processing Center of Thailand.
The Establishment of the Department of Community Development
In 1963 the Department of Interior was reorganized; the community 
development function was enlarged and the Department of Community 
Development was established. Although the existing functions remained 
in the Department of Interior, the name was changed to the Department 
of Local Administration. The major functions of the Department of 
Community Development were to develop community spirit, to initiate 
community activities and to encourage participation by the communities 
in these activities. A minor function was to develop infrastructure 
for local community benefit.
In reviewing the effects of Sarit's reorganization, it is noted 
that the scope of the Office of the Prime Minister expanded from control 
of 11 departments to control of 24 government organizations, including 
4 universities. The reorganization included the restructuring of some 
departments, the integration of others and the establishment of new 
agencies. One of the new agencies was the Ministry of National 
Development with Sarit as its head, although this was abolished
later under Thanom.
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THANQM (9 December 1963-14 October 1973)
General Thanom Kittikachorn, A Deputy Prime Minister, succeeded 
Sarit by Royal Command on 9 December 1963. On 19 December 1963 Thanom 
informed the Constituent Assembly of the important principles governing 
its administration. One phrase of his statement was:
...since the administrative policy of the previous 
government has evidently yielded substantial 
benefit to the country and to the people, the 
government has, therefore, decided to administer 
the country in accordance with the said (previous) 
policy as announced at the Assembly on 12 February 
1959...43
Sarit's policy included the establishment of universities in every region 
so that higher education would be readily available to the rural 
populace. The Council of Ministers decided in 1960 to establish 
Chiengmai University (in the northern part of Thailand). The Chiengmai 
University Act of B.E. 2507 (1964 A.D.) was promulgated on 15 January 
1964. It was the first university established outside the capital.
In 1965 Khon-Kaen University was established in the north-eastern part 
of the country, and Prince of Songkhla University was established in 
the South in 1967. All of these universities were under the Office 
of the Prime Minister.
The Establishment of the Board of Investment
The Mission of the IBRD pointed out that the Act on Promotion
of Industry of B.E. 2497 (1954 A.D.), 'is confused in its wording,
difficult to administer, and gives the impression that applicants will
44be penalized rather than helped'. The Minister of Industry 
administered this Act receiving advice from a committee of Ministers 
and high officials. However, böth the Minister and the committee
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lacked staff to examine the applications and was not empowered to
approve assistance under the Act, this authority being reserved
for the Council of Ministers. Understandably, the outcome was long
delays for applicants and very little actual assistance disbursed.
One of its recommendations was to establish an Industrial Promotion
Committee with a complementary Planning Secretariat, the objective being
45to foster new industries. After Sarit had been in power for two
months, the Revolutionary Party's policy regarding promotion of private
industry, promulgated by Proclamation No. 33 of the Revolutionary Party,
was to ensure that the government would neither set up any competing
46industry nor nationalize private industries.
A few months later, the Industrial Promotion Committee was established
in the Office of the Prime Minister to consider applications for the
establishment of private industries and to issue permits to those deemed
viable. In 1962 the Industrial Investment Promotion Act of B.E. 2505
was passed to attract foreign investment for industrialization and
diversification of the economy. Three years later, in 1965, Thanom's
government realized that management by the Industrial Promotion Committee
was not efficient, therefore it submitted a proposal to the Constituent
Assembly acting as the legislative body to establish the Office of the
47Board of Investment and abolish the Industrial Promotion Committee.
The Office of the Board of Investment was established on 26 January 
1966 by the Act on the Organizing of the Office of the Prime Minister 
of B.E. 2503 (1966 A.D.).
The Reorganization of the Office of the Civil Service Commission
Again in 1971, the Office of the Civil Service Commission was 
reorganized, this time to cope with a new function —  the installation
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of position classification throughout the civil service. The Technical 
and Examination Division and the Civil Service Regulation Division were 
reorganized into three divisions: Positions and Pays Division, responsible
for the new function, the allocation of positions and pays, and provision 
of the staff member on the Sub-Committee on Restructuring and Staffing 
Patterns; Technical and Standards Division, and Examination Division.
THANOM VS. THANOM
Thanom initiated revolution against his own government on 18 November
1971 for the stated reason of protection of the institution of the
Monarchy, and in response to problems both inside and outside the
48National Assembly affecting government administration. He, as Chairman
of the Revolutionary Party, was empowered with the authority of the
49Prime Minister and of the Council of Ministers.
Although administrative reform in the past failed to achieve
coordination among the government agencies, Thanom believed that reform
during the existing revolutionary period could be achieved quickly
without resistance. In recognition of this need Thanom re-established
50the Administrative Reform Advisory Committee on 29 December 1971.
Its assigned goals were reassignment of departmental roles, restructuring 
of the government agencies and establishment of staffing patterns.
These were the same as the goals of the previous committees but were 
treated more seriously. The details of reform are in Chapter 5.
In April 1972, Thanom responded to public demands for a 
Constitution by declaring that reform of the civil service, a major
51objective of the Revolutionary Party, had not yet been accomplished.
This excuse could not suffice for long. The Secretary of the Royal
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Household announced the intention to appoint Prince Vachiralongkorn 
as Crown Prince on 28 December 1972 and convention required the 
Prime Minister to ratify the King's Proclamation. The new Constitution 
was required so that a government could legally take office and the 
position of Prime Minister be filled before the 28 December. The 
NEC hurriedly completed their reforms, the Constitution was promulgated, 
members were nominated to the National Legislative Assembly and 
Thanom appointed Prime Minister.
STRATEGY EMPLOYED BY THE ARAC IN THANOM III REGIME
The Advisory Committee attempted to employ a comprehensive strategy. 
Its work was carried on in secret and 'insiders', officials from subject 
departments, did not participate in this reform study. The environment 
and the political system (dictatorship) enabled the Advisory Committee 
to accomplish its task within a year, and there was virtually no 
resistance from the bureaucrats even though their interests were at 
risk. The findings of the Committee cited several casues of mal­
administration :
1. Over-Centralization
Policy originated at the centre but the policy-makers 
did not fully comprehend the problems of provincial or 
local administrations.
2. Excessive Routine Workloads
The Office of the Prime Minister and the Offices of the 
Under-Secretaries of State carried a heavy workload 
most of which dealt with routine matters. Bureaucrats 
were preoccupied with this routine work and neglected 
the planning, coordination and follow-up of other work 
more important to national development. The problems 
which resulted in the excess of routine work remained 
untouched.
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3. Duplication of Work by Departments
Functions and responsibilities of departments were 
poorly defined, leading to cases where more than one 
department pursued similar tasks. This duplication 
or overlap wasted effort and funds, and confused those 
dependent on government services.
4. Lack of Cooperation among Departments
Costly schemes were planned and executed without 
sufficient consultation with other agencies responsible 
for follow-up action. For example, the Royal Irrigation 
Department in the Ministry of National Development was 
responsible for the construction of dams, and the 
Department of Agriculture in the Ministry of Agriculture 
was responsible for technical and other assistance to 
farmers, but the former would build water storages 
without adequate prior discussion with the latter, 
resulting in less than maximum benefit being realized 
by the local farmers.
5. Lack of Direction from Ministers
The planning function was overlooked by Ministers; 
Ministries were simply a meeting place for departments. 
Offices of the Under-Secretaries of State failed to 
provide the leadership essential to the successful 
planning and execution of programs. One consequence 
was that individual departments could act completely 
independent of others within the same Ministry whose 
cooperation was essential to the success of the program, 
without fear of discipline from above.
6. Absence of an Appropriate Structure within a Ministry, 
for Planning, Controlling, Coordinating and Following-up 
Programs
There was no structure at other than local administrator 
level, to ensure the implementation and control of policy. 
This was true in both Central and Provincial Administration 
at departmental level, and resulted in programs being 
local administrator controlled and oriented.^
To solve these problems the Advisory Committee sought authority to reform 
two aspects of administration:
1. Roles and Structure of Government Agencies
The functions and structure of departments required review 
with the goals of efficiency and economy, having regard to 
the political background, the administration, social 
environment and economics of Thailand. The review should 
take account of the behaviour and problems of existing 
organizations.
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2. Management
Management was as crucial as organization to good 
administration, and if effective policy control were to 
be achieved there would need to be substantial improvement 
in management both within and between departments. This 
applied especially to personnel administration, both at 
the central and the provincial levels.
The Advisory Committee listed five steps as the priorities for these 
administrative reforms:
1. The Establishment of a Master Plan
This plan would first indicate the proposed composition 
of the civil service (ministries and departments).
The next steps would not be attempted unless the 
Chairman of the Revolutionary Party agreed to the plan.
2. Reorganization within Departments
Functions would be allocated and departments restructured 
to achieve efficiency, economy and cooperation.
3. Reorganization of State Enterprise
Commercial enterprises run by the State would be reviewed, 
with consideration being given to their integration, 
separation, alteration or abolition in the interest 
of efficiency and economy. The quality of management 
of enterprises would be examined and improvements 
effected where necessary.
4. Management Development in Government Agencies
Guidelines for cooperation, policy control and 
management within Ministries would be developed.
These guidelines would be devised to ensure efficient 
management and speedy reaction to events.
5. Development of the Civil Service System and Improvement 
of Personnel Standards
Administrative achievement reflected both the techniques 
employed and the standard of personnel. Both these 
aspects must be developed in parallel.53
RECOMMENDATIONS
The Master Plan proposed the abolition of one of the 13 Ministries 
and the addition of one 'public body' equivalent to a department 
taking the total of such bodies from four to five. The Ministry of
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National Development, established by Sarit through the transfer of 
functions from other departments, was the Ministry selected for abolition, 
the Plan retransferring its functions to other appropriate ministries, 
whilst the additional 'public body' was the Audit Council of Thailand, 
at that time operating within the Office of the Prime Minister. The 
purpose of the proposed transfer of the Audit Council was to allow 
that body to work independently, free from the influences of other 
bodies. The Council would report direct to the Prime Minister.
The National Executive Council acting as the Council of Ministers, 
agreed to the Master Plan. The Advisory Committee examined each 
Ministry and Department and recommended that no reform action be 
instigated in the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Justice,
Finance, nor in the five public bodies in question.
This recommendation was not agreed to by the National Executive
Council who decided reform was necessary in certain areas of the
Ministry of Finance. Within this Ministry, the Banking Control
Division, whose functions concerned banking control and monetary and gold
policy was transferred from the Office of the Under-Secretary to the
Fiscal Policy Office, and renamed Banking and Fiscal Institution
Control Division; two new divisions were established —  Computer Division
in the Office of the Under-Secretary, whose services would be available
to other departments such as Customs and Revenue within the Ministry;
and Personnel Division, also located in the Office of the Under- 
54Secretary. A restructuring of the Fiscal Policy Office, to meet 
new functional requirements, was ordered. That Office was reorganized by 
the Advisory Committee into five divisions, the Office of the Secretary, 
the Fiscal Policy Division, the Tax and Duty Policy Division, the
Statistics Division and the Banking and Fiscal Institution Control Division. 55
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It seems odd that the Advisory Committee, which emphasized
the need to plan programs, failed to establish a planning function in
either the Office of the Under-Secretary or the Fiscal Policy Office.
When the Fiscal Policy Office was again reorganized in 1976, a Fiscal
5 6Planning Division was established.
SANYA (14 October 1973-22 May 1974, 27 May 1974-14 February 1975)
Professor Sanya Thamasak, a former judge, the King's Privy 
Councillor and the Rector of Thammasat University was appointed to 
be Prime Minister on 17 October 1973 following the period of student 
riots. His government was to act as caretaker during the drafting 
of the new constitution. His policy, stated to the Legislative 
Council on 25 October 1973, centered on national stability rather than 
on administrative reform. For the continuation of the administrative 
reform of the former governments, he appointed an Advisory Committee; 
five Sub-Committees were established for staffing patterns and 
reorganization, administrative reform of provincial administration, 
improving efficiency and so forth. Sanya resigned on 22 May 1974 
due to his inability to control the civil situation but was reappointed 
on 27 May 1974. On 4 June 1974, his new policy concentrated on 
economics. Policy towards the bureaucracy was concerned mainly with 
the eradication of corruption and the development of discipline 
and efficiency among civil servants. He reappointed the same Advisory 
Committee, and at this period only three Sub-Committees were 
established. Sanya directed his attention to the labour and farmer 
problems, and to preparations for the coming election.
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THE READJUSTMENT OF PAY
The Advisory Committee recommended that the Civil Service Pay 
scale be readjusted to align with the cost of living; that civil 
servants pay their own income tax —  previously paid for them by the 
government; and that salary step increases be calculated on a percentage 
basis. All of these recommendations were embodied in the Civil Service 
Act of B.E. 2517 (1974 A.D.).
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT BOARD
Some months later, the Council of Ministers directed the Advisory 
Committee to examine a bill for the establishment of the Office of the 
National Environment Board, which had been submitted to the National 
Legislative Assembly by Mr. Pairot Suwannakorn, a member of the
57Assembly who also held a position in the Ministry of Agriculture.
The Chairman of the Advisory Committee delegated this study to the
Sub-Committee for cooperation amongst Departments Concerned with
Utilization of Natural Resources and Preservation of the Environment,
which at the time was preparing a report on guidelines for this purpose.
The Sub-Committee agreed with Mr. Pairot's proposal for the establishment
of an organization in the Office of the Prime Minister to be entrusted
with preservation of the environment. Different in structure to that
suggested by Mr. Pairot, this organization was set up by the National
Legislative Assembly with the title 'Office of the National Environment
Board'. It comprised five divisions: Office of the Secretary,
Environment Quality Promotion, Environmental Policy and Planning,
Environmental Impact Assessment, and Environmental Quality Standard 
58Division.
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THE FULL INSTALLATION OF POSITION CLASSIFICATION
The major administrative development was the full installation 
of position classification in January 1975 (not as a result of the 
work of the Administrative Reform Committee) by the promulgation of the 
Civil Service Act of B.E. 2518 (1975 A.D.). This aspect of administration 
had earlier (1964) been the subject of a study by the United States 
Operation Mission, during the Thanom regime.
Under the USOM program, Mr. Ernest J. Barbour, a personnel expert,
examined the personnel administration problems in Thai bureaucracy. On
24 March 1964 he submitted a report 'The Needs of the Thai Civil
Service System', identifying 10 problem areas and prescribing solutions
One recommendation in the report was the introduction of position
classification as the foundation for an effective personnel management 
59program. A further result of the Barbour Report was the establishment
by the Council of Ministers on 20 October 1964 of a special short-term
6 0Advisory Committee on the Improvement of the Civil Service System.
(See Table 3^1.)-
This short-term Committee recommended the introduction of
position classification to the System. On 21 December 1965 the Council
of Ministers directed the CSC to examine the functions and responsibilities
of all positions in the civil service, their findings to form the basis
61of position classification. Position classification was not completely 
new to the Service as it had been introduced in a modified form during 
an earlier regime (Sarit, 1963). When Thanom came into power, he picked 
up the notion and developed it along broader lines.
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TABLE 4.1: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
SYSTEM
Thawee Rangkham
M.L. Choochart Kamphoo
General Nete Khemayothin
Phairote Chainam
Puay Ungphakorn
Lt. Gen. Sawaeng Sananarong
Thuy Laosunthorn
Malai Huwanant
Boonma Womgsawan
Luang Sitthidusitphai
Colonel Chinda na Songkhla
Police Maj. Gen. Attasit Sitthisunthorn
Sakorn Karunanont
Luang Prakorb Nitisarn
Maj. Gen. Bunruan Buacharune
Khor Sawaddiphanit
Prasong Sukhum
Chub Karnchanaprakorn
Sorat Sucharitkul
Chairman
Member
" and Secretary
Source: Office of the Civil Service Commission.
The United States Operations Mission to Thailand (USOM) sent 
Officers expert in position classification from California State Personnel 
Board, to assist officials in the Office of the Civil Service Commission 
from June 15, 1965 to June 30, 1971.
Five years after the installation of position classification, the 
Secretary General of the Office of the Civil Service Commission, in 
a report to the CSC in May 1980, drew attention to the widespread public 
criticism of the civil service, citing terms such as 'Corrupt', 'Mafia',
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'Inefficiency1 and 'Crazy C.' used by the public when referring to 
6 2public servants. The latter term, 'Crazy C.' denoted 'Crazy 
Classification (system)', which was seen to encourage civil servants 
to spend their time and effort seeking higher classification rather 
than tending the needs of the public.
In part this activity was justified by the inequities of the 
application of position classification. For example, a position with 
a particular responsibility in one department might attract a higher 
classification than a position of equal or higher responsibility in 
another department. There were similar inequities within departments, 
and the effect was to cause civil servants to focus on their own 
grievances rather than on the needs of their clientele.
Some examples illustrate the problem: In 1972, when position
classification was introduced into the Revenue Department, the 
position of Chief of Placement Section, Personnel Division was 
classified Class 5; one year later the equivalent position in Customs 
attracted only a Class 4 classification, in spite of a heavier workload. 
Endeavouring to justify this situation, the Chief of Position 
Classification Section in the Office of the Civil Service Commission, 
Somsala Chiraphan, explained that as the work of this position in 
the Revenue Department requires an honest official he should be granted 
a higher position. The lack of logic in this response illustrates 
the bias which so often occurred in position classification.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM
On 20 December 1974, the Assistant Minister of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives submitted a Bill on Agricultural Land Reform; in support
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of this Bill, he noted that farmers who previously owned their land but
became impoverished through high loan repayment commitments to middlemen
and subsequently were forced to sell their holdings, found themselves in
an even worse situation as tenants when rentals increased; 'Justice',
in the form of guaranteed fair prices for farm produce, or protection
from unfair rentals, was not available to the farmer. Incentive to
maintain farm facilities and to protect soil fertility was reduced, and
so productivity fell. The situation as a whole posed social, economic
and administrative problems to the government. The Bill was passed
and became the Act on Agricultural Land Reform, promulgated on 5 March
1975. This Act would permit the Government to pursue the policies
described in the Constitution of B.E. 2517 (1974 A.D.). Under this Act
the Government on the 6 March 1975 established an Office of Agricultural
6 3Land Reform in the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives.
The Advisory Committee studied the function of thie Office and 
set up its structure consisting of an Office of the Secretary and five 
divisions: Land Reform Management, Agricultural Land Reform Fund
Administration, Legal Affairs, Technical and Planning and Changwad 
Agricultural Division. However the subsequent performance of this 
Office suffered due to inadequate staffing numbers.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE PRIME MINISTER
On 28 November 1974 the Secretariat of the Prime Minister was 
formed to oversight and rationalize the work flowing to the Prime 
Minister, the Deputy Prime Ministers, and the Prime Minister's advisors. 
To staff the Secretariat,officers were transferred from the Government 
House, this office being abolished; the Publication Division of the
Government 'House was transferred to the Secretariat of the Cabinet. 64
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
The performance of newly established agencies did not always bear
out the promise. On 8 August 1974, two laws enabling the establishment
of a Food and Drug Administration agency, and the transfer to it of
functions, assets, manpower and budget from the existing Food and Drug
Control Division of the Public Health Promotion Department, were passed
6 5by the National Legislative Assembly.
The objective of this transfer was to expand government activities 
and effectiveness in the field of food and drug control, and to support 
this aim the new agency was set up at departmental level, with an Office 
of the Secretary and seven divisions: Technical, Drug Control, Food
Control, Cosmetic Control, Public Relations and Advertisement Control, 
Narcotics Control and Inspection Division.
There was, unfortunately, no upturn in achievement following this
government initiative. In one area of interest, food inspectors from
the Agency in 1979 collected food samples from Bangkok restaurants,
shops and stalls which, on analysis, proved unfit for consumption.
One popular dish obtainable at every street corner of Bangkok, meat
balls, was found to contain a chemical which could cause death. The
Agency did not prosecute the offending merchants but merely issued
6 6public warnings regarding the food. Hong Kong authorities examined 
vegetable oil imported from Thailand, found it unfit for human 
consumption and prohibited its sale; the Thai Food and Drug Control 
Division took no action to remove the oil from sale in the home market, 
or even to warn Thai consumers of the danger. Further, in 6 years 
of operation the Agency conducted activities only in Bangkok although 
its responsibilities extended to all 72 provinces. Today, time-expired 
drugs are still sold by pharmacies.
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As the major functions and duties of all transferred staff remained 
unaltered, this was a change in name only and did not represent an 
effective reorganization within the Civil Service. Thus, expansion of 
a department or establishment of a new agency did not result in improved 
effectiveness of the civil service. It did, however, serve as a screen 
covering inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the service, deluding 
the public into believing the government was aware of the problems 
and was taking effective action to solve them. Shuffling of this 
nature saved government 'face'.
THE PRAMOT GOVERNMENTS
SENI PRAMOT (15 February 1975-6 March 1975)
After the general election, M.R. Seni Pramot was appointed Prime 
Minister on 15 February 1975; his final statement on policy in the 
House of Representatives concerned reform of civil service management 
and personnel administration in the interest of efficiency, and the ridding 
of corruption including maltreatment of the people by the officials.
As Seni failed to receive the confidence of the House on March 6, 1975 
(it was the first time in history that the House of Representatives did 
not give confidence), this policy was not initiated.
KUKRIT PRAMOT (14 March 1975-12 March 1976)
M.R. Kukrit Pramot was appointed Prime Minister on 14 March 1975.
His administrative reforms stressed decentralization to provinces and 
the local government, down to grass roots level —  the Tambon Council.
This Council was to be the basic unit in the development of democracy 
and the achievement of economy. The government would amend the Act
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to enable the Tambon Council to be more independent of control from
the Central and Provincial Administration; the Tambon Council would
determine its own economic development programs, while the government
would find Kukrit's view of administrative reform was not bureau
shuffling but the raising of funds for development of local self-
government; however this policy was opposed by the Democratic Party
which claimed that Kukrit used taxpayers' money for political campaigns.
Kukrit's government spent 6 billion baht (A$ 250 million) on the Tambon
6 7Development Scheme. His Party which gained 18 seats in the 1975 
election, gained 83 seats in the 1979 election.
Kukrit's government lasted about one year during which his 
coalition faced considerable political and economic problems. He 
dissolved the House of Representatives on 12 March 1976.
SENI PRAMOT (20 April 1976-17 September 1976; 25 September 1976- 
6 October 1976)
Seni was reappointed Prime Minister on 20 April 1976 with a policy 
similar to his former policy, i.e. the reform of civil service management 
and personnel administration in the interest of higher efficiency.
Civil servants would be directed to give the best service to the 
people. Anti-corruption action was to be a means to reform 
bureaucracy. Junior officials would get welfare assistance such as 
housing and living allowances. Like Kukrit, Seni also faced severe 
political and economic problems. He dissolved the House of Representa­
tives on 17 September 1976, was reappointed on 25 September 1976, 
formed his government and received the confidence of the House of 
Representatives on 5 October 1976. The military group which called 
themselves Administrative Reform Party overthrew Seni's Government on
6 October 1976.
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There was a proposal to the leaders of both the democratic 
governments from the former secretary of the Advisory Committee, to 
re-establish the Advisory Committee, but this was rejected in both 
cases. These two ex-Prime Ministers indicated that they saw no 
advantage in re-establishing Administrative Reform Advisory Committees, 
and therefore did not take this a c t i o n . B o t h  governments were 
concerned with the implementation of policies highlighted during 
their political campaigns for election such as housing, health care 
and the establishment of a distribution fund for the Tambon Development 
Scheme.
SA-NGAD (6 October 1976-22 April 1979)
THANIN (8 October 1976-20 October 1977)
Admiral Sa-ngad Chaloryoo RTN ousted the elected government on 
6 October 1976, and, in an endeavour to legitimize the overthrow,
T»
had Mr. Justice Thanin Kraivixian appointed Prime Minister. Suppression 
of Communist and dissident activists represented the main policy of 
the government, although some attempts were made at administrative 
reform.
The Establishment of the Office of the Narcotic Control Board
The National Administrative Reform Assembly (NARA) which replaced 
the National Legislative Assembly, passed the Act on Prevention and 
Suppression of Narcotics in November 1976, in accord with government 
policy to prevent and suppress the sale and consumption of narcotics, 
which posed dangers for economic and social development.^ An Office
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of the Narcotics Control Board was set up in 1977, composed of
7 agencies —  Office of the Secretary and the following divisions,
Therapy, Research and Flanning, Preventive Education, Suppression,
Legal and Scientific Detection and Narcotic Plant Control. Due to
the increased workload, in May 1979 the Regional Center for Co-operation
70in Prevention and Suppression of Narcotics was added. This might
show the failure of either the reorganization in 1977 or of the operation
of this Office. The Economist was told by one Shan rebel leader from
Burma that, 'There has always been one foolproof way to defeat law-
enforcement. From the Thai border the heroin can be ferried to Bangkok
in army vehicles, VIP limousines, and even narcotics police 
71helicopters'.
The Establishment of the National Committee on Steel Industry Development
In December 1976, the heavy workload associated with the Committee
on Steel Industry Development functioning in the Industrial Economic
and Planning Division of the Office of the Under-Secretary, Ministry
of Industry, resulted in the separation of this function from the
Industrial Economic and Planning Division. The Office of National
Committee on Steel Industry Development was set up. A further reform
within this division was the elimination of sub-nomenclature in the
Central and Finance Divisions, to improve efficiency and permit
72administrative flexibility.
The Reorganization of the Fiscal Policy Office
The Ministry of Finance was another target for reform. A Fiscal 
Planning Division was erected in the Fiscal Policy Office to perform 
the analysis and planning tasks of the Office, to follow-up revenue,
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excise and duty collections, and to examine government expenses.
73Divisions were re-named in keeping with their functions. However 
the potential of the new Fiscal Planning Division was effectively 
negated by the continuing corruption practised in the Revenue, Excise 
and Customs Departments.
Sa-ngad, as Chairman of the National Advisory Council, soon 
recognized that Thanin was not under the Council's control and on 
20 October 1977 —  following Thanin's refusal to reshuffle Cabinet —  he 
had Thanin replaced by General Kriengsak Chomanan. This time Sa-ngad 
called his clique the Revolutionary Party.
KRIENGSAK (11 November 1977-22 April 1979)
The Improvement of the Position Classification System
The outstanding recommendation of the Advisory Committee in the 
Kriengsak I government was the improvement of the position 
classification system. The introduction of position classification 
into the Civil Service was resisted; some reasons were there were 
11 levels instead of five classes in personnel classification (then 
there were five selective examinations for promotion rather than three), 
and the spoils system was used in the reallocation of officials to the 
newly classified positions. The Advisory Committee recommended the 
introduction of a so called 'deep class' in order to lessen the 
selection examination, and selection for promotion was employed too.
The 'deep' class covered the salary ranges of several regular classes 
e.g. of class 1, 2 and 3 combined. This reform was effective in
April 1977.
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The Readjustment of Pay
The Advisory Committee recommended readjustment of the salaries 
paid to civil servants to keep pace with the cost of living. The 
Civil Service Act of B.E. 2521 (1978 A.D.) was promulgated to adjust 
pay scales, effective 1 September 1978. This reform might have been 
a case of 'politics' by Kriengsak, who wanted to gain the favour of 
civil servants.
Acceleration of Civil Service Performance
The Regulation of the Office of the Prime Minister on Accelerated
Civil Service Performance was implemented as recommended by the
Advisory Committee. The purpose of this Regulation was to encourage
74the provision of a faster service to the public by civil servants.
A Commission on Accelerated Civil Service Performance was established 
with a Deputy-Prime Minister as President, to report to the Council 
of Ministers on the amendment of rules or regulations in the civil 
service, aimed at achieving acceleration of the service to the public. 
The Commission directed the government agencies to report their 
performance in this regard; the result was ineffective because of lack 
of performance planning or performance standards in each department, 
and also lack of staff in the Committee to examine those reports 
provided by departments. This regulation was not popular with 
Departments, which looked forward to its withdrawal with the next 
change of government."^5
The Establishment of the Non-Formal Education Department
A Non-Formal Education Department was set up in 1979 by Article 24 
of the Act on the Amendment of the Proclamation of the Revolutionary 
Party No. 216 dated 29 September 1975, B.E. 2522 (1979 A.D.) again on 
an Advisory Committee recommendation. The aim here was to give those
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members of the community who could not, for economic or geographic
reasons, attend formal courses the opportunity to receive vocational
education. Mr. Arthit Urairat, a member of the Advisory Committee
who strongly supported this scheme, indicated that some members of
the Advisory Committee and the Council of Ministers needed to be
persuaded of the value of establishing the Non-Formal Education
Department. Before this establishment, non-formal education was
oversighted by an informal organization in the General Education
Department of the Ministry of Education. The structure of the Non-
Formal Education Department was: the Office of the Secretary,
Operation Division, Planning and Research Division, Non-Formal Education
Development Division, Educational Technology Center, and Center for
7 6Services in Education.
The Establishment of the Ministry of Sciences, Technology and Energy
In March 1977 the National Research Council submitted to the
Council of Ministers a report on administrative reform recommending the
framing of a policy on natural science and technology and the
establishment of a Ministry of Natural Science and Technology. The
National Research Council believed that the government should have
a policy on, and utilize natural science and technology in, for example,
natural resources, land utilization, agriculture, industry, environment,
medical science and public health, in the interest of national 
77development. The Ministry of Natural Science and Technology should
78be established to study, plan, and implement these policies. The 
establishment of this Ministry would require the setting up of new 
organizations, and transfer of existing agencies. There would be a 
permanent Advisory Committee on Natural Sciences and Technology to
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advise Ministers in these matters. Some state enterprises would 
participate within this Ministry, and both new agencies and existing 
state enterprises be transferred to the control of the Ministry, 
some with expanded roles.^
The Council of Ministers directed the Administrative Reform 
Advisory Committee to study this report. Simultaneously the 
National Energy Administration submitted a proposal to the Council 
of Ministers to establish an Energy Authority. The Prime Minister
81directed that these 2 organizations should be in the one Ministry.
In 1979, the Ministry of Science, Technology and Energy was
established; to it were transferred the Office of Atomic Energy for
Peace from the Ministry of Industry, the National Energy Administration,
the Office of the National Environment Board, and the Office of the
National Research Council all from the Office of the Prime Minister,
and within it were the newly established Office of the Secretary,
Office of the Under-Secretary and the Science Service Department;
also included was a state enterprise —  the Thailand Institute of
8 2Scientific and Technological Research.
Reform in the Office of the Juridical Council
The Act on Juridical Council of B.E. 2476 (1933 A.D.), provided 
that the Office of the Juridical Council perform a law-drafting 
function, and supply legal advice to the legislative body, the 
Council of Ministers and government agencies. The Act was updated 
in B.E. 2510 (1957 A.D.).
On 1 May 1979 the above Acts together with the Act on Petitions
O O
of B.E. 2492 (1949 A.D.) were abolished. The new Act extended the 
duty and authority of the Office of the Juridical Council. Under the
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new Act, the Office of Petition Commission, attached to the Office of 
the Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister after the abolition of the 
Board of Inspection and Follow-up of Government Operation, was 
amalgamated with the Office of Juridical Council. The Act of B.E.
2522 referred to the former Act of B.E. 2476 as outdated and unsuitable 
for public administration. It was stated that it was a Government 
policy to establish a Tribunal Administration to be managed by the 
Ministry of Justice. Petitions would be dealt with by this Tribunal 
Administration and the Office of the Juridical Council needed to 
follow the course of petitions if they (the Council) were to amend the 
Act. Further, amalgamation would provide the Petitions Commission with 
experience in drafting laws and framing recommendations for a legal 
viewpoint. Finally, amalgamation would resolve the confusing situation 
where people could place petitions through both the Office of the 
Petitions Commission and the Secretariat to the Prime Minister: from
now on there would be only one place of lodgement —  the Office of 
the Juridical Council.
On the same day (but published in later pages) the Act to
transfer Functions and Administration of the Office of Petition
Commission in the Office of the Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister
to the Secretariat of the Prime Minister or to the Office of the
84Juridical Council was promulgated. Article 3 stated:
Transfer authority and duty of the Office of 
Petition Committee, Office of the Under-Secretary 
to the Prime Minister, Office of the Prime Minister, 
and the authority and duty of the Secretary of the 
Petition Commission to the Office of the Juridical 
Council or the Secretary-General of the Office of 
Juridical Council.
Article 4 of the Same Act stated:
Transfer the assets, debts, civil servants, employees 
and budget of the Petition Commission, the Office 
of the Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister to the
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Secretariat of the Prime Minister or the Office 
of the Juridical Council, as the Prime Minister 
would announce in Royal Thai Government Gazette.
The aim of the new Act ostensibly was to remove the functional 
overlap between the Office of the Petitions Committee and the Division 
of Public Service in the Secretariat of the Prime Minister, and to 
improve the working of the Petitions Committee.
In fact, there was no functional overlap as the Division of Public 
Service examined the general cases submitted by the people to the 
Prime Minister whilst the Petitions committee dealt with those (other) 
cases which came under the provisions of the Petitions Act of B.E.
2492 (1949 A.D.) and to the Amendment Act of B.E. 2516 (1976 A.D.). 
These were cases which required government action to remedy unfair 
treatment or maltreatment of the public by government employees. Thus 
there was no administrative logic in bringing together these agencies. 
Similarly the argument that the amalgamation was necessary for the 
Juridical Council to be able to amend the Petitions Act appears 
groundless when it is realized the Juridical Council already amended 
civil and commercial law without any amalgamations in those areas.
The proposed Tribunal Administration was to be in the Ministry of 
Justice, i.e. quite separate from the Juridical Council.
A more cogent reason for the amalgation could be that Sompop 
Hotrakit, a Deputy Prime Minister, Secretary-General of the Office 
of the Juridical Council and also Chairman of the Administrative 
Reform Advisory Committee, sought to increase his power.
The Effort to Reform the Competitive Examinations
The Advisory Committee decided to reform the competitive 
examination conducted for entry into the public service. The Civil
159.
Service Commission was directed to establish a Committee for Competitive
Examination, comprising representatives from departments. This Committee
was to administer the examination and to cooperate with departments
in the placement of the successful candidates; to improve the eligible
list (i.e. the list of successful candidates) and improve the standard
of the examination. But the Civil Service Commission did not execute
8 5the Advisory Committee's direction.
CONCLUSION
From Sarit through to Kriengsak I, each military regime maintained 
a policy of national economic and social development and the reform of 
the administrative agencies central to this development, the civil 
service. Each military regime approached reform of the Civil Service 
in the same way: by the establishment of an Advisory Committee to
examine the administration of departments and to make recommendations 
to the regime on actions necessary to achieve reform.
The problems the Advisory Committees were directed to solve were: 
(i) the unequal distribution of staff both between and within 
Ministries, (ii) overlap of functions between Ministries, (iii) 
lack of coordination between and within Ministries, and (iv) the 
absence of planning services in some areas concerned with government 
policy.
The Advisory Committees made recommendations which, in general, 
were those expected by the ruling junta, i.e. the Advisory Committees 
displayed respect for their masters' wishes as they dealt with their 
studies. Sarit, for example, made it clear he wanted more control
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vested in his own office (Office of the Prime Minister), and the 
Advisory Committee obliged by transferring or establishing several 
departments under the control of his office.
All Advisory Committees recommended the restructuring of 
selected departments, with appropriate reallocation of staff; all 
recommended the establishment of new agencies. In general, these 
were the only recommendations made. Exceptions occurred during the 
Sarit and the Thanom III regimes, when proposals included a 
reallocation of responsibilities in the Civil Service generally, 
accompanied by the transfer of departments between Ministries. As 
a rule, the regimes accepted and implemented the recommendations put 
toward, especially those which reflected their own beliefs. Some 
recommendations, but never more than one-third of those proposed, were 
modified to suit political or prevailing circumstances.
From the viewpoints of efficiency and economy, the reforms failed 
to achieve their objectives. The Report of the Advisory Committee in 
1972 to the Thanom III regime stated that the previous (1959-1971) 
reorganizations caused problems and raised barriers in administration, 
especially in the aspects of efficiency and economy. Successive 
regimes reversed some of the reforms of previous governments as 
current policy directed, e.g. the Office of the Prime Minister had 
its powers, responsibilities and staff numbers greatly increased 
under Sarit, to be subsequently reduced under Thanom and increased 
three years later under Sanya.
The practical capability of staff was a vital factor affecting 
the outcome of any reform measures, but the Advisory Committees ignored 
this aspect. Failure to recognize that academic qualifications,
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however desirable, could not substitute for practical training directly 
related to duties has led to criticism by the World Bank as recently 
as 1977. Representatives of the Thai Government, the United Nations 
and the World Bank agreed that public administrators in Thailand were 
not ready to meet the challenges facing management in the complex 
public sphere.88
This sentiment was supported in the Fourth National Economic 
and Social Development Plan (1977-1981) of the Government of Thailand 
which stated that:
Most of the administrators in Thailand are 
still unaware of the basic principles of sound 
.management.
and that
At present the demand for capable and 
experienced administrators in Thailand far 
exceeds supply.87
Under the democratic governments (between the Sanya and Thanin 
government) no Administrative Reform Advisory Committees were 
established. Both Kukrit and Seni Pramot saw no advantage in such 
committees, and preferred to concentrate their efforts on social and 
land reforms rather than the restructure of government agencies.
Kukrit's attention was focused on foreign policy, especially on 
the establishment of diplomatic relations with China; on the 
domestic front he instituted the Tambon Development Fund, in line 
with his declared campaign policy of decentralization of government 
to the grassroots. On a cost-benefit basis the taxpayer probably 
lost money supporting this scheme; although, from Kukrit's viewpoint, 
at least the funds provided employment for the poor rural people 
during the dry season which is a more noble outcome than other
government ventures where large sums seem to do little other than
support corrupt practices in the civil service.
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CHAPTER V
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES DURING MILITARY REGIMES
INTRODUCTION
From the time of Sarit's regime, all administrative reform advisory 
committees have operated under appropriate legislative cover, the 
relevant Act being amended or replaced as successive governments have 
deemed necessary. Whilst committee membership has varied both in composition 
and numbers under different governments, certain characteristics have 
remained largely unchanged from Sarit to Sa-ngad II: members are senior
civil servants or technocrats, virtually all holding tertiary qualifications, 
and most hold other full-time positions making prior demands on their 
time.
In this chapter a comparison is drawn with the interdepartmental 
committees of the Australian bureaucracy, revealing similarities in 
structure and operational approach, and problems common to both.
The advisory committee was re-established by each of the military 
governments, and a degree of continuity provided by the retention of 
several members through a number of committees. To assist the committee 
to carry out its detailed tasks, personnel analysts and O&M officers 
were provided as support staff. Initially these numbered fewer than 
ten officers but as a clearer understanding of the size of the workload 
emerged their numbers were increased, eventually to over two hundred.
Other support was provided by the allocation of civil servants to the
various sub-committees established by the advisory committee. 
Administrative support at the meetings was supplied by a Secretariat 
drawn from the same office or agency providing the Secretary.
Research conducted for this study has not revealed any useful 
information on costs associated with the establishment or operation 
of the advisory committees.
Finally, this chapter notes that the role of the committee was 
advisory and the functions of successive committees included 
restructuring and the establishment of staffing patterns. In executing 
these functions, the advisory committee followed procedures laid down 
for its guidance.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES
Phibun's attempt at reform within departments was conducted by 
the CSC as part of its normal function. No special legislation was 
provided to support the CSC in this activity, nor was any task force 
formed to carry out the task. The attempt at reform was not effective. 
A lack of clear objectives in the 'Five Year Plan', the framework 
within which reforms were to be achieved, contributed largely to the 
failure of the attempt.
A further venture into reform concerned decentralization. In 1956 
Phibun's government endeavoured to introduce decentralization in 
administration; a 'Committee for Establishment of Staffing Patterns', 
chaired by the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Interior was 
established with the objective of transferring officials from Central
to Provincial and Local Administration. This venture also failed when
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the central departments refused to release the officers; however, the 
committee did succeed in establishing the number of officials for 
transfer .
Sarit assumed power in 1958, and the following year in line with 
his declared policy he established a committee to study public 
administration and recommend ways of improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of departments. Legislation was enacted to provide a legal 
basis for the operation of the Admnistrative Reform Advisory Committee 
as it was to be titled.
Article 17 of the Act on Organizing of the Administration in the 
Office of the Prime Minister cf B.E. 2502 (1959 A.D.) empowered the Prime 
Minister to appoint well-educated or experienced public administrators 
to work in his office.'1' Thus Sarit was able to set up the first 
Administrative Reform Advisory Committee and have it function within the 
Office of the Prime Minister. In later years, under other regimes, 
this Act was replaced by other legislation or proclamations, but at all 
times there was a legal basis supporting the Administrative Reform 
Advisory Committee. For example, the initial Act of B.E. 2502 (1959 A.D.) 
was abolished and replaced by another Act of the same title in B.E. 2505 
(1962 A.D.) in which article 20 gave the Prime Minister similar powers 
to Article 17 of the initial Act.
On 29 September 1972 Proclamation No. 218 of the Revolutionary Party 
abolished the Act of B.E. 2505 and in Article 9 (6) empowered the Prime 
Minister to appoint well-educated or experienced public administrators 
as chairman of advisors, or as members of advisory committees, or to act 
as advisors themselves to the Prime Minister. Whilst the appointment of 
the Administrative Reform Advisory Committee was based on statutory 
law, the committee itself was a non-statutory body, operating under
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normal civil service acts and regulations. The Report of the RCAGA
defines a non-statutory body as 'a governmental agency which is not
created by an Act of Parliament or an executive regulation (and which
2is not a department)'. By contrast, had the committee been established 
as a statutory body, it could have been independent of the civil service 
and able, within the limits of its budget, to employ and dismiss 
permanent staff selected according to its own standards.
The advisory committee and its sub-committees were dissolved when a
change of government occurred because they were established to serve the
3policy of the government of the day. The incoming government might choose 
not to establish Administrative Reform Advisory Committees, as happened 
in the Seni Pramot and Kukrit Pramot regimes. The existence of the advisory 
committee was dependent upon the new government re-establishing the 
committee. A discontinuity in the design of administrative reform has 
occurred in the Pramot regimes.
The fact that the committee was a non-statutory body had several 
effects detrimental to the achievement of reform. There was a break in 
continuity as the committee depended on being re-established by the 
incoming government, with no guarantee that the composition of membership 
would remain unchanged. A conflict of interests could arise when 
members, who were drawn generally from civil service departments to 
serve part-time on the committee, had to consider issues affecting their 
own or associated departments. This conflict would be avoided if the 
committee had status as a statutory body, with members employed on a 
permanent basis and having loyalty only to that body. The committee 
had no direct access to the Parliament, the findings being presented 
by the chairman to the Prime Minister. Under recent regimes, the chairman
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has been drawn from the Office of the Prime Minister, a fact which puts 
the objectivity of the committee's findings under question.
STRUCTURE OF MEMBERSHIP
Thai military-dominated bureaucracies were alleged to lean more 
heavily than others on expert civilian administrators or technocrats 
for advice, and these technocrats often exercised considerable influence 
because of their knowledge and personal qualities and the confidence which 
the rulers had in them. The technocrats working for the Administrative 
Reform Advisory Committee primarily were academics who specialized in 
organization and management. The other members were senior or retired 
officials experienced in personnel and public administration, and treasury 
matters. Most of the members were 'outsiders' of the departments being 
reorganized. Over a period 1959 to 1979, and excepting the appointed 
governments of Sanya, and the democratic interlude of 1975-76, a total 
of seven military regimes governed Thailand. Each of these regimes 
established an Administrative Reform Advisory Committee, whose membership 
tended to remain stable.
On April 18, 1959, Sarit established the first Advisory Committee 
on State Enterprises to enquire into activities and practices of state 
enterprises with a view to reform, and also the first Administrative 
Reform Advisory Committee, the latter under the chairmanship of Thawee 
Raengkham the Dean of the Faculty of Political Science at Thammasat 
University who also held an attached position in the Office of the 
Prime Minister. There were 12 members including the chairman, and the 
committee was serviced by its secretary, the Deputy Director-General 
of the Department of Interior, assisted by selected CSC staff. The
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median age-grouping of the committee was 51-60 years, with no member 
younger than 40 years. All were graduates including' two holding doctoral 
degrees. Two of the members were retired officers, and all had made their 
careers in the public sector.
Later in 1959 Sarit added two members to the committee, Sakron 
Karunanont —  Deputy Comptroller —  and Utai Sinthusan —  Assistant Budget 
Director, an addition was made again in 1960 —  Manune Borisuth, the 
Secretary General to the Council of Ministers — , and on two occasions 
in 1963 —  Major General Hiran Siriwat, the Deputy Executive Secretary 
to the Prime Minister, Colonel Chinda na Songkhla, the Deputy Secretary 
General of the Office of the Civil Service Commission and Buntham 
Thongkhaimuk, the Deputy Budget Director. At the close of the Sarit 
regime, the advisory committee comprised a chairman —  still the original 
office holder —  and 17 other members (Table 5.1). The median age of 
members collectively remained as before and all held tertiary 
qualifications. Two of the 18 were from the retired list, and the 
original 12 still served on the Committee.
On 26 March 1963, a Sub-Committee on Staffing Patterns was 
established (Table 5.13), composed of 15 members, to study staffing 
patterns in the civil service, a new function of the advisory committee.
The Thanom I period commenced on 9 December 1963. Thanom 
reappointed the Chairman-Thawee Raengkham and established an Advisory 
Committee of 19 members (Table 5.2). Seventeen of these had served 
on the previous committee. Luang Attakriwanwatee was not reappointed 
due to his age, and two new members were Lt. General Nete Khemayothin 
and Maj. General Sawaeng Senanarong. The median age of the committee 
remained in the 51-60 years group, all members were qualified at the
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TABLE 5.1: ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ADVISORY COMMITTEE UNDER THE SARIT
GOVERNMENT
1. Thawee Raengkham Chairman
2. Malai Huwanant Member
3. M.R. Thongthaeng Thongtham II
4. Luang Sukhumnaiyapradit I f
5. Phraya Sunthornphiphit It
6. Phra Dunyaphaksawaman II
7. Maj. Gen. Chitti Naweesathien 11
8. Luang Norrakitborrihan 1 9
9. Luang Attakriwanwatee II
10. Colonel Banchob Issaradun If
11. Bunchana Atthakorn I !
12. Sakorn Karunanont II
13. Uthai Sinthusan II
14. Manune Borisuth If
15. Maj. Gen. Hiran Siriwat II
16. Colonel Chinda na Songkhla If
17. Buntham Thongkhaimuk If
18. Phuang Suwannarat " and Secretary
Source: Order of the Prime Minister No. 18/2502, 19/2502, 34/2503,
16/2506, 31/2506 and 50/2506
175.
TABLE 5.2: ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ADVISORY COMMITTEE UNDER THE THANOM I
GOVERNMENT
1. Thawee Raengkham Chairman
2. Phraya Sunthornphiphit Member
3. Phra Duyaphaksuwaman II
4. General Chitti Naweesathien II
5. Lt. Gen. Nete Khemayothin II
6. Maj. Gen. Sawaeng Senanarong If
7. Bunchana Atthakorn II
8. Malai Huwanant II
9. M.R. Thongthaeng Thongthaem II
10. Luang Norrakitborrihan I t
11. Luang Sukhumnaiyapradit II
12. Colonel Banchob Issaradun II
13. Sakorn Karunanont II
14. Manune Borisuth II
15. Maj. Gen. Hiran Siriwat II
16. Colonel Chinda na Songkhla II
17. Buntham Thongkhaimu II
18. Phuang Suwannarat " and Secretary
19. Uthai Sinthusan " and Assistant Secretary
Source: Order of the Prime Minister No. 286/2506
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tertiary level and there was no representation from outside the public sector. 
This structure was retained throughout the period.
A Sub-Committee on the Establishment of Reorganization and Staffing Patterns 
was formed (Table 5.13) to assist the main committee on 13 February 1964. It 
had 21 members including the chairman who was the Director-General of the 
Treasury Department. The task of the sub-committee was to conduct studies 
and make recommendations to the Advisory Committee.
During.the Thanom II regime, substantial changes to the committee 
were effected (Table 5.3). On re-establishment, the Administrative 
Reform Advisory Committee contained ten members, mostly new appointees
TABLE 5.3. ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
THANOM II GOVERNMENT
UNDER THE
1. Thawee Raengkham Chairman
2. Lt. Gen. Sawaeng Senanarong Member
3. Secretary-General of the National 
Economic Development Board .
4. Budget Director II
5. Comptroller-General II
6. Secretary-General of the Office of 
the Civil Service Commission II
7. Malai Huwanant II
8. Sak Phasukniran II
9. Praween na Nakorn II
10. Director of Technique and Examination
Division, Office of the Civil Service 
Commission " and Secretary
Source: Order of the Prime Minister No. 122/2512
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with the same chairman —  Thawee Raengkham —  as the previous committee. 
The position of committee secretary was now taken by Samran Thawarayuth—  
the Director of Technical and Examination Division of the Office of the 
Civil Service Commission. Median age, level of academic qualification 
and background of the committee remained as previously, but one 
structural change was noticeable —  five members were selected on the 
basis of their civil service positions rather than for any personal 
qualification. These were the Secretary-General of the National Economic 
Development Board, the Budget Director, the Comptroller-General, the 
Secretary-General of the Office of the Civil Service Commission and 
the Director of the Technique and Examination Division of the Office 
of the Civil Service Commission. The remaining five members were the 
Advisor to the Minister of Interior, Malai Huwanant; the Secretary- 
General of the Office of the Civil Service Commission, Colonel Chinda 
na Songkhla; an academic from Thammasat University, Sak Phasukniran; a 
Deputy Secretary-General of the Office of the Civil Service Commission, 
Praween na Nakorn; and the Minister of the Office of the Prime Minister,
Lt. General Sawaeng Senanarong. Later an assistant to the committee was 
appointed from the Office of the Civil Service Commissicn. As with the 
previous committee, a sub-committee, this time of 17 persons, was 
formed to provide assistance (see Table 5.13).
In June 1971, toward the end of the second Thanom regime, a 
committee comprising the same officers was appointed to replace the 
previous committee. This was necessary as members were appointed by 
position, and one of the members —  Samran Thawarayuth—  had taken up 
a different position after the reorganization of the Office of the
Civil Service Commission.
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November 1971 saw the third Thanom regime. Again, the committee
was re-established (Table 5.4) with one notable departure from the past —
for the first time an 'outsider' to the civil service was placed on the
TABLE 5.4: ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ADVISORY COMMITTEE UNDER THE THANOM III
GOVERNMENT
1. Maj. Gen. Siri Siriyothin Chairman
2. Lt. Gen. Sawaeng Senanarong Member
3. Admiral Anan Netrote t l
4. Lt. Gen. Bunruan Buacharune II
5. Lt. Gen. Chan Uangsuchote II
6. Colonel Chinda na Songkhla 1»
7. Colonel Chinawoot Sunthonsima II
8. Malai Huwanant n
9. Praphon Bunnak i t
10. Praween na Nakorn i l
11. Samran Thawarayuth " and Secretary
Source: Order of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Party No. 99/2514
committee: Colonel Chinawoot Sunthonsima, at the time working on loan
from the Army for ECAFE (now called ESCAP). In the event he proved to 
be a most productive and energetic committeeman. The previous chairman, 
now very old, was not reappointed—  the new chairman was an ex-serviceman, 
ex-politician, ex-speaker of the House of Representatives —  Maj. General
Siri Siriyothin. The position of secretary was given to Samran Thawarayuth
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the Director of Positions and Pays in the Office of the Civil Service 
Commission. Median age and academic qualification were similar to 
previous committees. As seen in Table 5.13, three sub-committees now 
serviced the advisory committee —  a Sub-Committee on the Establishment 
of Reorganization and Staffing Patterns (17 members), a Sub-Committee 
on Restructuring the Civil Service (15 members) and a Sub-Committee on 
the Establishment of the Office of Food Standards Commission (8 members).
On 18 December 1972, the Thanom IV regime was formed. The advisory 
committee subsequently appointed (Table 5.5) had 12 members including 
the chairman, a position held on this occasion by the Minister of the
TABLE 5.5: ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ADVISORY COMMITTEE UNDER THE THANOM IV
GOVERNMENT
1. Lt. Gen. Sawaeng Senanarong Chairman
2. Malai Huwanant Member
3. Admiral Anan Netrote "
4. Lt. Gen. Bunruan Buacharune "
5. Lt. Gen. Chan Uangsuchote "
6. Colonel Chinda na Songkhla "
7. Phanat Simasathien "
8. Praween na Nakorn "
9. Colonel Chinawoot Sunthonsima "
10. Amorn Raksasat "
11. Kramon Thongthammachat "
12. Samran Thawarayuth " and Secretary
Source: Order of the Prime Minister No. 7/2516
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Office of the Prime Minister Lt. General Sawaeng Senanarong, who had
been a member of the previous committee, the secretary to the previous
committee Samran Thawarayuth retained this position on the new committee.
Eight of the members were civil servants, three were academics, Amorn
Raksasat, Kramon Thongthammachat and Malai Huwanant, and one was an
outsider, Colonel Chinawoot Sunthonsima, the same person as on the
previous committee), the median age was 50, and all had tertiary
qualifications, four having gained these overseas. In order to develop
the restructuring proposed by the previous committee (and subsequently
implemented by the regime) the new advisory committee was assisted by
a total of nine sub-committees, (see Table 5.13) whose specific charter
was to improve the organization and management of departments, and the
coordination, planning and policy between departments, and to improve
4the efficiency of the civil servant.
Thanom resigned and went into exile following student unrest in 
October 1973; his successor was Professor Sanya Thammasak. The first 
Sanya regime, 14 October 1973 to 22 May 1974 reappointed an Administrative 
Reform Advisory Committee (Table 5.6), chaired by the same person as 
headed the outgoing committee —  Lt. Gen. Sawaeng Senanarong. Sanya 
used qualification, as distinct from position, as the criterion for 
appointment; however, this did not result in any change to the 
composition of the committee as all previous members, except for the 
secretary, were returned to the new committee. Samran Thawarayuth, the 
previous secretary was promoted to an overseas posting, and Somdee 
Charoenkun of the Office of the Civil Service Commission became the 
new secretary to the committee with Udon Bunprakob as assistant secretary. 
This advisory committee had five sub-committees to assist with the workload
(see Table 5.13). Sanya resigned on 22 May 1974 and was re-appointed 
within 5 days, to form his second regime.
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TABLE 5.6: ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ADVISORY COMMITTEE UNDER THE SANYA I
GOVERNMENT
1. Lt. Gen. Sawaeng Senanarong Chairman
2. Malai Huwanant Member
3. Admiral Anan Netrote ft
4. Lt. Gen. Bunruan Buacharune II
5. Lt. Gen. Chan Uangsuchote II
6. Colonel Chinda na Songkhla II
7. Phanat Simasathien II
8. Praween na Nakorn II
9. Colonel Chinawoot Sunthonsima II
10. Amorn Raksasat II
11. Kramon Thongthammachat II
12. Somdee Charoenkun " and Secretary
Source: Order of the Prime Minister No. 238/2516
Again he set up the advisory committee (Table 5.7), this time 
of 13 persons including a new chairman Manune Borisuth, who replaced 
Lt. Gen. Sawaeng Senanarong in the position of the Minister of the Office 
of the Prime Minister. Eight men from the previous committee were 
retained, but the new members were somewhat younger than their colleagues, 
resulting in a lower median age of 41 to 50 years for the committee. All 
had degrees, two were academics and the remainder civil servants. There 
were no outsiders on the committee; the new chairman held the position 
of Minister of the Office of the Prime Minister. Three sub-committees
were formed to help the main committee. (See Table 5.13.)
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TABLE 5.7: ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ADVISORY COMMITTEE UNDER THE SANYA II
GOVERNMENT
1. Manune Borisuth
2. Thien Atchakun
3. Lt. Gen. Bunruan Buacharune
4. Phlang Meechun
5. Budget Director
6. Colonel Chinda na Songkhla
7. Phanat Simasathien
8. Sanoh Unakun
9. Praween na Nakorn
10. Nitsai Wetchachiwa
11. Amorn Raksasat
12. Kramon Thongthaminachat
13. Somdee Charoenkun
Chairman
Member
and Secretary
Source: Order of the Prime Minister No. 135/2517
Under the new Constitution, elections were held resulting in the 
election of Seni Pramot in February 1975. Under the democratic governments 
of Seni and Kukrit Pramot, no advisory committees were established.
On 6 October 1976, a coup d'etat carried out by a group under the
title of National Administrative Reform Party, resulted in Admiral Sa-ngad
Chaloryoo RTN taking power, with Thanin Kraivixien appointed as his
5Prime Minister to gain legitimacy. An advisory committee (Table 5.8) 
was established, with the Under-Secretary of the Office of the Prime 
Minister as chairman. Eight persons comprised the committee, selected
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TABLE 5.8: ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ADVISORY COMMITTEE UNDER THE THANIN
GOVERNMENT
1. The Under-Secretary of the Office of the
Prime Minister*
2. Budget Director**
Chairman
Member
3. Secretary-General of the Office of the
Civil Service Commission*** "
4. The Comptroller-General "
5. Thanom Suksat "
6. Chalermrat Khamphanont "
7. The Director of Standards and Development
Division, Office of the Civil Service " and Secretary
Commission****
8. The Chief of the Advisory Board and Committee 
Division, Secretariat of the Prime Minister and Assistant Secretary
Source: Order of the Prime Minister No. 33/2519
N.B. * Lt. Gen. Bunruan Buacharune
** Suthee Singsanae
*** Colonel Chinda na Songkhla
**** Somdee Charoenkun
according to their positions. Fifty-one to 60 years was the median age 
grouping, all had degrees, five from overseas, and one of the members 
was an 'outsider': Chairman of the Textile Organization —  a state
enterprise. To support the work of the advisory committee, two sub­
committees were established (See Table 5.13). The secretary of the 
main committee, although the same person as previously held the position, 
was now the Director of the Standards and Development Division, Office 
of the Civil Service Commission.
Thanin was ousted on 20 October 1977, and the Sa-ngad II regime 
selected General Kriengsak Chomanan as Prime Minister. The Advisory
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Committee (Table  5 .9 )  t h i s  t im e  was c h a i r e d  by t h e  D eputy-P rime  M i n i s t e r ,  
who e n l a r g e d  t h e  Committee  t o  21,  by i n c l u d i n g  t h e  U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y  o f  each
TABLE 5 . 9 :  ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ADVISORY COMMITTEE UNDER THE KRIENGSAK
GOVERNMENT
1. A D epu ty - Prime M i n i s t e r Chairman
2. The M i n i s t e r  o f  t h e O f f i c e o f  t h e Prime M i n i s t e r * Member
3. The Under - S e c r e t a r y o f  t h e O f f i c e o f  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r II
4. II II II II M i n i s t r y o f Defence II
5 . If II II I t M i n i s t r y of F in a n c e II
6 . II II II II M i n i s t r y o f F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s 11
7. II II II I t M i n i s t r y o f A g r i c u l t u r e  and 
C o o p e r a t i v e s
If
8 . II If II II M i n i s t r y o f Communicat ions I t
9 . II II II ll M i n i s t r y o f Commerce II
10. II II 1 II M i n i s t r y o f I n t e r i o r II
11. II IS II it M i n i s t r y o f J u s t i c e II
12. II II II II M i n i s t r y o f E d u c a t i o n II
13. II II II If M i n i s t r y o f P u b l i c  H e a l th 1
14. 1 If II If M i n i s t r y of I n d u s t r y If
15. II II II II M i n i s t r y o f S t a t e  U n i v e r s i t i e s II
16. The Budget  D i r e c t o r II
17.  The S e c r e t a r y - G e n e r a l  o f  t h e  O f f i c e  o f  t h e  C i v i l  S e r v i c e  H
Commission**
18.  Meechai Ruchuphan "
19.  A t h i t  U r a i r a t  "
20.  Somdee Charoenkun Member and S e c r e t a r y
21.  The C h ie f  o f  t h e  A d v i s o r y  Board and Commit tee  D i v i s i o n ,  Member and
S e c r e t a r i a t  o f  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r  A s s i s t a n t  S e c r e t a r y
S o u r c e : Order  o f  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r  No. 19/2521
N .B . * L t . Gen. Bunruan Buacha rune
** C o l o n e l  Chinda  na  Songkh la
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Ministry. One effect of this approach was to raise the. median age of 
members although it remained in the 51-60 years grouping. All had 
university qualifications, a majority (15) receiving their degrees 
overseas. Two were academics, the remainder civil servants. The person 
who previously performed the role of committee secretary retained that 
post. Five sub-committees were formed (see Table 5.13).
It is interesting to note that the next government, i.e. Kriengsak's 
elected government, reverted to the previous practice of appointing 
individuals, rather than office-holders, to the advisory committee 
(see Table 5.10), because of the demonstrated unwillingness of the latter 
to participate vigorously in Committee discussions. In an interview one 
member, Dr. Arthit Urairat, ascribed this behaviour to a fear that 
criticism of another department might later lead to a searching 
examination of the critics own department.
The composition of committees had a significant effect on their 
ability to perform their role. Firstly, members found difficulty in 
coping with workloads additional to those stemming from their normal 
departmental duties. This was reflected in the poor attendance achieved 
at the monthly committee meetings, a quorum often being barely achieved. 
Departmental duties affected the time members could give to studying 
papers listed for committee discussion —  frequently members were 
forced to rely completely on briefings prepared by their own staff, 
thus giving undue weight to the views of juniors. The composition 
of committees also raised the question of divided loyalties: each member
had to weigh his contribution to committee debate with its effect on 
the interests of his own department. One further criticism of committee 
composition concerns the lack of 'outsider' participation. Although
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TABLE 5.10: ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ADVISORY COMMITTEE UNDER THE ELECTED
GOVERNMENT OF GENERAL KRIENGSAK CHOMANAN
1. Deputy Prime Minister (Sompop Hotrakit) Chairman
2. Minister of Science, Technology 
(Chub Kanchanaprakon)
and Energy Vice-Chairman
3. Admiral Kete Santiwetchakun Member
4. Thaloeng Thamrongnawasawat 11
5. Praween na Nakorn 11
6. Preecha Kosonphan 11
7. Phanat Simasathien I!
8. Meechai Ruchuphan II
9. Wichan Niwatwong II
10. Wichit Srisa-an M
11. Winyu Angkhanarak 11
12. Wirote Laohaphan II
13. Captain Wirote Osathanukraoh 11
14. Somdee Charoenkun II
15. Amorn Raksasat II
16. Arthit Urairat II
17. Wanchak Worradilok Member and Secretary
18. Suthep Thammaphibaludom Member and Assistant Secretary
19. Sub. Lt. Pramote Sutrabut Member and Assistant Secretary
Source: Order of the Office of the Prime Minister No. 140/2522
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members were invariably outsiders to the department under study, they 
nevertheless were civil servants or other government' employees, constrained 
in their views by past bureaucratic experience. Committees might have 
benefited from the appointment of some private sector persons as members; 
this could well have led to a wider range of options or recommendations 
being presented to government, and in addition, the objectivity of the 
recommendations might have been enhanced.
Parallels can be drawn between aspects of Thai Administrative 
Reform Advisory Committees and the category of Australian Government 
Interdepartmental Committee (IDC) concerned with policy coordination 
and the provision of policy advice on matters of public administration 
to the government. These latter forums often are established when more 
than one department has a vested interest in a policy issue on which
g
government has not yet adopted a firm stance. Composition of such
7an IDC is likely to be fewer than 12 members, it will meet probably 
from one to five times a year and, in the case of the ’standing’ IDC
3
should enjoy a life-span in excess of 6 years. The chairman and
members will most likely be senior members of the several departments
involved in the IDC. Painter and Carey note that collective forums —
such as Cabinet Committees —  have not worked well in the Australian
context, hence the proliferation of IDCs to formulate advice. However
the IDCs themselves are collective forums and the lack of incentives
for departmental representatives to reach collective agreement has
9inhibited their effectiveness. IDCs have been described as cumbersome, 
slow and yielding recommendations which are over-cautious and reflect 
only the small common ground of the views of the departments involved.^
At times, IDCs operate under vague, ambiguous terms of reference, ^  and 
tend to delay decisions, but this may well suit the politicians of the
day.
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Thus the Australian civil service standing IDC and the Thai 
Administrative Reform Advisory Committee exhibit a number of common 
characteristics: each is composed largely (100% in the Australian case)
of bureaucrats and is similar in size, membership is drawn from senior 
officers, committees meet infrequently, and tend to continue in operation 
over several years, and most importantly the dominance of individual 
departmental interests governs and consequently restricts the value of 
committee recommendations, so that the agreed proposals often represent 
an ineffectual response to the policy issues examined.
PROFILE OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ADVISORY COMMITTEE
From the regime of Sarit through to Sa-ngad II, there were a total 
of nine committees established to advise on administrative reform.
Whilst individual committees differed in composition (Table 5.11), a 
number of characteristics were common to all, consequently it is 
possible to present a profile of the 'typical' committee. This profile 
however should be read in conjunction with Table 5.11.
From Table 5.11, the typical committee would consist of around a 
dozen members, aged 40 to 60 years. All would have tertiary 
qualifications, eight obtaining theirs from overseas universities, and half 
of the members would be qualified at an advanced level. Three-quarters 
of the members would be regularly employed within the bureaucracy, two 
would be academics, and the other members would either be retired 
from full time employment of be from outside the civil service. The 
chairman would be a senior Minister, most likely with a military background, 
and aged in his mid-fifties.
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Almost all members were technocrats. Stifel defined a technocrat, 
in the Thai context, as:
...a government official with a modern education in 
Thailand or abroad which provided skills used to make 
significant improvements in national policy formulation
or administration.12
By these criteria, the level of office achieved by advisory committee 
members, coupled with their educational background ensured the presence 
of a strong technocratic influence in the committees.
This was in keeping with recent Thai experience; technocrats have
featured prominently in the development of national administration from
the Chakkri Reformation through to the present, and since 1932 technocrats
13have increasingly filled the higher positions in the bureaucracy.
The majority of advisory committee members would qualify as
'technocrats' also under Peter Self's classification, wherein management
14experts and economic advisors are placed within the 'technocracy'.
CONTINUATION
In accord with the legislative requirements, the advisory committee 
ceased to exist when a government left office. With the exception of 
the elected governments, successive regimes chose to re-establish the 
Administrative Reform Advisory Committees which then continued to pursue 
the legacy of tasks inherited from the previous committee. A new government 
introduced new policies, often requiring modifications to the existing 
administrative structure for their implementation. The advisory 
committee of the day would be directed to make recommendations regarding 
the administration of these new policies, thus its workload did not 
diminish. The work of the advisory committee was not well known outside
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the bureaucracy. In fact there were occasions when members were 
reappointed by a Prime Minister who previously had been unaware of their 
existence as a committee, but who wished not to disappoint the sponsors.
Each of the prime ministers might also have recognized the
rationality of retaining a committee with an administrative reform role.
In re-establishing the advisory committee successive governments could be
seen to be pursuing an incremental policy regarding administrative reform.
Dye, citing Lindblom as the originator of the incremental model,
describes incrementalism' as a method which 'views public policy as a
continuation of past government activities with only incremental 
16modifications'. Dye goes on to claim that 'policy makers generally
accept the legitimacy of established programs and tacitly agree to
continue previous policies'. In his view, this reflects acknowledgement
of the difficulties in examining alternatives, the desire to 'play it safe'
by keeping to known programs, the natural tendency to follow-up previous
investments, and political expendiency, in that modifications to existing
17programs arouse less opposition than to radical new policies.
Table 5.12 which lists membership of each advisory committee 
illustrates the number of members who continued in committee service 
through more than one regime e.g. Colonel Chinda na Songkhla, from 
the Office of the Civil Service Commission has been appointed a member 
of the advisory committee established under each regime from Sarit to 
Sa-ngad II. The academic, Malai Huwanant retained membership from the
Sarit committee through to that of Sanya I.
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TABLE 5 . 1 2 t  MEMBERSHIP O r ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ADVISORY COMMITTEES
SAIUT
18
THANOM I  
19
THANOM I I
10
THANOM I I I
11
C h i n d a  n a  S o n q k h l a CSC X X X X X X X X X
T h a v e e  R a e r .q kh a n A c a d e m i c X X X
M a l a i  H u w a n a n t A c a d e m i c X | X X X X X
T h o n g t h a c n g  T hon g thorn F i n a n c e X L .  *
S u k h u m n a l y a p r a d i t CSC X
L .  *
S u n t h o r r . n h i p h i  t R e t i r e d X *
D u n y a p h a k s u w a n a n R e t i r e d X x
C h i t t i  N a w e c s a t h i e n M i l i t a r y X
1 x !
N o r r a k i t b o r r i h a n I n t e r i o r X X
A t t a k r i w a n w a t e e Re t  i  r  ed X
B a n c h o b  I s s a r a d u n A c a d e m i c X x L _
B u n c h a n a  A t t a k o r n A c a d e m i c X X
P h u a n g  S u w a r . n a r a t I n t e r i o r X X
S a k o r n  K a r u n a n o n t F i n a n c e X X
Ma n un e  B o r i s u t h O . P . M . X X x
U t h a l  S l n t h u s a n B u d g e t X X
H l r a n  S i r i w a t O . P . M . X X —
Bun t h a n  T ho ngk  a i m u k B u d g e t X X
N e t e  K h e n a y c t h i n O . P . M . x  1
S a w a e n g  S e r .a n a r o n g O . P . M . x x t x •X X
P r a y a d  B u r a n a s i r i NFB _ J ____i _
R a n o o  S u w a n n a s i t B u d g e t ________ X
Yuo S u s a y a n F i n a n c e i x
P r a w c c n  n a  N a ko rn CSC
1 x
X X X X
S a n r a n  T h a w a r a y u t h CSC i X X X
Sa k P h o s u k n i r a n A c a d e n i c ________ ! x
S l r l  S i r i y o t h i n E x - S e r v i c e r . a n  
P o l l t i c i a n
1
♦ X
A na n N e t r o t e O . P . M . 1 X X* X
B u n r u a n  B u a c h a r u n e O . P . M .
1 x X X X X x
Ch a n U a n g s u c h c t e B u d g e t ! X X X X
C h i n a w o o t  S u n t h o n s i r r a ECAFE 1 X X x
P r a p h o n  B u n n a s F i n a r  c e
1
X
P h a n a t  S i m a s a t h i e n F i n a n c e X
_
X
__
X X
A n o r n  R a k s a s a t A c a d e m i c 1 . X X X —
—
K ra r .o n  T h o n g  t h a r r . a c  h a  t Ac  a d e -  l c i X X X
T h i e n  A t c h a k u n I n t e r i o r X
P h l a n g  M e c c h u n O . P . M . ' X
S a n o h  U n a k u n ONC3DB 1 x
N i t s a i  W e t c h a c h i w a F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s
1 x
S e n d e e  C h a r o e n k u n CSC x x X X
S u t h e e  S i n g s a n a e B u d g e t i X X
Thanora  S u k s a t S t a t e  
E n t e r p r i s e . . . . . .  !  i
X
C h a l e r m r a t  K h a n p h a n o n t A c a d e m i c X
P r a p o t e  S u t a b u t O . P . M . X ::
S o n p o b  H o t r a k i t D e p u t y  P . M. X
P r a k o b  C h a r u m a n e e O . P . M . X
C h i t t i  S a n g k h a d u n D e f e n c e X
C h a n c h a l  L e c t h a w o r n F i n a n c e X
A r u n  P h a n u p h o n ? F o r e i g n  A f f a i r s X
P r e e d a  K a n n a s u t A g r i c u l t u r e X
C h a r o c n  C h a r o o n r a t c h a t o p a k  C o r w j n i c a t i o n X
W i c h a n  N iw a tw o n g C o r j r o r c e X
W in y o o  C n g k o n a r a k I n  t e r i o r X
S i r i  A t h i p h o J u s t i c e X
R a n g s a r i t  C h a o v a n a s i r i e d u c a t i o n X
P r a k o h  T o r c h  i r !  a R u t  1 i c  ' l e a l  t h X
W l - c n  w i r i y a w i t X
P r a t e f t  r . a  N a g e r n Ac a J e n e X
M c e c h a i  £uchwrf r.on o.?.:;. A
A t b . t c . r . M . X
THANOM IV
12
SANY A I
12
SANYA I I  
13
SA-NCAD I I
21
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STAFF OF THE COMMITTEES
Advisory committees required the services of support staff, and these 
were provided from the civil service. Staff were allocated on a part- 
time basis to assist at committee meetings, to conduct studies of selected 
departments or agencies and to prepare proposals for reform based on 
analysis of the studies. The Ministry of Interior supplied an officer 
to act as assistant secretary to the Joint Advisory Committee, and the 
Office of the Civil Service Commission provided around seven officers, 
all personnel analysts, to examine the selected departments under the 
direction of the committee. The regular (CSC) duties of the personnel 
analysts principally were to examine and report on requests from 
departments for new positions, the reclassification of existing positions, 
and for transactions concerning positions and pay. Later, when the full 
extent of the workload involved in these studies became apparent, 
additional staff were allocated and in 1962 O&M Division of the Budget 
Bureau joined with the Office of the CSC in their supply. This arrangement 
lasted till 1969 when disagreement between the CSC officers and their 
Budget Bureau colleagues, emanating from the differing approaches to 
examination and analysis taken by the parties, resulted in the withdrawal 
of the Budget Bureau staff. In 1980 there were about 200 personnel 
analysts supporting sub-committees.
Three problems arose related to the staffing arrangements. First 
was the lack, or inefficient provision, of formal training in personnel 
analysis. Whilst all the designated 'personnel analysts' were qualified 
at tertiary level in some discipline, they were, in the earlier years 
of the advisory committees, required to learn the art of personnel 
analysis from Manuals for Reorganization and the Establishment of
Staffing Patterns, at the same time as they gained field experience.
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Under Sarit, the advisory committee performed its role without the 
benefit of formal written instructions. The committee and its small 
staff of CSC officers applied general theoretical principles to the 
problems of reorganization and 1 learnt by their mistakes' as they 
progressed .
By the time Thanom took charge (1963) the application of these 
general principles had yielded a number of practical rules, and coinciding 
with the establishment of the first sub-committee, the officer-in-charge 
of the secretariat of the advisory committee who was also a member and 
secretary of the sub-committee (Mr. Samran Thavarayuth) arranged for 
these rules to be collected and formalized into guidelines, published 
under title of the 'Manual for Reorganization and the Establishment of 
Staffing Patterns'. He subsequently was appointed secretary of the 
advisory committee during the Thanom II period. The manual, or its revised 
version, was used as the basic instruction by all subsequent advisory 
committees. Subjects covered included guidelines for reorganization, and 
for the establishment of various levels of administration, the principles 
to be followed when conducting a reorganization study, and guidelines 
governing staffing patterns. The manual emphasized the purposes underlying 
reorganization e.g. to improve efficiency, to achieve economy, or to promote 
national development. Personnel analysts, in framing their reorganization 
proposals, were required to include in their consideration the purpose 
and functions of the organization under study, its social and geographic 
environment, and the cost benefits or penalities attaching to their 
proposed solutions. Criteria were set out for the establishment of 
sections or divisions within a department. The manual listed the steps 
to be taken when planning or implementing a study, and detailed the 
actions accompanying each step e.g. the design of questionnaries, their
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analysis and the form of subsequent personnel interviews. As a guide to
the establishment of staffing patterns, criteria governing position levels
18were described, and quantified where necessary.
As the committees gained experience, the manual was revised, 
second and third editions being issued in 1968 and 1973. Unfortunately, 
these issues were of limited numbers of copies, and subsequent to 1973 
became increasingly difficult to obtain. From 1971, formal courses were 
provided for CSC staff, but these were of dubious quality in that they 
lacked depth mainly due to their attempt to cater for officers drawn from 
a wide range of levels and with varying qualifications; staff of the 
advisory committee would make up only half of a training class. Consequently, 
the value of the work performed for the advisory committee could vary, 
and the time required to complete some analyses was excessive. A second 
problem was the loss of competent, skilled staff to other departments 
or areas of work. Experienced staff found they were able to gain 
promotion to other departments by virtue of their new skills, and there 
was a constant drain of personnel for this reason. Adding to this loss 
was a CSC policy of staff rotation, which required officers to accept 
transfer to work in another area every two years. The purpose of this 
arrangement was to prevent an officer becoming biased in his reporting 
through familiarity with a subject department; however logical the aim 
may have been, it destroyed all chance of building a firm foundation 
of skills to support the advisory committee. Last, the provision of 
staff on a part-time basis resulted in departmental requirements always 
taking priority over the work of the committee.
Assignment to the staff supporting the advisory committee carried 
status, the work being considered most difficult; however, the deadlines
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associated with normal departmental tasks assured them priority over 
tasks for the advisory committee.
Recently, a further problem has arisen —  the continuing loss of 
copies of the limited print of the manual dealing with reorganization 
and staffing patterns has resulted in the unavailability of guidelines 
to assist analysts.^
It is puzzling why the manual has not been reprinted. A possible 
reason is that a recent secretary to the advisory committee, Somdee 
Charoenkun, hoped to write a replacement manual but refrained from 
doing so until he gained more experience in this topic.
The sub-committees (Table 5.13) established initially in 1964 to 
assist the main committee, also drew on the civil service for their 
members. By 1973 there were nine sub-committees requiring 160 civil 
servants as members. These officers were allocated by a number of 
departments in the civil service.
THE SECRETARIATS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES
The first secretariat of the advisory committee was located in 
the Department of Local Administration where Mr. Phuang Suvannarat, 
the secretary of the advisory committee, was the Deputy Director-General. 
Although Mr. Phuang was still the secretary of the second advisory 
committee, the secretariat was now provided by the Office of the Civil 
Service Commission, since O&M Officers from the Budget Bureau and 
personnel analysts from the Office of the Civil Service Commission 
(both were in the Office of the Prime Minister) took a larger part 
in the advisory committee's tasks. At this time, the Office of the
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Civil Service Commission transferred Mr. Samran Thavarayuth from the 
Ministry of Education to the Office of the CSC, where he was to be 
responsible for the secretariat task; later he became secretary of 
the third, fourth and fifth advisory committees. When the eighth 
advisory committee was set up under Thanin's Government, the role of 
the secretariat was transferred to the Advisory Board and Committee 
Division in the Secretariat of the Prime Minister because the Director 
of the Advisory Board and Committee Division was appointed assistant 
secretary to the advisory committee. The same arrangements held for 
the ninth advisory committee, under the Kriengsak I Government (1978). 
In 1979 the Director of O&M Division in the Budget Bureau was appointed 
secretary of the advisory committee; the provision of the secretariat 
then became the O&M Division's responsibility.
A decision on reorganization and staffing patterns taken by the 
Council of Ministers on 18 December 1973 with the aim of reducing the 
Council's workload, identified those cases which needed to be submitted 
for the consideration of the Council of Ministers. These were cases 
where:
1. reorganization of structure was sought 
simultaneously with the introduction of 
new staffing patterns;
2. restructuring was sought; and
3. staffing patterns were to be established for 
the first time.20
The decision also specified those cases where the Prime Minister 
could approve proposals without reference to the Council of Ministers. 
These were proposals:
1. seeking to increase staffing numbers in an 
organization to which staffing patterns had 
already been introduced; and
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2. seeking to reclassify established positions:
e.g. Typist fourth class to Typist third class.21
As position classification had by now been fully installed in the 
civil service, the advisory committee's tasks were confined to the 
reorganization of administrative structures, even though their terms of 
reference still included the establishment of staffing patterns. In 
practice, the CSC took over responsibility for determining increases to 
staffing levels.
COST OF THE COMMITTEES AND REFORM
When the allowances paid committee members, the administrative costs 
associated with committee functions, and the salaries of the large 
supporting staff and the analysts are all taken into account, the cost 
of the advisory committees must have been considerable. However, no 
separate accounts on any of these costs were kept at any time by the 
committees or by the respective departments and offices; therefore, it 
is not possible to determine the amounts involved. Some measure of the 
costs is provided by the level of the monthly allowance paid a committee 
member for attendance at one or more meetings per month.
The Thanin Government amended the Allowances Act to the effect that 
allowances to members of those committees advising the Prime Minister 
were set at a higher rate than remuneration to members of other 
committees, in recognition of the importance of their work. Members 
of the Administrative Reform Advisory Committee benefited from this 
change. All told, allowances paid to members of committees operating 
within the Thai civil service totalled around 80 million Baht ($A 3.5 
million) a year. Part of this large sum was paid as a monthly meeting 
allowance to members whose committees met less often than once a month.
In an endeavour to reduce this cost burden the Council of Ministers
2 0 0 .
at a meeting held 6 May 1980 decided that the number of committees should
be reduced, and that payment for meeting of non-statutory bodies, from
221 June 1980, would be on a meeting, not a monthly, basis.
FUNCTIONS
Throughout its existence, the functions of an Administrative Reform
Advisory Committee tended to remain unaltered. The order issued by the
Prime Minister when appointing a committee listed its functions, which
required the committee to establish the facts and make recommendations
on the creation, integration, alteration or abolition of the organizational
structure of selected departments, on the allocation or reallocation of
functions, and on the establishment of staffing patterns in the departments
under study, with the aims of achieving efficiency, economy and national 
23development. When sub-committees were established to assist the 
advisory committee, functions were specified in line with their roles: 
e.g. the 'Sub-Committee on Reorganization and Staffing Patterns' was to 
advise on re-organization in regard to departmental structure and 
responsibilities, down to the sectional level; and to identify and 
determine the number of positions, and the level of pay associated with 
the identified responsibilities.
Advisory committee meetings followed a set pattern. It was normal 
for the business list to comprise 7-8 items —  reports on a selected 
department prepared by personnel analysts from the Office of the Civil 
Service Commission. These reports would already have been considered 
and the proposals agreed by the appropriate sub-committee. Meetings 
usually lasted three hours. Members received a copy of the reports 
prior to the meeting. To finalize their activities more quickly,
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advisory committees (and the sub-committees) separated into smaller
groupings. For example in Sarit's regime, the main committee divided
into seven divisions: Divisions 1, 2 and 4 took charge of the
reorganization aspects, Division 3 was concerned with the replacement of
officials of the third and fourth classes, and Division 5 was charged
24with setting up staffing patterns. As Division 5's task depended on
the result of the reorganization carried out by Divisions 1, 2 and 4,
it was the last to commence work. There was also a Research Division
to examine the areas of maladministration, and a Special Division to
perform special assignments, for example, the examination of the Civil
Service Act, the Audit Council and the Administrative Inspection 
25Department.
During the Thanom I Government, the advisory committee separated 
into only two divisions; one concerned itself with reorganization 
matters within the civil service whilst the other division examined 
specific requests for restructuring, the establishment of staffing
26patterns, and the placement of officers of the third and fourth classes.
At present, the advisory committee does not separate into divisions.
Following discussion of the contents of the reports of the meeting, 
the chairman sought agreement to the proposals put forward in the reports 
and at this point it was customary for members to introduce amendments, 
usually minor in nature. Final agreement to the amended proposals 
would signal the end of the meeting. Later, normally within two weeks 
of the meeting, the chairman presented the agreed proposals to the 
Prime Minister, together with a report to the Council of Ministers, 
for the Prime Minister's consideration. These reports were prepared 
by the meeting secretary, and were the only records made following the
committee's deliberation.
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The sub-committees appointed by the chairman of advisory committees 
to assist the main committees, had the following functions:
1. To advise on re-organization in regard to structure 
and responsibilities down to sectional level. The 
sub-committees examined departmental documents and 
the information supporting a departmental request 
for reorganization, setting these in the context of 
government policies and of the National Socioeconomic 
Development Plan. The examination in those cases 
where reorganization was recommended would establish 
staffing patterns to ensure that an adequate supply of 
suitable manpower was allocated when the reorganization 
was put into effect.
2. To advise on the establishment of staffing patterns.
The establishment of staffing patterns involves 
identifying and setting the number of positions, the 
level of pay, and the associated functions and 
responsibilities. In response to a request from 
the Office of the Civil Service Commission or the 
Budget Bureau, the advisory committee might direct 
the sub-committee to establish staffing patterns 
based on the existing structure of the specified 
agencies or departments. In those cases where the 
sub-committee believed the existing structure to
be inadequate for its purpose and unable to be 
remedied by a simple reordering of staffing patterns, 
it might recommend that the advisory committee 
reconsider its direction, and replace it with one 
calling for a departmental reorganization including 
new staffing patterns.
3. To determine criteria for the establishment of 
reorganization and staffing patterns. The sub­
committee set the criteria governing re-organization, 
and the criteria for setting up staffing patterns, in 
line with the policy of the Council of Ministers and 
the advisory committee. For example, criteria for 
the establishment of Personnel Section, Personnel 
Division and Finance Division; criteria for the 
determination of staffing patterns in Finance 
Section or Finance Division.
4. To effect cooperation in controlling staffing 
patterns. The sub-committee cooperated with the 
Office of the Civil Service Commission, the Budget 
Bureau and the Comptroller-General’s Department
in relaying the Council of Ministers' decisions 
on the establishment of staffing patterns, so 
that the departments could not get excess budget 
or appoint officials in excess of the determined 
positions, or draw 'over' pays.27
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The Budget Bureau might not necessarily provide money even though 
the Council of Ministers allocated the positions. For example, in 1978 
a Class 5 position was allocated to the Office of the Superintendent of 
Thai Students Abroad in Canberra, a division of the Office of the 
Civil Service Commission. The Educational Counsellor in Canberra 
requested this extra position, which would be added to the existing 
structure of one Education Counsellor (Class 7), one Accountant (Class 5) 
and one local staff, in order that he (the counsellor) would be free to 
visit Thai students located elsewhere around Australia. The staff of 
the sub-committee, in accordance with a direction of the Secretary- 
General of the CSC, recommended the granting of this extra position; 
however, the Budget Bureau did not provide funding for the new position. 
In fact , it appears likely that the existing positions in Australia 
will be abolished unless there is an increase in the number of students 
to be counselled.
Sub-committee meetings followed similar lines to meetings of the 
advisory committee, although at these sub-committee meetings the report 
was considered in much finer detail. A problem common to advisory 
committees throughout the military regimes, was the inability of members 
to find sufficient time to thoroughly study the reports. Other 
responsibilities sometimes prevented members from attending a meeting. 
Compounding these effects, was the lack of interest of some members who 
failed to recognize the potential importance of the role of the 
advisory committee.
PROCEDURE
There were ten steps in each study for restructuring and the 
establishment of staffing patterns. Because of the complexity of the
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task and length of the procedure it usually took 3-4 months to accomplish 
the task for one department. From Table 5.14 there 'were ten steps in 
the procedure.
1. The subject department requested restructuring 
and establishment of staffing patterns to the 
Prime Minister through the Advisory Board and 
Committee Division/ Secretariat of the Prime 
Minister, Office of the Prime Minister.
2. The Prime Minister considered the request and 
directed the advisory committee, through the 
Advisory Board and Committee Division, to 
conduct an examination.
3. The chairman of the advisory committee directed 
the Sub-Committee on Restructuring and Staffing 
Patterns accordingly.
4. The sub-committee studied the request of the 
subject department, examined the department and 
gave their draft recommendations to the department 
for comment.
5. The subject department considered the recommendations 
and replied to the sub-committee; if the department 
agreed, the recommendations would be submitted to 
the advisory committee. If the department rejected 
some recommendations, the sub-committee would 
reconsider the case.
6. The advisory committee debated the proposals, the 
chairman submitted the recommendations to the 
Prime Minister through the Advisory Board and 
Committee Division.
7. The Prime Minister directed the Legal Advisory 
Committee to study the recommendations from the 
legal view point.
8. The Legal Advisory Committee submitted its study 
to the Prime Minister.
9. The Prime Minister submitted the recommendation 
and legal advice to the Council of Ministers.
10. The Council of Ministers made their decision and
the Secretary of the Council of Ministers delivered 
that decision to the departments concerned, viz. 
the subject department, the Budget Bureau to 
consider the provison of the budget, the Office 
of the Civil Service Commission to allocate the 
positions, salaries and establish special class 
positions, and the Comptroller Department in the 
Ministry of Finance to arrange payment of 
salaries.
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Before 1 October 1972, the establishment of a new organization 
within a Ministry became effective, after publication in the Royal Thai 
Government Gazette, by promulgation of an Act, or where the reorganization 
concerned an agency within his own Office, by Proclamation of the Office 
of the Prime Minister. This was amended by Proclamation of the 
Revolutionary Party No. 218, 1972, Article 6, which reduced the power 
of the Prime Minister in that he now requires approval from the House 
of Representatives in all cases including those concerning his own 
Office.
The procedure governing the whole study —  the request for 
reorganization, consideration by the committees, the examination, analysis 
of the results, consideration of the recommendations, the decision to 
implement the recommendations and acceptance or rejection of this 
decision by the department under study —  was both complex and time- 
consuming .
This length of process had its own effect on the results, for 
example, the findings of the personnel analysts could be studied at 
length by the subject departments, and this would often lead to rejection 
of the advice. Consequently, the personnel analysts might be prevailed 
upon to reconsider and reconstruct their findings in a way acceptable 
to the departments. Such action would of course not only affect the 
objectivity of the study but also further lengthen its duration.
This opportunity for the subject departments to interfere with the 
findings of the study posed a serious threat to the value of any 
recommendations which might eventuate. Further, the high priority 
accorded completion of a task led the advisory committee to accept 
amendments put forward by subject departments rather than dispute
them. Caiden notes that a strategy which encourages active 'local 
participation' in the reform process is more likely 'to be successful,
28but this principle does not appear to apply to the Thai Civil Service. 
Only during the 1964 sub-committee did the representatives from the 
subject departments attend the meeting of the sub-committee as members.
Again, those permanent heads who were strong-willed were more 
likely to have their departments reorganized to their liking (i.e. 
enlarged), than were those more reasonable chiefs who cooperated 
sincerely in a study.
In recognition of the need to reduce the time taken to complete 
a departmental study, the advisory committee in 1977 allowed 3 months 
compared with the previous average time of 4 to 5 months for the sub­
committee to complete a study. However, this decision resulted in the 
personnel analysts complaining that the time given was insufficient for 
their examinations and that a lowering of quality could be expected. 
Table 5.15 shows the time taken for the various steps in the analysis.
In fiscal year 1977, a total of only six agencies were reorganized. 
The task of carrying out the studies was made more difficult than it 
appeared by the lack of statistical data maintained within departments. 
Further, the absence of performance standards hindered attempts by the 
analysts to set staffing patterns.
In essence, the recommendations of the advisory committee were 
strongly influenced by the findings of the personnel analysts. These 
findings were framed as recommendations by the sub-committees and 
passed to the advisory committee for endorsement. However, in arriving 
at their findings, the personnel analysts were mindful of what was and
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TABLE 5.15: TIME SCALE OF EXAMINATION BY PERSONNEL ANALYSTS
Total number APPROXIMATE TIME REQUIRED TO: Total time 
required 
to submit 
report to 
sub­
committee
of p<_>sJl Lioiit> 
in subject 
department 
before
reorganization
study dept's 
request, and 
prepare 
guidelines 
for the 
examinations:
analyse
restructur­
ing
proposal
analyse
staffing
patterns
proposal
prepare 
analysts 
report to 
sub­
committee
less than 200 2 days 2 weeks 2 weeks 1 week 5 weeks
201-300 2 days 3h weeks 2 weeks 1 week 6 weeks
301-500 3 days 3h weeks 3 weeks lh weeks 8 weeks
501-700 4 days 4 weeks 3h weeks lh weeks 9 weeks
701-1000 1 week 4 weeks 4 weeks 2 weeks 11 weeks
Source: Office of the Civil Service Commission, Manual for Reorganization
and Staffing Patterns, 1973, p. 18.
Note: The right hand column figures refer to elapsed time, not to the
sum of individual components, which may overlap in time.
what was not acceptable to deparmental heads, so to a degree the determination 
can be said to reflect the original proposal of the department seeking 
reorganizations.
One reason for the importance of the role played by the personnel 
analysts was that they alone had access to all the data related to 
the study. The sub-committees and the advisory committees could 
question the analysts but lacked independent reliable data to test
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the analysts' findings. It was the personnel analysts who drafted the 
recommendations seen by the Prime Minister. These recommendations 
were brief, and the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers had no 
supporting information to broaden their view or to verify the proposals 
put to them. They usually accepted the recommendations put forward by 
the advisory committee, taking them 'on trust'. In consequence, the 
personnel analysts were the prime formulators of the outcome, and the 
influence of the departmental heads meant that most outcomes supported 
the growth of departments.
The committee had the power to conduct studies, within specified 
guidelines, in selected government organizations, and the right (and 
duty) to present recommendations resulting from the study to the Council 
of Ministers through the Prime Minister. Legally it was an advisory not 
an executive body, therefore the committee of its own accord could 
not enforce the recommendations put forward and in practice the 
effectiveness of the exercising of these powers was modified by 
attitudes and actions beyond the committee's control, namely:
1. the degree of cooperation and objectivity of the 
subject department, and the sufficiency of the 
data supplied; the basis of many requests for 
reorganization was the desire to solve some internal 
problem rather than to improve efficiency;30
2. the quality of the study conducted by the CSC 
personnel analysts;
3. the attitude of the Prime Minister and the Council 
of Ministers to the committee's recommendations;
4. the degree to which the subject department 
implemented the recommendations, when these were 
gazetted as directives by the government; and
5. the lack of post-implementation audit: the function
of the advisory committee ended with the submission 
of recommendations to the Prime Minister.
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However, there was recognition of the potential power of the 
Committee, as departmental heads and their staff appreciated the need 
to present their 'best fact' when made the subject of a study. The 
recommendations of an advisory committee could, and at times did, 
alter the functions of a division and the status of senior and other 
staff members.
To sum up, stability and conservatism were the hallmarks of the 
committee. Such characteristics may seem inevitable in a part-time 
committee composed of middle-aged senior civil servants chaired by 
the Prime Minister’s nominee. The committee was handicapped in 
achieving effective reforms by the lack of permanent, dedicated staff 
whom it could directly supervise.
CONCLUSION
Each military regime re-established the administrative reform advisory 
committee, indicating that they saw some value in the continuation of the 
work of the committee; although, how strongly each government felt about 
administrative reform remains open to speculation.
Certain aspects of the advisory committee tended to limit its 
usefulness as a reform agent. It functioned as a temporary element 
of an office within the civil service, relying on the generosity of line 
departments for its support staff; there was a lack of trained staff 
available membership was drawn mostly from the public sector, and the 
full-time responsibilities of members left them little time to devote 
to the work of the committee. Those members (the majority) who were 
still serving as civil servants could be troubled by a conflict of
211.
interest when considering questions of reform. No estimates of the 
costs of the advisory committees are available, as operating costs 
are subsumed within the budgetary allocations of departments and 
ministries.
These problems could have been overcome, or would not exist, if the 
committee had been established as a statutory body. Then, permanent 
staff could have been recruited and training programs established as 
necessary, membership of the advisory committee could have embraced both 
public and private sectors, both members and staff would be engaged on 
a full-time basis in the process of administrative reform, and the 
costs of the exercise would be visible.
Most importantly the fact that members were engaged in reform 
activities independent of any departmental connections, and that they 
included representatives of the private sector would have improved the 
objectivity of committee deliberations, broadened their scope, reduced 
the influence of subject departments and resulted in more purposeful 
recommendations to government.
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CHAPTER VI
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM ADVISORY COMMITTEES: 
SOME CASES AND ANALYSES
INTRODUCTION
The five cases chosen for study illustrate important facets of 
administrative reform and problems facing the reformers in Thailand.
The first analysis deals with the establishment of the Accelerated 
Rural Development Department (ARD), proposals for its reform, and the 
relationship of the ARD with the Community Development Department.
This case typifies an agency set up for political reasons, and the 
difficulties this presents to subsequent attempts at reform. Drastic 
reforms were recommended by the advisory committee during the Thanom III 
regime, and a study of these provides the second case analyzed in this 
chapter. This was the first, and to date the only, occasion on which the 
entire civil service structure was examined from the viewpoint of reform, 
and was possible because of the imposition of martial law at that time. 
The third case studied —  the Office of Youth Promotion and Coordination 
Commission—  provides an example of an agency which was established, 
abolished and reestablished, undergoing several changes of title in the 
process. Customs is the subject of the fourth case study, and involves 
both restructuring and the introduction of position classification. The 
power of the Customs Department becomes abundantly clear. The final 
analysis concerns the Department of Aviation and illustrates all the 
steps entailed in reorganization and the establishment of staffing 
patterns, including the roles played by sub-committees. This case study 
highlights some characteristics of the advisory committee's approach to
reform.
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CASE STUDY 1: THE OFFICE OF ACCELERATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT (ARP)
Until 1962 the development of rural areas was solely the
responsibility of the Community Development Department. The first
Rural Reconstruction Program was set up as early as 1942 under Phibun's
administration, with the objective or raising living standards in the
rural areas.^ In this program Rural Improvement Committees were
established at local level, and short training courses for local leaders
were also organized. It was controlled by the Ministry of Interior,
and change of Government and management problems caused it to lapse after
2 years. Attempts to revive the program were made in 1951 and 1953,
2but these failed due to lack of funds. Further attention to rural 
development was given in 1956 when the Ministry of Interior proposed a 
community development program to the Council of Ministers, which four
3years later was incorporated in the National Economic Development Plan.
On 1 October 1962 the Community Development Department was established
4to be responsible for rural development. It was made up of an Office 
of the Secretary, four divisions dealing with Operations, Community 
Education, Training, and Research and Evaluation, together with a number 
of Community Development Regional Offices, all the above coming under 
the central administration, plus Changwad and Amphur Community Development
5Offices at the provincial level. Within two years the department had 
set up programs in 23 Changwads, 15 in the North East, four in the South 
and four in the Central area.^
Another program of rural development was announced in 1964. This 
was the Accelerated Rural Development Program, and was introduced 
primarily as a counter to communist influence in the sensitive border 
areas, on the reasoning that a healthy, growing economy was the best
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defence against the arguments of the communists. The U.S. Government, 
through USOM, strongly supported the concept and the' establishment of 
ARD, providing training and equipment, whilst the Thai Government 
supplied staff and administered the operations. The ARD Program was
3
submitted to the Council of Ministers on 17 March 1964.
The Accelerated Rural development Center was set up in June 1964 
with aid from USOM (machinery for road construction costing 38 million 
Baht). The operation was managed under an Accelerated Rural Development 
Committee, until the Office of Accelerated Rural Development was 
established on 26 January 1966 by the Act on the Organizing of the 
Administration in the Office of the Prime Minister of B.E. 2509 (1966 A.D.) 
The ARD was concerned first with the development of infrastructure such 
as construction of roads and digging wells and second with the local 
development teams such as the Youth Activities Group. On 1 March 1966, 
the structure of the ARD was announced by Proclamation of the Office of 
the Prime Minister. Seven agencies constituted the ARD: the Office of
the Secretary, and six divisions, viz. Finance and Accounts, Research 
and Planning, Evaluation and Report, Public Information,.Agricultural 
Business, and Technical Service. It was noticeable that this structure 
was set up without the Administrative Reform Advisory Committee conducting 
a prior study. Later, the advisory committee was assigned to set up 
staffing patterns.
As the role of the ARD required the cooperation of several 
departments, the Government believed control should be vested in the 
Office of the Prime Minister. Peter F. Bell cites the uncoordinated 
nature of the implementation of policies in Thailand as a factor 
causing USOM to create agencies such as ARD, which were supra-departmental.
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The Office of Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) was established on
26 January 1966.10 There were six divisions in the ARD, plus an Office
of the Secretary. The divisions were: Finance and Accounts, Research
and Planning, Evaluation and Reports, Public Information, Agricultural
Business, and the Technical Services Divisions. The promulgation was
effective from 5 February 1966. The government's view was not shared
by all, many people regarding ARD as a proper function of the Community
Development Department. Following the establishment of ARD within the
Office of the Prime Minister, the work of the Community Development
Department did not run smoothly, as people preferred to deal with ARD
12which had more funds and supplies. One important side product was 
the acceleration of reported communist activity, reflecting the local 
belief that development aid would more likely be given to areas at 
risk from communist insurgency.
A third group with responsibilities in rural development was the 
Communist Suppression Operation Command (CSOC) established in 1965 
(now Internal Security Operation Command, ISOC) which, although primarily 
a military command, was involved at all levels of the community in
13development tasks, again with the aim of frustrating the dissidents.
Later, during the Thanom III period, the advisory committee 
proposed that control of ARD be transferred from the Office of the 
Prime Minister to the Ministry of Interior where it would be integrated 
with the Community Development Department. In theory this was a most 
desirable recommendation, as both agencies had similar functions 
although their priorities differed —  ARD placed emphasis first on the 
development of infrastructure and second on the development of skills 
among the people, whereas the Community Development Department reversed 
these priorities.
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Dr. Sak Phasukniran in his 1969 paper to the National Defence
College, had criticized the overlap which was evident between the
activities of ARD, CSOC and the Community Development Department, and had
suggested ARD and the Community Development Department should be 
14amalgamated. The recommendation of the advisory committee was in 
accord with this view.
The NEC rejected the proposal, believing that US funding of ARD 
activities was predicated on the counter-insurgency, i.e. anti-communist, 
value of its role rather than on the development of community living 
standards Per se. If ARD was taken over by the Community Development 
Department it would cease to be visible to the U.S. Government and 
financial aid might be withdrawn. The fact that the responsibilities 
of the Community Development Department spanned all rural areas lent 
further support to the NEC's reasoning. A compromise solution was 
adopted the ARD being transferred to the Ministry of Interior but 
retaining its separate identity.
In 1973 the Community Development Department requested the Prime 
Minister, Sanya Thammasak, for permission to establish a Personnel 
Division and to reorganize the Training Division into 3 Divisions: 
Training, Volunteer Development and Community Leadership Development.
The advisory committee, in April of that year mentioned to Sanya the 
1971-72 recommendation to amalgamate ARD with the Community Development 
Department which had been rejected on political/financial grounds, 
although the option for a future amalgamation had been retained by 
transferring ARD to the Ministry of Interior, which also controlled 
the Community Development Department. It was recommended that the
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Ministry of Interior study the integration of these agencies as a matter 
of urgency, and put forward a proposal for the structure of the new 
organization to the Council of Ministers.^ The advisory committee 
supported the Community Development Department request for the establish­
ment of a Personnel Division noting that there were 4,098 civil servants 
in that Department and that no problem would arise if the proposed 
amalgamation with ARD took place as the latter agency had no Personnel 
Division. Of these proposals the Prime Minister and the Council of
Ministers accepted the recommendation for a Personnel Division, which
16was established on 21 September 1974. Later the Kukrit Government 
agreed to the establishment of the Volunteer Division on the ground of 
a changing and growing workload.1^
Another proposal to restructure ARD was put forward to the Prime 
Minister by the Minister of Interior in 1976. This sought to reorganize 
the ARD from one having two offices, 8 divisions and one Center to an 
agency comprising 19 elements. Expansion of this type provided 
opportunities for promotion of staff to higher, e.g. divisional head, 
levels.
The existing structure which followed a reorganization in June 
1967, was as follows:
1. Office of the Secretary
2. Finance and Accounts Division
3. Technical Services Division
4. Public Information Division
5. Rural Survey and Research Division
6. Rural Youth Division
7. Agri-Business Division
8. Engineering Office
9. Planning and Projects Division
10. Evaluation and Reports Division
11. Northern Accelerated Rural Development Center
- Civil Engineering Unit
- Water Resources Engineering Unit
- Equipment Engineering Unit
- Engineering Training Unit
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Claiming that the proposed restructure would benefit rural 
communities, the Government acceded to the request and on 13 April 1976 
announced the following organization of ARD, which now included a 
Personnel Division:
Central Administration:
1. Office of the Secretary
2. Finance and Accounts Division
3. Personnel Division
4. Procurement Division
5. Construction and Maintenance Control Division
6. Equipment Control Division
7. Agricultural - Business Division
8. Technical Service Division
9. Field Operation Division
10. Evaluation and Report Division
11. Public Information Division
12. Planning and Project Division
13. Occupation Promotion Division
14. Rural Youth Division
15. Workshop Division
17. Survey and Design Division
18. Rural Survey and Research
19. Field Operations Center
Provincial Administration:
18Changwad ARD Offices.
A Field Operations Center (element 19 above) was established in 
six provinces —  Nakorn Ratchasima, Lampang, Khon Kaen, Suphan Buri, 
Prachub Khirikhan, and Songkhla —  but these were not specified in the 
promulgation to obviate the need to repromulgate in future should their 
number vary. For similar reasons the Changwad ARD Offices were not 
enumerated —  there were 53.
After more than 20 years of government endeavour in rural
development, the results are disappointing despite the provision of a
substantial and increasing budget for this work. The World Bank
reported that over 11 million poor existed in rural Thailand in 1976-75
even though developmental activity had taken place for a long time. 19
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In apportioning blame for this failure it would seem that the 
structure of ARD was not at fault so much as the imposition of 
bureaucratic rules and regulations, and the inability of the program to 
gain the cooperation of local people who were alienated by government 
insistence on centralized control.
CASE STUDY 2: ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS UNDER THE THANOM III REGIME
Reform of the entire civil service was one of the policies initiated 
by the NEC operating under the martial law provisions of the Thanom III 
regime. The Administrative Reform Advisory Committee was directed to 
examine all government agencies and recommend administrative reforms 
wherever they were deemed necessary. Those cases where reforms were 
proposed follow.
OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
Before the reorganization there were 29 agencies in the Office of
the Prime Minister, comprising policy and planning agencies and
operation agencies. The latter were not concerned with the function
of the Prime Minister or of the Council of Ministers, but had been
brought into the Office to strengthen the Prime Minister's hand in
policy matters. Since the general election of 10 February 1969,
20politicians had been expressing a desire to reform this Office.
Problems arose in this Office because of its size and large range 
of activities it controlled. The more critical problems were:
1. the Prime Minister had insufficient time for 
policy making and planning, as he was occupied 
for much of his time with routine work —  
appointments, discipline and the like;
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2. the lack of coordination with other ministries 
on those matters of common concern; e.g. both 
the National Economic Council, within the Office
of the Prime Minister, and the Ministry of Education 
had some common functions, and similarly some 
functions of the Board of Export Promotion (Office 
of the Prime Minister) and the Ministry of Industry 
related to matters of mutual interest; and
3. work duplication or overlapping which affected 
efficiency and economy.21
About this time, views on the Office of the Prime Minister were
expressed by several people occupying responsible positions in Thailand.
Three of these views, summarized here, are seen to be in general
agreement with the findings of the advisory committee. Colonel Chit
Chinachot, Deputy Permanent Head of the Office of the Under-Secretary
to the Prime Minister, delivering a lecture to the National Defence College
on 28 November 1968, commented on the likelihood of problems occurring
as a result of the workload generated by Sarit’s reorganization; he cited
22duplication and work overlap as two of these problems. A politician
of the time, Praphansak Kamolphet, in a book published in 1970, noted
that the centralization of power in the Office of the Prime Minister was
a recurring theme of administrative reform from Sarit to the Thanom II
period. A consequence was an ever increasing workload for the Prime
Minister who became involved in decisions even on routine matters;
another result was the staff increase in the Office of the Prime
Minister, alleged to be necessary to cope with the greater workload.
While both these effects caused administrative delays, the later
presented opportunities for the development of red tape and corrupt 
23practices.
Dr. Sak Phasukniran, an academic later Rector of Ramkamhaeng 
University, in a paper presented to the National Defence College in 1968,
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drew attention to the placement of the Board of Export Promotion within
the Office of the Prime Minister, whereas the nature of its role indicated
it should operate under the Ministry of Economic Affairs. This placement
had occurred on the establishment of the Board in 1960 through the Act on
Export Promotion of B.E. 2503, and in fact since that time the Board's
functions had overlapped those of the Foreign Trade Department in the
24Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Recommendations
There should be 15 agencies, not 29; 11 were to continue in their
existing form, two were to be restructured, and a further two transferred
from the Ministry of National Development to the Office of the Prime 
25Minister. Of the remaining 16 agencies originally under the Office 
of the Prime Minister, 10 were Universities which together with the 
National Education Council were transferred to the control of the 
Ministry of Education, the Meteorological Department was transferred to 
the Ministry of Communications, the Office of Accelerated Rural 
Development was transferred to the Ministry of Interior, the Board 
of Investment to the Ministry of Industry, the Board of Export Promotion 
to the Ministry of Commerce, and the National Audit Council, as 
already mentioned, became an independent body.
The 11 agencies retained dealt with policy and planning.
The Technical and Planning Division in the Office of the Under-Secretary, 
was restructured to provide the Prime Minister with his principle 
policy and planning body. This division in its new form, coordinated 
the programs and activities of the 11 planning agencies in the Office.
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The Board of Tax Supervision responsible for the investigation of
duty, excise and revenue collection, was integrated'with the Inspection
Bureau, the Commission of Petitions in the Office of the Under-Secretary
and the Public Service Division of Government House. This new combination
was given the name ’Office of the Board of Inspection and Follow-up of
Government Operations’, and was structured into six agencies: the Legal,
Tax, Research and Information, and Planning divisions, and the Offices
26of the Under-Secretary and of the Petitions Commission. It was the 
most powerful Government agency, and Thanom himself was Chairman of the 
Board. The National Energy Administration and the Department of 
Technical and Economic Cooperation were transferred to the Office of 
the Prime Minister from the Ministry of National Development, which 
was abolished.
Implementation
The recommendations were modified by the National Executive Council 
with the effect that the 15 agencies recommended by the advisory 
committee to come under the Office of the Prime Minister was agreed to. 
Another two agencies —  the Office of the National Education Commission 
(formerly the Education Council) and the Board of Investment —  were 
viewed by the NEC as policy making bodies, requiring the supervision 
of the Prime Minister. The 10 universities remained under the Office 
of the Prime Minister, but, whereas previously they were considered 
individually, they now were brought together within a newly established 
Office of the State Universities which itself was part of the Office of 
the Prime Minister . The NEC insisted that the Public Service Division 
be in the Government House so that citizens could appeal directly to 
the Prime Minister —  a political reason.
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MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
The Ministry, comprising 12 agencies, was responsible for local 
administration, promotion of employment, the control and protection of 
labour, the prevention of public disorder and the keeping of the public 
peace. Few problems were observed by the Advisory Committee in relation 
to this Ministry, and the Committee presented only two recommendations, 
one of them a minor change of title.
Some existing problems were overlooked, such as red tape, over-
27centralization and lack of planning and coordination. At a House of
Representatives Session No. 5/2518 on 10 October 1975, a member levelled
criticism at actions of CDD officials, linking their behavior to that of
ticks: sucking blood from the people. As an example, he quoted the
occasion when 2,000 baht had been provided by government for digging a
well —  800 Baht was budgeted for materials and the balance was to provide
for labour. The materials were purchased but the 1,200 baht earmarked for
28labour disappeared. No recovery action was taken.
In another example, officials encouraged the peasants to raise 
pigs, chickens and ducks; government funds were used to purchase initial 
stock which was distributed among the peasants by officials. Later, 
when the fattened stock had been sold, the officials reappeared to demand 
reimbursement of the capital cost —  at an inflated value —  plus half the
29profits. The proceeds of this extortion went into the officials' pockets. 
Recommendations
1. The name of the Public and Municipal Works 
Department should be changed to the Department 
of Public Works.30
2. The Office of Accelerated Rural Development should 
be transferred from the Office of the Prime Minister 
to the Ministry of Interior, and there integrated 
with the Community Development Department as stated 
above.31
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3. Improvement of Provincial Administration by
delegating the Changwad Governors as representatives 
of the Central Administration, empowering them to 
supervise, coordinate and be responsible for
administration in the provinces.32
Implementation
The Party agreed to the simple change of title of the Department 
of Public and Municipal works, but as already mentioned it rejected the 
second recommendation although ARD was transferred to the Ministry of 
Interior.
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY
Promotion and control of industry, the determination of industrial 
policy and the development of industry programs were the main functions 
of this Ministry. In addition the Ministry managed some public 
enterprises.
The advisory committee found the major problems to be the location
of a number of industry related agencies in other departments and
consequently recommended the scope of Ministry of Industry activities
33be expanded to embrace these agencies.
The high incidence of pollution in Thailand's inland waterways, 
and the frequent occurrence of industrial accidents caused by faulty 
equipment point to a failure on the part of the Ministry of Industry 
to inspect and enforce individual safety provisions; however, the 
advisory committee did not comment on the Ministry's performance of
these functions.
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Recommendations
The government agencies concerned with Industry were transferred
to this Ministry. The Department of Mineral Resources and the Office
of Atomic Energy for Peace, were recommended to be transferred from the
Ministry of National Development, and the Board of Investment, then
located in the Office of the Prime Minister was also to be transferred
34to the Ministry of Industry. Other recommendations sought the transfer 
from the Office of the Prime Minister of a public enterprise, the Applied 
Scientific Research Corporation of Thailand, and within the Ministry, 
the transfer of the Factory Control Division from the Office of the 
Under-Secretary to the Department of Industrial Works. The establishment 
of an Industrial Standards Institute within the Department of Science 
was also recommended."^
Implementation
All recommendations, except the transfer of the Board of Investment,
and of the Applied Scientific Research Corporation of Thailand, were
implemented. The departure of the Central Machinery Registration and
Factory Control Division resulted in a reorganization of the Office of
the Under-Secretary, so that it now comprised five divisions —  Central,
Finance, Industrial Economic and Planning, Petroleum and Industrial
Relations Division and two offices —  the Office of Sugarcane and
36Sugar, and the Provincial Industrial Offices.
One further action ordered by the National Executive Council, and 
additional to those recommended, involved an internal change to the 
Ministry of Industry, with the transfer of the Thailand Management 
Development and Production Center from the Department of Industrial 
Work to the Department of Industrial Promotion.
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MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE
There were six departments and two offices in this Ministry; the 
Departments of Agriculture, Rice, Fisheries, Livestock Development, 
Agricultural Extension, and the Royal Forestry Department, and the 
Offices of the Secretary to the Minister and of the Under-Secretary.
The advisory committee identified three major problem areas within the 
responsibility of this Ministry:
1. lack of co-ordination between departments, 
e.g. the Royal Irrigation Department in the 
Ministry of National Development failed to 
have regular liaison with the Department of 
Land Development in the Ministry of Agriculture;
2. marketing —  a substantial share of the farmers' 
rice potential income was directed to middlemen; 
the agency which might have corrected this 
situation was the Department of Co-operative 
Credit and Marketing, but this agency was
located in the Ministry of National Development; and
3. the overlap of functions both within the Ministry 
of Agriculture and between that Ministry and the 
other Ministries e.g. the responsibilites of the 
Regional Agricultural Center included research 
projects which impinged upon tasks also undertaken 
by the Departments of Agriculture, Rice, Fisheries, 
Livestock Development, and the Royal Forestry 
Department, all of which came under the Ministry
of Agriculture. There was overlap in the 
irrigation functions of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the Ministry of National Development 
and the Ministry of Interior.37
Of these three problems the last two could be seen as facets of the 
first e.g. lack of coordination between instrumentalities.
The most important problem faced by this Ministry was overlooked 
by the advisory committee —  this was law enforcement. In June 1977 
the Police seized several officials, from the Forestry Department, 
Local Administration, Lands Department, and a Chief of Local
Administration, 'Kamnan', in Kamphangphet Province. They were charged
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with aiding the illegal logging of reserved forests by providing false
documents which permitted the transfer of cut timber from reserved to
licensed areas. However, those seized were the 'front' men; loopholes
in the law, together with the influence of important and unscrupulous
persons in the timber industry, ensured that police investigation did not
38proceed beyond the capture of the pawns.
The outside appearance of a National Forestry Reserve in Thailand 
can be deceptive: dense forestation at the perimeter may hide a
denuded center, the result of illegal logging. Such unlicensed cropping 
has been blamed for recent floods, due to the effect on the national 
drainage system.
Recommendations
It was proposed to rename the Ministry of Agriculture the Ministry
of Agriculture and Cooperatives, to integrate the Department of
Agriculture, the Department of Rice and the Regional Agricultural Center
under the title 'Department of Agriculture' and to bring a number of
agencies under the one banner, viz. the Departments of Land Cooperatives,
of Cooperative Credit and Marketing and of Cooperative Auditing, and
the cooperative functions under the Office of the Under-Secretary,
Ministry of National Development were to be amalgamated into a
'Cooperative Promotion Department'. The Advisory Committee also
recommended transfer of the Royal Irrigation Department and the Land
Development Department from the Ministry of National Development to the
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 39
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Implementation
The National Executive Council rejected the proposal to transfer
the Regional Agricultural Center, modified the recommendation to integrate
all cooperative functions and accepted the other recommendations. In the
case of cooperative functions, the National Executive Council decided to
organize these under the two departments -- Cooperative Promotion and
Cooperative Auditing within the Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives.
40These changes were put into effect.
However the reorganized Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
failed to lift farmer incomes. Middlemen continued to control the 
marketing of rice despite the reorganization, which in theory should 
have strengthened the power of the farmers' cooperatives.
Farmers became poorer and poorer, and the result was a scarcity
of rice for local consumption. This caused Sanya, when he succeeded
Thanom, to express his disbelief that a nation famous for its export
41of rice could not produce sufficient grain for itself. The reason 
was that farmers lacked the financial means and incentives to increase 
their sowings. Later, Kukrit tried to solve this problem by raising 
and guaranteeing the price of rice. This measure failed as farmers 
had already contracted to sell their produce for previously agreed 
prices to the middlemen, so once again it was they, not the farmers, 
who benefited from government action. This rice problem eventually 
caused Kukrit to dissolve the House of Representatives.
MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
This Ministry had responsibility in economics and commerce, including 
marketing, exchange freight and the control and promotion of commerce.
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These responsibilities were carried out by seven agencies and Thai Trade
Centers in Frankfurt, New York, and Sydney. The only problem in this
Ministry noted by the Advisory Committee was the duplication of some of
its functions by the Board of Export Promotion in the Office of the 
42Prime Minister.
Police General Prasert Ruchirawong, during an interview with a 
reporter, criticized the performance of Commerce Counsellors who he
claimed received pay but did little work and who failed to understand
43the tactics of foreign merchants. Sak Phasukniran raised the 
question of the overlap of functions between the Department of Foreign 
Trade and the Board of Export Promotion.
Recommendations
The advisory committee proposed the Ministry be known as the 
Ministry of Commerce, and that within it the Department of 'Economic 
Relations' be retitled 'Commercial Relations' and that the Board of
Export Promotion become part of the Department of Foreign Trade within
44the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Implementation
All the recommendations were implemented, with some restructuring 
to accord with the new titles. The role of the Department of Foreign 
Trade was expanded following the transfer of the functions of the 
Board of Export Promotion to its control.
MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATION
In addition to Posts and Telegraphs, this Ministry was responsible 
for most land, air and sea transport. The advisory committee discovered
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that some functions closely associated with the Ministry were not under
45its control. These included highways construction and meteorology. 
Recommendations
To complete its control over transport aspects, the advisory 
committee recommended transfer into the Ministry of the Department of 
Highways from the Ministry of National Development and of the
46Meteorological Department from the Office of the Prime Minister.
One most important problem area overlooked by the advisory committee 
was public transport; perhaps this oversight reflected their lack of 
experience in using Government buses and trains. Another notable 
omission was the postal system which had a poor public image.
Implementation
The recommendations were agreed and implemented with the Office 
of the Under-Secretary being reorganized.
MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH
The Ministry was responsible for the staffing and operation of 
public general hospitals and of hospitals directed to the treatment 
of specific illnesses, for the provision of the community health 
services including health education and promotion and for the operation 
of the regional health centers. It also directed medical research 
and analysis and operated the Virus Institute. Through the Ministry 
the Government coordinated its medical work with that of the Red Cross 
Society. These responsibilities were carried out by a ministerial 
structure of 5 agencies —  the Offices of the Secretary, of the Under­
secretary, and three departments.
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A major problem facing the Ministry was the preference shown by
doctor-employees for the Department of Medical Services over the
Department of Health. Employment in the Department of Medical Services,
which involved the treatment of patients in the general hospitals,
appeared more professionally satisfying than work in the Department
of Health which dealt with specific diseases and the provision of
community health services in up-country regions often far removed from 
47Bangkok. Not raised by the advisory committee was the question of the
inadequacy of hospital services —  prospective patients often joined
queues around 7 a.m. Other conditions the Committee failed to examine
included the 'moonlighting' of doctors and the rudeness of nursing staff
towards patients. Around half the hospital patients in Bangkok were
from country areas; many had travelled hundreds of kilometers to seek
medical advice and care. At the hospital, diagnosis could take hours
or even days; although, the endless queue of patients restricted the time
a doctor could give to an individual patient to a few minutes. This work
overload also meant that patients received a prescription but little or
no counselling. The patient had to join another queue to receive the
48prescribed medicine. The reformers failed to consider the need to expand 
medical schools and hospital facilities and services, in contrast to the 
awareness shown by the public when choosing their wedding gift to the 
Crown Prince: they donated money to be used to build hospitals in rural
areas.
Recommendations
Four recommendations came from the Advisory Committee.
1. The establishment of a new department to 
be responsible for medical specialists 
presently in both the Department of 
Medical Services and the Department of 
Health.
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2. The establishment of a further new department 
taking responsibility for the provision of 
general-practice medicine, and the prevention 
and promotion aspects of public health care 
presently carried out by the Departments of 
Medical Services and Health.
3. The establishment of an Institute of Research 
and Analysis embracing the functions of the 
existing Department of Medical Science, together 
with the research and analysis functions found 
elsewhere in public health areas.
4. The establishment of a Planning Division in 
the Office of the Under-Secretary, and the 
transfer of the research and operations 
functions from this Office to appropriate 
departments with the aim of giving the Under­
secretary more time for coordination and policy 
work .49
Implementation
The recommendations were modified by the National Executive Council
to provide two new departments —  the Department of Medical and
Health Services which effectively placed control of all hospitals
both general and specialized under the one large department, and the
Department of Public Health Promotion which dealt with the issues of
nutrition, sanitation, environmental, family and school health and 
50the like. Community health services which included Changwad
and Amphur Health Centers came under the control of the first of
the above-mentioned departments. The Office of the Under-Secretary
comprised six Divisions: Central, Finance, Health Planning, Epidemiology,
51International Health, and Construction and Design.
In the event both the recommendation of the committee and the 
action of the National Executive Council proved to be based on a 
simplistic approach to a very complex problem, with the result that 
later years saw further massive reorganization within this Ministry.
The Department of Public Health Promotion was abolished; health
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services and medical health administration was performed by the 
Department of Medical Services and the Department of Health.
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION
Responsibility for education, religion, and culture was vested in
this Ministry. The Advisory Committee identified problems which arose
because the large number (11) of agencies operating under the Ministry
made policy determination and forward educational planning difficult.
Further, the emphasis on academic achievement at the expense of cultural
development and moral discipline resulted in students graduating who
52were not fully trained to take their place in society. They were 
educated but delinquent, many were addicted to drugs such as heroin and 
general standards of dress and behavior fell. The traditional respect 
shown to elders became less evident.
Dr. Puay Ungphakorn suggested that the Government should reform
the educational system —  reform the elementary education which was
compulsory and whose rate of return on investment was higher than that
of the university level. The Government paid more attention to university
than elementary education because it wanted to please the people in the
53city, rather than the country. It is recognized that children who 
finished elementary education in the rural areas often could not read 
and write.
Some universities were under the Office of the Prime Minister and 
others under the Ministry of Education. In Dr. Sak Phasukniran's view, 
all should operate under the Ministry of Education. These arrangements 
created inequalities among lecturers in that those in the Office of the
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Prime Minister could be promoted without examination whilst lecturers
under the Ministry of Education had to undergo examination to qualify for 
54higher positions.
Recommendations
A number of recommendations were made by the Advisory Committee 
which together had two main aims:
1. to place control of all (primary, secondary 
and tertiary) educational policy and 
administration in the hands of the Minister 
of Education, and
2. to make the Minister of Education responsible 
for the coordination of education policy where 
other ministries were involved in administration 
or management.55
Specific recommendations were that the Ministry's name be changed 
to Ministry of Education and Culture; that the Departments of Elementary 
and Adult Education and of Secondary Education be amalgamated to form a 
new Department of General Education; that the Universities presently 
administered by the Office of the Prime Minister be brought under the 
control of the Minister of Education; that the private schools and 
universities similarly be brought under the Minister's control; that 
the Minister coordinate the development of adult education with the 
other responsible ministry; and that the planning and budgeting of, and 
planning of curricula for, primary education courses managed by the local 
administrative authority be made the responsibility of the Minister.
Moral training and cultural activities were to become the responsibility 
of the Department of Religious Affairs. A further recommendation was 
the transfer from the Office of the Prime Minister of the National 
Education Council which was to become the National Education and
Culture Commission under the Minister of Education.
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Implementation
Several of the recommendations were implemented. The Universities
remained under the Office of the Prime Minister although their control
was vested in a new Office of the State Universities. Local administration
retained control of the planning as well as the management of primary
education in local areas. The most important recommendation to be
implemented was the amalgamation of the Departments of Elementary and
Adult Education and Secondary Education to form the new Department of
General Education. Also an Office of the Private Education Commission was
established under the Minister to be responsible for grant-in-aid, and
evaluation and development of private-education insitutions. In
accordance with the advisory committee's recommendation, this Office
comprised an Office of the Secretary and four divisions: Private
Institution Grant-in-Aid, Records and Statistics, Evaluation and
Development and the Division of Private Institutions. This arrangement
has not eradicated all the problems of private education in Thailand;
classes of over 70 pupils still are common —  the UNESCO standard is 32.
There was also reorganization in the Office of the Under Secretary,
Department of Teacher Training and Religious Affairs Department to
5 6facilitate handling of the new functions.
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
This Ministry was established in Sarit's regime by transferring 
departments and their functions from existing Ministries with the aim 
of concentrating in the one Ministry the policy and planning roles for 
nationally important tasks. These tasks can be categorized under five 
diverse headings: energy, cooperatives and land irrigation and
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development, mineral resources, highways and the distribution of foreign
technical and economic aid. Sarit himself was the first Minister of this
big Ministry. The advisory committee identified the problems of
inefficiency and lack of coordination between Ministries. The latter
circumstance flourished because it enabled Ministers to deny responsibility
for failures e.g. the Minister of Agriculture could claim it was not
responsible for lack of progress in agricultural dvelopment, as key
aspects: cooperatives, land development and irrigation, were controlled
57by another Ministry, in this case National Development.
In his paper submitted to the National Defence College, Dr. Sak
Phasukniran argued that responsibility for land development should lie
with the Land Development in the Ministry of Interior, or when the
purpose was primary production, with the Ministry of Agriculture. He
also proposed that the Department of Technical and Economic Cooperation
should be part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as requests for foreign
aid dominated its role. He noted that the creation of the Ministry
of National Development resulted in function overlap between the new
Ministry and those Ministries which surrendered tasks to it; problems
caused by this overlap generated much hostility although the Ministries
58concerned dared not openly express their criticisms.
Recommendation
The advisory committee proposed to redistribute the functions of 
this Ministry among the other ministries.
Implementation
As indicated in the preceding pages, the functions of the Ministry 
were redistributed as recommended, generally by being transferred back
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to the Ministries of their origin. The need for the Ministry for 
National Development therefore disappeared, and the'Ministry ceased to 
exist.
The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand, which had operated 
as a public enterprise under the Minister of National Development, was 
placed under the control of the Prime Minister, while the existing 
Metropolitan Electricity Authority and the Provincial Electricity 
Authority were under the Minister of Interior. The reorganization of the 
other enterprises did not take place as planned by the advisory committee, 
perhaps because of the director ships held by the military men.
CASE STUDY 3: THE OFFICE OF YOUTH PROMOTION AND COORDINATION COMMISSION
Early in 1973, General Prapat Charusatien, Deputy Prime Minister
in the Thanom IV regime, directed the advisory committee to study a
proposal to form an Office of National Youth in the Office of the Prime
Minister. At the time, the function of the proposed Office was performed
by the Office of the National Youth Promotion Committee, an agency of
divisional status situated in Government House. This Committee
oversighted student activities, e.g. youth training and the construction
of public places such as Thambon Development Centers, playgrounds for
59children, and the installation of village water supplies. The report 
of the advisory committee supported the proposal, and in April 1973 
the Council of Ministers submitted to the Legislative Assembly a Bill 
of Amendment to Proclamation No. 216 of the Revolutionary Party,
29 September B.E. 2515 (1972 A.D.), to establish the proposed office 
with departmental status, in the Office of the Prime Minister, and a
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Bill to Transfer to the Office of National Youth the Administration of
the Office of the National Youth Promotion Committee. Referring to this
transfer of function, Lt. General Sawang Saenanarong, the Minister of
the Office of the Prime Minister (and chairman of the advisory committee)
stated it would enhance the Government's ability to coordinate and follow-
6 0up work in this field. Both Bills were passed, and were promulgated
on 29 May 1973. Relocation also enabled the Prime Minister to place
his own man in charge of the function —  Mr. Daecho Saovananon was
appointed by promotion Secretary-General of the Office on 26 July 1973.
Suwit Yodmanee, Thanom's son-in-law, was Deputy Secretary-General. Within
this Office there was an Office of the Secretary and three divisions —
61Youth Coordination, Training, and Promotion and Development.
The month that followed the 1973 uprising witnessed the emergence 
of literally hundreds of new pressure groups ranging from labour unions 
to the Young Monks Groups. Students were the catalysts for nearly all 
of this sudden explosion of political activity. As shown in Table 6.1, 
between November 1973 and September 1974, there were 322 demonstrations 
in various provinces outside Bangkok. Nearly half of those demonstrations 
were protests against the provincial government administration in the 
local areas. Such events usually included demands that specified local 
officials be ousted. Next in frequency were protests by university 
and teachers' training college students against school administrations. 
Demonstrations involving labor problems and disputes ranked next, followed 
by protests over the high prices of commodities (especially rice) and, 
finally, public gatherings for democracy propaganda. The students used 
these public meetings to solicit grievances from the people, also 
requesting provincial officials such as Governors and District Officers 
to come and explain to the people their positions on various important
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TABLE 6.1: TYPES OF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, NOVEMBER 1973 TO
SEPTEMBER 1974
Subject Total Percent Region Number Percent
Demonstrations against provincial 154 48 Central 33 21
government administrators, North 26 17
demands for ouster of Northeast 45 29
provincial officials East 8 5
South 42 27
Demonstrations against 55 17 Central 14 25
educational administrators North 15 27
Northeast 13 24
East 3 5
South 10 18
Demonstrations about labor 31 10 Central 13 42
problems North 3 10
Northeast 11 35
East 1 3
South 3 10
Demonstrations against the 28 9 Central 10 36
high prices of goods North 5 18
Northeast 6 21
East 2 7
South 5 18
Public gatherings for democracy 18 6 Central 5 18
propagation North 3 17
Northeast 5 28
East 1 6
South 4 22
Other types of demonstrations 36 11 Central 16 44
North 8 22
Northeast 4 11
East 4 11
South 4 11
TOTAL 322
Source: Sawat Kritchrachatanon, 'Demonstrations in the Provinces',
Singha Review (Journal of the Office of Policy and Planning), 
Bangkok, Ministry of Interior, October 1974, pp. 12-13.
Note: Percentages are rounded and do not necessarily sum to 100.
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issues. The ruling class saw the students as left-wing nuisances, and 
suspected the presence of office-seeking politicians behind them, 
especially in rural areas.
In the National Legislative Assembly, during discussion of the
Budget Bill for Fiscal Year 1975 (Session 8, 7 November 1974), Yai
Sawittachart, a member who sought the abolition of the Office of National
Youth, proposed disallowance of the entire budgetary provision
O  16,124,000) for this Office on the grounds that it had been
established by the Thanom Government and had a bad reputation. When
the Expenditure Budget Act of B.E. 2518 (1975 A.D.) was promulgated on
18 November 1974 no funds were appropriated for this Office. On 12
December 1974 (Sanya regime) the Council of Ministers and two members
of the National Legislative Assembly submitted Bills seeking to rename
the office as the Office of Youth Promotion and to transfer it from
the Office of the Prime Minister to the Ministry of Education. The
rationale for these proposals was that placement under Education
would facilitate cooperation on youth matters involving other education 
6 2bodies. The Office was renamed and transferred as proposed on 
6 330 December 1974.
In June 1975 the Government accused the students of spreading
propaganda and training people to use arms. The Council of Ministers
decided to arrest those students who had been involved with the 
64farmers' cause. On 24 June 1975 the Council of Ministers agreed with 
a recommendation of the Office of Youth Promotion to control the activities 
of youth and to prohibit the printing and sale of a publication of 
dissident youth titled Chivathat Yaowashon.^^ The Government believed 
that the Office of Youth Promotion was being used by student activists,
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and furthermore that youth training organized by this Office overlapped 
training programs of ISOC and the Community Development Department.
A year later, in 1976, Thanin Kraivixien decided to abolish the Office 
of Youth Promotion on the grounds of overlap between the functions of 
the Office and those of the Physical, Teacher and General Education 
Departments. However, he may also have been mindful of the experience 
of Field Marshall Thanom, who had been overthrown as a result of student 
opposition to his plan to draft a Constitution, which involved a 3 year 
delay for the holding of general elections. Thanin's plan for this 
development of democracy required 12 years to elapse before the next 
election was held, and the Office of Youth Promotion provided a forum 
where student opinion could be organized against him. When Thanin 
submitted his proposal to the National Reform Assembly, one of the 
members, General Charoen Phong-Phanit argued that there were about 
10-12 million juveniles in the population of 43 millions, and in view 
of the importance of these young people to the future of the nation there 
should be a bigger government agency responsible for their training 
and the development of their welfare. He suggested the office be 
transferred back to the Office of the Prime Minister, and its functions 
reorganized.^^ In spite of this plea, the office was duly abolished 
in 1976, and its staff and assets transferred to the three Education 
departments mentioned above.
Under General Kriengsak Chaomanan, the Act on Youth Promotions and 
Coordination of B.E. 2521 (1978 A.D.) was promulgated, enabling the 
establishment of an Office of Youth Promotion and Coordination Commission 
in the Office of the Prime Minister. The establishment of this Office 
was justified in the Act by recognizing that the majority (60%) of the
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population were 'juveniles' (in Thailand, 'youth' includes those up to
24 years of age), with a consequent requirement for ‘an organization to
plan, coordinate, supervise and follow-up the activities for youth which
6 7were managed under diverse government and private agencies. Among 
those agencies were the Community Developments Department, the Y.M.C.A. 
and Voluntary Association of Thailand.
The reestablishment of this organization seemed to be a political 
device aimed at indicating Government concern for youth, in 
acknowledgement of the forthcoming International Year of the Child; 
another effect of reestablishment was the creation of new positions in 
the bureaucracy, allowing the promotion of officials. Mr. Kamchorn 
Prahmawan, Deputy Directory-General of the Physical Education Department 
was promoted to Secretary-General of the new Office and Mr. Suchin 
Phaicharoen, who had fought for this reestablishment and was an 
Investigator Class 6 in the Office of the Commission to Counter Corruption 
was made Deputy Secretary-General (Class 9). Kriengsak had planned to 
resume his position as Prime Minister and desired the support of the nation's 
youth. He was also influenced by his wife who favoured the promotion of 
Suchin.
It took the advisory committee six months to decide a suitable 
set of functions for the office; difficulties arose in justifying 
departmental status for what was largely a co-ordinating role. The 
structure eventually selected resembled that of the 1974 Office of 
National Youth, except that Training Division was replaced by Youth 
Policy and Planning Division. Principal functions concerned policy­
making, and the coordination and control of youth training. Excluded 
from the role of the new office was the actual arranging and supervision
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of training, these responsibilities being carried by other government 
agencies, e.g. the Department of Community Development, the Office of 
Accelerated Rural Department and Internal Security Operation Command 
(ISOC). The office over sighted the work of the Development of Community 
Development in the training of 'Youth Workers', and of the Department 
of Public Welfare in the training of Chiefs of Youth Centers; it also 
organized pre-service training for those officials who would work with 
juveniles. Tasks performed by the latter varied according to the age 
of the youth, e.g. for the new-born babies to one year olds it provided 
a mother and child welfare service, for 3-5 year old children, a child
g
care service or preschool, and for 21-24 year olds an employment service. 
As the year 1979 was the Year of the Farmers, this Office, in consultation 
with the Department of Community Development, the Office of Accelerated 
Rural Department, Department of Agricultural Extension, and Internal 
Security Operation Command (ISOC), organized apprentice centers or 
youth centers in the rural areas for training youth in farming or other 
professions concerned with farm life according to the need of each 
community.
CASE STUDY 4: THE CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT, 1973
The advisory committee was presented with a real opportunity to 
demonstrate its usefulness as an instrument for reform in 1973, when 
the Director-General of Customs approached the Chairman of the advisory 
committee, seeking restructuring of his department.
Along with the Revenue Department, Customs represented the largest 
collector of income to the Government. Customs was known for its
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inefficiencies, exemplified by delays in client service, conflicting 
judgements in tariff cases, and widespread corruption throughout its 
activities. An invitation to study and improve the Department should 
have stimulated any reformer.
In 1962 a Royal Decree established the structure of the Customs 
Department into an office and 16 divisions, 4 Customs Regions and 53 
Customs Houses. The office and 16 divisions were:
1.
2 .
3.
4 .
5 .
6 .
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14 .
15 . 
16. 
17 .
Office of the Secretary 
Legal Division
Comptroller of Customs Division
Export and Import Formality Division
Laboratory Division
Air Freight Division
Duty Collection Division
Export Inspection Division
Outdoor Inspection Division
Tariff Division
Finance Division
Statistics Division
Appraisement Division
Customs Techniques Division
Import Inspection Division
Postal Inspection Division
Customs Investigation Division
The four Customs Regions were: Bangkok, Nongkai in the North-East,
Songkhla in the South, Phuket in the South West.
This structure was maintained until 1973, and at that time the 
Department employed around 3,200 Civil Servants. In 1973 the Department 
sought permission to increase staff by around 300 personnel. At the 
same time the Customs Department requested restructuring citing an 
increasing workload in the areas of both revenue collection and 
suppression of smuggled goods by the Central and Provincial Administrations. 
The existing structure was felt to be not suitable to achieve Departmental 
goals in these areas. The Department requested that it be organized
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into 20 divisions and four Customs Regions. The three additional 
divisions sought were the Valuation, Personnel, and-Warehouse for 
Smuggled Goods Division. To support its claim, Customs presented 
figures (Table 6.2) illustrating the workload:
TABLE 6.2: REVENUE COLLECTION IN 1970-1972
YEAR MILLION BAHT
1970 5,904
1971 5,395
1972 5,971
Source: Report of the Customs Department FY 1974 , p. 80.
Other figures (Table 6.3) showed the declining success of the Department 
in detecting evasions:
TABLE 6.3: STATISTICS OF DETECTIONS OF SMUGGLED GOODS AND GOODS
ATTEMPTING TO EVADE DUTY IN 1970-1972
YEAR NUMBER OF CASES
1970 7,211
1971 5,822
1972 5,665
Source: Report of the Customs Department FY 1974 , pp. 32-33.
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After personnel analysts from the advisory committee examined the
functions and workloads of Customs, it was decided that a Personnel
Division should be established to coordinate the 3,200 civil servants
in the Department. The Sub-Committee's criteria for the establishment
of a Personnel Section in any government agency is that there be at
least 300 civil servants in the agency, and a workload in the the section
69requiring at least five civil servants. A Personnel Division can be 
established in a Ministry or Department where there are 3,000 or more 
civil servants, and a personnel workload requiring at least 20 civil 
servants.
In this case a Personnel Division could have been established 
years ago. But there was not even a Personnel Section in the Department, 
all personnel management being performed in the Correspondence Section 
of the Office of the Sectetary. In the Customs Department where 
amounts in the order of millions of Baht were involved, the opportunity 
for corruption was immense, and this is alleged to have attracted 
officers who were by nature corrupt. Even in the Statistics Division, 
responsible for the collection of statistical data concerning the 
volume of trade, officers can make money by copying information which 
the Department considers secret, and selling the data to commercial 
interests. Thus, the Chief of Correspondence Section and the Divisional 
Secretary wished to maintain their direct authority over the corrupt 
personnel, hence the lack of previous internal initiatives to establish 
a Personnel Division.
The stimulus for the 1973 request for reorganization was the desire 
of certain Customs officers, who had worked in the Ministry of National 
Development until its abolition in 1972, to gain permanent positions
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in the Customs and, in particular, of one person who sought to be 
Director of the Personnel Division.
As a result of the investigation and advice of the advisory 
committee, a Personnel Division was established but the position at 
the rank of Director in this Division was not agreed —  only the 
lesser rank of Chief of the Personnel Division was allocated.
The advisory committee agreed (as recommended by the sub-committee) 
that the Warehouse for Smuggled Goods Division should not be established 
because neither the quality nor the quantity of work were sufficient 
to justify separation from the Outdoor Inspection Division.
The personnel analysts determined that the Valuation Division 
should not be established because it would largely duplicate the 
pricing work already conducted.
1. The Custom Investigation Division should be 
amalgamated with the Outdoor Inspection Division 
in light of the high correlation existing between 
the investigation and inspection functions.
These two Divisions should be renamed 'Prevention 
and Suppression Division'.
2. Export and Import Formality Division should 
be renamed 'Customs Formality Division' to 
concisely indicate the functions performed.
3. Customs Techniques Division should be 
amalgamated with the Statistics Division and 
renamed 'Techniques and Statistics Division', 
again, for the correlation between these two.
4. 'Appraisement Division' should be renamed 
'Assessment Division'.
5. Laboratory Division should be renamed 'Customs 
Laboratory Division'.
6. Duty Collection Division should be renamed 
'Cashier Division' because its function was 
not only the collection of duty but also the 
refund of moneys.
7. Air Freight Inspection Division should be 
renamed 'Bangkok Airport Customs House'.
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8. Postal Inspection Division should be renamed 
'Postal Customs House' for the same reason as 
in (7) above.
9. Regional Customs Supervisors, who were chiefs of 
the four Customs Regions and responsible to the 
Central Administration for the insepction of and 
reporting on regional Customs Houses (53 in total), 
were restricted in their control over the Customs 
Houses as these were under the Provincial 
Administration. These Customs Houses should be 
under the direct control of the Regional Customs 
Supervisors to facilitate cooperation amongst the 
Customs Houses in the suppression of smuggling in
the Regions.70
When the Customs Department was asked to comment on the proposed 
recommendations for that structure, the Director-General, Sanan 
Kettut, and Kamchorn Sathirakun, the Director of Tariff Division, did 
not agree with the disestablishment of the Valuation Division, insisting 
it was necessary for the Customs Department to have a 'price card' to 
be used not only in the central but also in all Customs Houses in order 
to prevent duty evasion. This price card function would be provided 
by the Valuation Division. As the Office of the Civil Service Commission 
wished to use the Customs Department in their introductory scheme for 
Position Classification, it was agreed that the Valuation Division 
would be established. In the event, this proved a correct decision, 
as the CSC was to learn, when they understood the importance of the 
Valuation Division which issued the 'price card'. The 'price card' 
was the only measure which led to a decrease of duty evasion, 
although the method of issuing 'price card' was not based on any 
advanced technique but merely followed the prices of goods imported 
through all ports. The highest price was deemed the true price and 
was used throughout every port. When both the merchants and the 
Customs Officers were faced with one accepted price for any particular 
item, the opportunity for corruption decreased and the propensity to
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evade duty diminished. This did not represent a cleansing of the whole 
Department but nevertheless was a small step in the‘right direction.
As mentioned, the CSC was responsible for the installation of the 
Position Classification, but it wanted the Customs Department to first 
install Position Classification, so it was decided to defer any study 
on staffing patterns at this stage. In this case the advisory committee 
approved the restructuring and the CSC approved the installation of 
Position Classificaiton.
To achieve the purpose of the CSC, the problem of lack of staff 
was overlooked. There were around 400 civil servants in the Office 
of the Civil Service Commission, it was concerned with around 130 
government agencies and the Office had three personal secretaries 
assisting the Secretary General and his two Deputy Secretary-Generals. 
However, there were around 3,200 civil servants in the Customs Department 
and its functions concerned thousands of importers but there was no 
personal secretary to the Director-General or his Deputies. Even a 
year later, when Customs requested personal secretaries from the CSC, 
it got none.
The number of staff in Legal Division was not appropriate to the 
workload, as the Table 6.4 shows:
TABLE 6.4: WORKLOAD OF LEGAL DIVISION, 1972-1974
FISCAL YEAR NUMBER OF LAW OFFICERS NUMBER OF CASES
1972 12 8,148
1973 13 7,579
1974 14 8,592
Source: Report of the Customs Department 1974, p. 42.
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This lack of staff caused delays in the finding of smugglers and 
the payment of rewards to the customs officers who Seized them, or the 
remuneration of informers. So the customs officers were tempted to 
accept bribe money from the smugglers, which sometimes might be more 
and sometimes less than the reward, but at least was 'money in hand' —  
they did not need to wait years to receive it. If there were enough 
staff to handle the cases, the customs officers might more often choose 
to suppress smugglers. The statistics in Table 6.5 show how many cases 
were finalized each year.
TABLE 6.5: CASES FINALIZED 1972-1974
FISCAL YEAR NUMBER OF CASES CONSIDERED NUMBER OF CASES FINALIZED
1972 8,148 1,777
1973 7,579 1,659
1974 8,592 2,045
Source: Report of the Customs Department 1974, pp. 42-43.
Among the 53 Customs Houses, there are many which do not have 
enough work, such as Langsuan, Parkphananang, Lanta Island, Kraburi, 
Mae Klong, and Ban Laem Customs Houses. The Director-General realized 
that those Customs Houses had little work, but he was afraid that if 
they were abolished it would be difficult for Customs Department to 
request for reestablishment if future workloads in these areas
increased.
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The personnel analysts who had data in hand dare not make 
recommendations for abolition, in case the Customs Department did not 
agree. As time passed, positions in those Customs Houses were reclassified 
to higher positions the same as other Customs officers. This was against 
the principle of Position Classification, 'Equal pay for equal work'.
The sub-committee had agreed with the analysis of the personnel
analysts on 15 July 1973, then the recommendation was put forward to
the advisory committee on 30 July 1973. The recommendation was approved
71without any change. The Royal Decree concerned the restructure of 
the Customs Department was promulgated on 15 December 1973. The new 
structure was as follows:
1. Office of the Secretary
2. Finance Division
3. Personnel Division
4. Technique and Statistics Division
5. Legal Division
6. Tariff Division
7. Valuation Division
8. Customs Formality Division
9. Assessment Division
10. Customs Laboratory Division
11. Cashier Division
12. Import Inspection Division
13. Export Inspection Division
14. Comptroller of Customs Division
15. Prevention and Suppression Division
16. Bangkok Airport Customs House
17. Postal Customs House
18. Office of Regional Customs Supervisor 1
19. " " " " 2
20. " " " " 3
21. " " " " 472
The restructure promoted by the advisory committee did not solve 
the problems of corruption and inefficiency in the Customs Department. 
For example, in 1973 one of the Customs Department requests was to 
establish an 'Investigation and Suppression Section' in the Bangkok 
Airport Customs House in order to suppress the smugglers who were
254.
assisted by corrupt Customs Inspectors. The request was not approved 
because the Advisory Committee believed that the duty of a Customs 
Inspector was to detect smugglers, and it was nonsense to set up an 
Investigation and Suppression Section to detect Customs Inspectors.
It was the duty and responsibility of the Customs Collector in charge 
of Bangkok Airport Customs House to manage customs administration 
as directed by the Customs Acts and Customs Regulations. However, 
an Investigation and Suppression Section was informally set up, which 
proved to be a failure in suppressing corruption in this area.
A Thai student returning to Bangkok following graduation from the 
Australian National University, spent two days arguing at the Bangkok 
Airport Customs House before being allowed to claim luggage, after 
she refused to pay 200 Baht (around A$9) as demanded by Customs Officers.
A case of failure of reform was its one-sided approach —  it 
considered only the structure of the organization and not the system of 
management. The advisory committee at that time did not look at the 
other areas needing reform such as the Customs Acts, Tariff Act, rules 
and regulations which were not suitable for the present situation.
The Customs Act of B.E. 2496 (1962 A.D.) was too old for the needs of 
modern management, even though there had been many amendments. No one 
in the Customs Department who knew the loopholes of the Customs Act 
was prepared to allow or recommend the drafting of a new Customs Act 
because these authorities did not want to lose power. The Customs 
Tariff Act of B.E. 2503 (1960A.D.) also needed amendment e.g., Heading 
No. 12 directed that 'Postal packages, value net more than 100 Baht 
each —  exempted duty'. To set the value of packages at 100 Baht 
(U.S. $5) in 1960 might be reasonable, but not in 1980. The cost of
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postage alone nowadays is more than 100 Baht. This is a loophole which 
allows the Customs Officer at the Air Frieght Inspection Customs House 
to demand small amounts of bribe money from a great many people collecting 
packages.
The writer interviewed Mr. Preecha Chavalitthamrong, a member of
the sub-committee whose task was to draft changes in the Law, and
suggested the Laws and Regulations concerning Customs should be amended.
Mr. Preecha disagreed, insisting the Laws and Regulations were good,
only the Customs Officers needed to be changed. He seemed not to
realize that corruption is an accepted norm in the Customs Department.
It is very difficult to change this attitude and practice, but it
should be possible to make it difficult for Customs Officers to practise
corruption. In 1974, 1975 and 1976 the number of Customs officers
73dismissed from the service were 3, 6 and 7 respectively. These were 
those cases with overwhelming evidence, not cases related to the everyday 
practice of thousands of Customs officers.
The corruption took other forms beside payment in lieu of duty; 
it extended to every public task that officers were required to perform 
under law. 'No pay, no work', is a slogan well understood by importers. 
No citizen or commercial enterprise in Thailand expects to get due 
service without first motivating the officials financially. Such 
bribes are called 'Speed Money' and ensure the fast service which was 
an entitlement in any case.
Phelps Dodge Thailand Limited, an American company manufacturing 
electrical cables, refused to pay speed money to assist the processing 
of imports. Its case has been in the Customs Department for over ten 
years, and still it is not finalized. This company has to pay interest
256.
to service the bank guarantee related to the imported goods. If it was 
not a branch of the American Phelps Dodge Company, the cost of this case 
would have resulted in its financial collapse.
In 1978 the Thai Red Cross in seeking entry for an 'artificial 
lung' machine requested reclassification of the equipment as a low- 
duty item. The employee making the request failed to offer 'speed 
money'. Consequently, no action at all commenced on the request until 
a high-level approach was made to a Deputy Director-General of Customs. 
The machine was then recognized as one properly importable at the 
lower duty rate.
Another example may be cited illustrating the inefficiency of 
the Import Customs Inspector and the Appraisement Officer. Many imports 
are difficult to correctly classify in accordance with the Brussells' 
Tariff, and require considerable study before a classification can 
be given with confidence. However, when a supermarket endeavoured 
to import Christmas cake decorations as such, the Import Customs 
Inspector classed the goods without further examination as edible 
confectionary, a prohibited item, and ordered the goods seized. In 
accordance with practice, the decorations were sent to the Appraisement 
and Tariff areas for classification. No action was taken however till 
after Christmas, by which time a judgement either way was only of 
academic interest to the supermarket.
CASE STUDY 5: THE DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION, 1973
The Department of Aviation has duties and responsibilities in the 
administration, supervision and promotion of civil aviation in accord
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with international agreenents and the laws governing aviation in 
Thailand. By 1971, the Department of Aviation comprised 879 positions 
in 8 divisions, —  a structure unaltered since 1963. Since 1966, the 
Aviation Training Center of Thailand had also been under the control 
of the Department, although not formally part of it.
During 1972 and 1973, the Department of Aviation made two approaches 
to Thanom, the Chairman of the Revolutionary Party, then the Prime 
Minister, seeking administrative alterations. The first approach was 
ignored, but the second led to a detailed investigation by the advisory 
committee and the Sub-Committee on Reorganization and Staffing Patterns, 
and subsequently to positive action by the Government.
During the revolutionary period (18 November 1971-17 December 1972),
the Department of Aviation requested permission of the Chairman of the
Revolutionary Party to Reclassify 824 positions. When this request
was passed to the Administrative Reform Advisory Committee, the
committee did not accede because the committee believed that the
Department's entire structure and staffing patterns, unaltered since
74they were set up in 1963, should be reorganized simultaneously. The 
Department of Aviation agreed to this; however, the advisory committee 
could not consider restructuring departments individually, as at that 
time it was their intention to restructure the whole of the civil 
service. It was not until the Thanom IV Government, after this 
revolutionary period, that the Department of Aviation was again examined.
The Department of Aviation then requested;
1. Restructuring: from the existing 8 divisions to 9 divisions:
plus Civil Aviation Training Center, Thailand. This structure included;
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1.1 Establishment of a Finance Division by taking the 
Finance Section, the Accounts Section and the Supplies 
Section from the Office of the Secretary.
1.2 Establishment of the Civil Aviation Training Center, 
Thailand as a formal organization within the Department 
of Aviation.
1.3 Renaming the Information and Air Transportation 
Division, the Technical division.
1.4 Renaming the Operational Communication and Air 
Traffic Control Division, the Communication and 
Air Traffic Control Division.75
2. The Establishment of Staffing Patterns: the existing 879 positions,
classified as follows: special class 3, first class 12, second-first
class 1, second class 73, third class 262, third-fourth class 1, fourth 
class 180, and employee 347 positions, were to be increased in number 
to 1847 positions with the following classifications: special class 4,
first-special class 7, first class 20, second-first class 66, second 
class 70, third-second class 243, third class 278, fourth-third 83, 
fourth class 272 plus employees of the Department 511 positions, and
76employees of the Civil Aviation Training Center, Thailand 293 positions.
The sub-committee examined the duties, responsibilities and workload 
of the Department of Aviation and at its meetings on 17 and 24 May 1973, 
made the decision that the Department of Aviation should have 8 Divisions 
(not 9 as requested), plus the Airports, as follows:
1. Office of the Secretary
2. Technical Division
3. Air Transport Control Division
4. Air Safety Division
5. Construction and Maintenance Division
6. Airports Service Division
7. Communication and Air Traffic Control Division
8. Air Navigation and Facilities Division
9. Airports.77
On 30 July 1973 the sub-committee brought three matters for decision
78to the advisory committee. The Director-General of the Department
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of Aviation and his colleagues were in attendance at this meeting.
Under consideration were:
1. The establishment of the Civil Aviation Training Center as a 
formal organization equivalent to a division in the Department of 
Aviation.
This Training Center had been established under a joint program 
of the Thai government and the UNDP, in which the Ministry of 
Communications represented the Thai government and the International 
Aviation Organization represented the Executive of UNDP. A five-year 
program commenced in January 1961. In 1966 when the UNDP program ended, 
the Thai government was authorized to manage the Center independently 
and delegated this task to the Department of Aviation. By this time, 
the initial reorganization of the Department had been completed.
Since 1966 the Civil Aviation Training Center had renamed an informal 
organization controlled by the Department of Aviation.
In this second consideration, the Department of Aviation requested 
that the Center be a government organization equivalent to a division, 
managed by employees other than civil servants.
The Sub-Committee considered that the Center was the organization 
which provided standardized training for people in Thailand and 
South East Asia in many fields of civil aviation. The curriculum 
provided and managed by the Center was not provided at any other 
educational institute in Thailand or elsewhere in South East Asia.
In order to preserve the existing salaries, which were higher than 
those of the civil service, it was decided this Center should be 
independent; this would also permit flexibility in its management.
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If however it was operated as part of the Department of Aviation, 
the Government would have to allocate the budget, and the employees 
would need to become civil servants. The fact that revenue by way 
of fees (3 million Baht) was considerably less than expenditure 
(12 million Baht) would pose an additional problem if the Center was 
incorporated into the civil service. The sub-committee sought policy 
advice from the advisory committee as to whether this Center should 
be under the Department of Aviation, operate as a State enterprise, or 
continue to be an informal organization within the Department of 
Aviation.
Believing that if this Center was an organization equivalent to 
a division or a State enterprise it would face the problems pointed 
out by the sub-committee, the advisory committee decided that it should 
continue to function as an informal organization in the Department of 
Aviation.
2. The establishment of the Finance Division was the second matter 
for consideration. The Department of Aviation requested that a Finance 
Division be set up by amalgamation of the Finance, Accounts and Supplies 
Sections of this Office of the Secretary. The rationale for this 
rearrangement was based on the increasing workload in the finance area.
The sub-committee could not decide on the matter. Generally, in 
the Thai civil service, the level of expenditure of an organization 
was one of the criteria determining its structure. In the case of the 
proposed Finance Division, the sub-committee set as criteria an annual 
expenditure and not less than JZ 50 million, and a staff of no fewer than 
30 officials (excluding janitors, drivers, temporary employees and the
like) .
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The sub-committee noted that the Department of Aviation budget 
averaged 50 million Baht including the expenditure of the Center 
(approximately 12 million Baht), and that the status of the Center 
was uncertain. The sub-committee believed that this level of 
expenditure warranted the financial function remaining in the Office 
of the Secretary but under the control of a more senior officer, a 
second-first class being recommended.
The advisory committee studied the expense and income of the 
Department which indicated its increasing financial responsibility:
Budgeted Expenditure
1971 £ 36,178,300
1972 # 45,046,900
1973 fS 56,964,600
Revenue from training fees averaged y> 3,185, 159 a year. Other 
income, from the usage of the airports and other fees averaged 
p 6,586,000 a year. In the three sections whose transfer was 
sought there were 22 civil servants and 40 employees. The advisory 
committee decided that the Finance Division was to be established.
3. The last matter concerned the improvement of airport management.
Airport staff comprised officers from the Airport Management 
Division, Communication and Air Traffic Control Division, and the 
Air Navigation and Facilities Division, each officer being responsible 
to his own Division rather than to the local airport management. This 
resulted in problems of supervision and coordination, and created 
duplication of effort. The sub-committee made the recommendation that 
the airports be under the direction of the Director General, with 
officers at each airport being responsible to the Officer-in-Charge
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at the airports. The advisory committee agreed with this recommendation. 
Apart from these three matters the advisory committee agreed with the 
other recommendations of the sub-committee.
On 24 August 1973 the advisory committee considered the 
recommendation of the sub-committee on staffing patterns which had set
79the number and level of staff in the Department of Aviation as follows:
Special class 3 positions
First or Special class 4 positions
First class 9 positions
Second or First class 1 position
Second-First class 17 positions
Second class 73 positions
Third-Second class 142 positions
Third class 177 positions
Fourth-Third class 4 positions
Fourth class 165 positions
Employees 345 positions
TOTAL 1,040
The sub-committee reported to the advisory committee that its decision 
on staffing patterns had been fowarded to the Department of Aviation 
for comment, and that Department had responded in the following terms:
1. request 4 inspectors
2. request higher classification for 4 positions
o n3. request 53 additional positions
The sub-committee did not agree to these requests. The advisory
81committee agreed with the sub-committee.
The Council of Ministers approved the advisory committee's 
recommendation for the restructuring and staffing patterns. The 
Royal Decree on the Reorganization of the Department of Aviation was
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published in the RTGG on 31 December 1973. The Decree abolished the 
existing structure and established the new structure as follows:
1. Office of the Secretary
2. Finance Division
3. Technical Division
4. Air Transport Control Division
5. Air Safety Division
6. Airport Service Division
7. Construction and Maintenance Division
8. Communication and Air Traffic Control Division
9. Air Navigation and Facilities Division
10. Airports82
The three requests of the Department of Aviation, except for the 
establishment of the Civil Aviation Training Center, were met. Manpower 
was expanded 18%, from 879 positions to 1,040 positions, in line with 
the advisory committee.
As mentioned, this case illustrates a number of aspects of 
administrative reform in Thailand. It showed the time scale of 
examinations. The study commenced after the revolutionary period (i.e. 
after 17 December 1972) and the Royal Decree announcing the decisions 
was proclaimed 31 December 1973; thus, the whole exercise occupied 
12 months. The lack of decision by the sub-committee on a sensitive 
topic —  the establishment of a Finance Division within the Department —  
is noteworthy. No such inhibitions affected its deliberations on 
staffing increases and reclassification of positions, a much less 
controversial matter.
In accepting the sub-committees' recommendations on staffing 
patterns, the advisory committee performed as expected, as it was usual 
to agree with the findings of the technical experts assigned to assist 
in the study, subject to the argument put forward by the department 
under study. The changes to the sub-committees' recommendations
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proposed by the Department of Aviation in this case would have not 
been vigorously pursued as they included a request for four 
Inspector positions, a classification normally reserved for Ministries, 
not departments; also the 18% increase in positions embodied in the 
recommendations would have been viewed as sufficiently generous to 
dissuade the prosecution of further claims.
But the most important characteristic of advisory committees 
illustrated by this study is the Committee's unwillingness to make a 
decision on the most difficult issue, namely, the question of the 
status of the Civil Aviation Training Center. Problems of salary 
were seen if the Center were to be incorporated within the Department, 
so it was left as it was, informally under the control of the 
Department, but not part of it. A better solution possibly would have 
been to declare the Center a state enterprise, increasing fees to a 
commercial level to achieve viability. But the 'don't rock the boat' 
syndrome prevailed.
CONCLUSIONS
David Wilson sees encouraging indications that the objectives
of programs such as those conducted by ARD are, to an extent, being met,
8 3although not yet finally attained. This might be taken as a measure
of success for ARD, but other authors, notably Ruang Kao, offered
84strong opinions to the contrary. In any event, the reforms resulting 
from the advisory committee recommendations benefitted civil servants 
more than the people ARD was supposed to help. Expansion of the 
administrative structure more likely would have added to the red tape
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associated with rural programs, and transfer of the office to the 
Ministry of Interior had no effect at the workface."
Whilst the reform role undertaken by the advisory committee in the 
Thanom III regime was far reaching in its aims, the results added to 
little more than bureau-shuffling. Positive results were a reduction 
in overlap between some departments and an improvement in coordination 
of some aspects of agriculture. Amongst the objectives of the Master 
Plan which were not met were the reorganization of state enterprises, 
the development of management and the improvement of personnel standards 
in government agencies. The extension of the powers of Changwad 
Governors to control all local administration, and the effective 
reorganization of the administration of public health affairs were not 
achieved. The problems of corruption and extortion associated with 
public administration were not attacked at all —  the advisory 
committee preferred to look at administrative structures rather than 
the behavior of civil servants.
The role of the advisory committee in the case of the establishment, 
abolition and reestablishment of the Office of Youth Promotion and 
Coordination Commission was merely to carry out the wishes of the 
regime in power. The committee made no independent, positive 
contribution.
As a very considerable revenue earner for Government, Customs should 
have represented a challenge to the genuine reformer. In the event, the 
advisory committee made no attempt to reconstitute management, change 
staff attitudes, improve provision of service to the clientele, or 
alter the Acts, Rules and Regulations which appeared to support the 
less-wholesome characteristics of the Customs Department. In Customs,
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the opportunities for self-enrichment are very well known and gaining 
employment in Customs was exceptionally difficult due to the fierce 
competition for positions. A basic flaw in the advisory committee's 
approach to reform of this Department was to direct their efforts 
narrowly, and only to the areas specified by the Customs Department. 
There was no attempt to understand the role of Customs as a whole, or 
to determine the underlying reasons for the corruption, inefficiency 
and comparative ineffectiveness of that department. Correction measures 
were applied to local troublespots, i.e. a 'band-aid' solution, with 
the cause of the problem left untouched.
The recommendations to establish a Personnel Division and to 
amalgamate previously separate divisions performing highly correlated 
functions were worthwhile. However, amalgamation by itself did not 
solve the problems of the new Prevention and Suppression Division.
Prior to amalgamation, the Investigative Officers of the old 
Customs Investigation Division could earn rewards for the 
detection and suppression of smuggling; under the new arrangement, 
the duties of these officers were limited to detection and the 
reporting of their finding to the Suppression area. This meant 
they lost their entitlement to a share in reward money for suppression. 
Understandably, they did not accept this and reverted to their previous 
detection and suppression role to maintain their incomes. Most of the 
remaining 'reforms' were merely cosmetic to give the illusion of 
progressive administrative reform.
In its study of the Department of Aviation the advisory committee 
failed to solve the problem of the status of the Civil Aviation Training 
Center. Although the Center's functions appeared to justify its
incorporation as a division of the Department, the consequential 
financial questions deterred the advisory committee 'from recommending 
the logical solution and caused it to opt for the status quo.
These five case studies offer little evidence of benefits
stemming from the work of the advisory committee.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter the major findings detailed in the previous 
chapters will be examined. Each of the military regimes in Thailand 
from Sarit to the present established an advisory committee on 
administrative reform and each functioned in a nearly similar manner 
within their respective governmental regime. It will not be 
necessary in this, the concluding chapter, to detail how each advisory 
committee operated or to review their respective reform proposals.
This information is presented in some depth in the summaries of the 
various chapters. This chapter will focus upon bringing forth the 
findings of the previous chapters to be analyzed under the eight aspects 
of the thesis outlined on pages 11 and 12 of Chapter I. These aspects 
are:
1. The political and administrative climate 
necessary for the establishment of numerous 
advisory committees for administrative reforms, 
and the reason for non-establishment of such 
committees during democratic regimes.
2. Purpose of the advisory committees.
3. Reform strategies utilized by the advisory 
committees.
4. The role played by 'technocrats', 'politicians' 
and 'group representatives' on the committees.
5. Recommendations and results of the committees. 
Because some of the documents containing the 
recommendations of committees were classified 
'secret' and later destroyed, this study can be 
done on specified recommendations only. Some 
recommendations in each regime will be studied,
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but the whole of the recommendations in the Thanom 
Regime III (17 November 1971-17 December 1972) 
which introduced more drastic reform than the 
other regimes, will be examined.
6. Effectiveness of the advisory committee system; 
did effective reform take place or were the 
committees designed to pacify important interests?
7. Reasons for the success or failure of the committees.
8. The role of the administrative reform advisory 
committees played in political and administrative 
processes in the military regimes.
Special attention must be devoted to three particular issues:
1. The general nature of the reform proposals in relation to the problems 
and needs of Thai public administration; 2. The influences of the 
composition and support services of the advisory committees upon the operations 
of the committees and what they recommended; and, 3. The factors which 
account for the almost permanent, institutionalized nature of the 
administrative reform advisory committee in Thai military regimes.
THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CLIMATE
The problems facing Thai public administration are not hidden 
from view and are well recognized by civil servants within the system 
and observers of the bureaucracy. The major problems outlined in 
Chapter III were concerned with the rapid growth in numbers of civil 
servants and the civil servants' general lack of competence and 
ability to perform necessary tasks of the job. The lack of responsibility 
and initiative and the well known problems of recruitment, placement and 
promotion were discussed. Difficulties in organization and management 
in relation to efficiency, effectiveness and productivity also were noted 
as common problems. Finally, corruption, especially in some departments, 
was prevalent at all levels within the bureaucracy.
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When Sarit took office in 1958 he introduced an ambitious 
program of socio-economic development. He realized that the services 
of an efficient, effective civil service would be important if his 
programs were to succeed, and it was clear that the Thai Civil Service 
was not of suitable standard. There had been no major overhaul of its 
composition, structure or methods since the Chakri Reformation, 
and many officials were incompetent, corrupt, or both. Most were 
untrained for their duties. Sarit established the first ARAC in 1959 
for the purpose of reforming and improving the civil service and so 
facilitating the introduction of his programs and the achievement of its 
goals.
As the power wielded by the Thai military rulers was virtually 
absolute, there was no public critisism of these actions. The political 
climate was perfect for the introduction of new schemes, due to the power 
of office and to the lack of any political expression contrary to that 
of the dictator. The members appointed to the Advisory Committee 
supported Sarit not only because they were sympathetic to his development 
program but, importantly, because of the enhanced status and extra income 
that accompanied membership of the Committee.
As regards the administrative processes, the Thai Civil Service 
was beset with problems including the incompetence of officials, 
their unwillingness to accept responsibility, the unfairness of the 
recruitment and promotion system, a failure to achieve objectives 
due in part to duplication of roles, inferior quality of management and 
corruption which was encouraged by low pay scales. National attitudes, 
such as that which encouraged the passing of responsibility to higher 
authority, and money for quick service, served to entrench the problems 
of the service. Consequently, the climate favoured changes to the
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administrative system. As reform proceeded at a slow pace, this 
administrative climate has persisted through all later regimes and as 
the political climate was nurtured by the military ruler, successive 
military regimes chose to re-establish the Administrative Reform 
Advisory Committee.
The democratic governments of Seni and Kukrit Pramot on the other 
hand, were sensitive to the mood of the electorate and, consequently, 
gave precedence to land reform, improvement of health care services 
and the provision of housing. Both leaders, however, acknowledged 
the need for administrative reform but did not regard the advisory 
committee approach as a useful tool or process for this purpose. Kukrit 
showed his contempt for advisors in general when he suggested their 
purpose was to look after the garbage bins; as a politican he viewed 
most advisory posts as rewards for political support.
This is not to say that the democratic governments ignored 
administrative reform; they simply gave a higher priority to popular 
reforms and when pur suing administrative reform they chose more direct 
means. For example Kukrit, in setting up the Tambon Development Fund, 
aimed at devolving power to the grassroots level; a move which, had it 
been successful, would have meant a very substantial shake-up of 
administrative arrangements. Adjustments to existing departmental 
structures continued under Kukrit (e .g. the enlargement of the Office 
of Accelerated Rural Development) but as there was no ARAC, the 
Office now put its proposal direct to its Minister, who brought the 
matter to the attention of the Council of Ministers. Again, Seni's 
policy statement to the House of Representative in 1975 and 1976 
referred to the need for the reform of civil service management and
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personnel administration. However, neither Seni nor Kukrit established 
an Administrative Reform Advisory Committee.
THE PURPOSE OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES
The Act on Organizing of the Administration in the Office of the 
Prime Minister (and from 1972 onwards Proclamation No. 218 of the 
Revolutionary Party) empowered the prime minister to appoint certain 
advisors. It was under this legislation that advisory committees were 
set up to advise the prime minister on the measures necessary to reform 
public administration. Not being statutory bodies, they could not act 
independently but were always under the direct, personal control of the 
prime minister.
Regardless of their performance, the existence of the committees 
could also be used by the revolutionary party as evidence of their 
reform intentions, the need for reform invariably being cited when 
justifying the coup.
As we have seen, Sarit introduced the first ARAC to identify 
areas of administration in need of reform so that the civil service 
might be improved to construct an effective vehicle for implementing 
his national development plans. This committee, and subsequent committees, 
approached reform in a tentative manner, concentrating efforts on the 
reorganization of departments and the introduction of staffing patterns.
That is to say, whilst the purpose of the reform allegedly was to improve 
the machinery of government, the proposals put forward by the ARAC's 
usually were limited to adjustments to the existing structure and practice. 
Although the restricted scope limited the type of reforms that could be 
achieved, this did represent an advance on Phibun's earlier attempts at
reform.
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The specific functions of the ARAC varied according to the emphasis 
particular regimes placed on reform; but common functions to all 
advisory committees were the review and amendment to departmental structures, 
identification and elimination of duplication of work, and the introduction 
of staffing patterns.
Evidence that the committee was to some extent merely 'window 
dressing' is given by Sarit's appointment of a 'secret' committee, 
operating unbeknown to the advisory committee for the purpose of implementing 
reform conceived personally by the ruler.
The ARAC fulfilled its purpose when it identified problem areas 
and developed proposals for the solution of these problems. It had 
no executive power, therefore, implementation of proposals lay outside 
its control. As effective reform of a system sometimes will alter 
existing balances within that system (with sometimes unpredictable results), 
it is often prudent to incorporate a mechanism to regularly monitor the 
effects of the reform action so that the nature of extent of the reform >
itself may be adjusted to optimise benefits. In the case of 
the ARACs this might have been achieved if they were given a 'feedback' 
role; but they were not. Consequently, the effectiveness of the ARACs was 
reduced. When approached on separate occasions by the former secretary 
to the Advisory Committee, both Kukrit and Seni Pramot refused to re­
establish the ARAC during their (democratic) terms in office, seeing no 
advantage in them. So while the purpose of the ARACs was acknowledged, 
not all in power saw them as useful in satisfying .-.that purpose.
REFORM STRATEGIES OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES
Prior to the establishment of the ARAC by Sarit, two attempts were 
made under Phibun to improve the civil service. Phibun in 1952 developed
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an administrative reform program to overcome the problems arising 
from the expansion of the role of the civil service pursuant to his 
Five Year Plan. The Civil Service Commission (CSC), to whom the task of 
initiating reform had been delegated, set out to determine the allocation 
of staffing patterns. A complex strategy featuring comprehensive planning 
and a rational approach was employed. All departments were asked to 
complete forms designed to provide the complete data necessary to develop 
staffing patterns appropriate to the needs of the Five Year Plan. This 
strategy failed, mainly because departments were unable to provide
precise information as to staffing requirements for a program as vague
)
as Phibun's Five Year Plan.
A second attempt to obtain this data took place in 1956; mindful 
of the 1952 failure the government established a committee with broad 
representation from the departments, which employed an incremental 
strategy. Although an improvement on the 1952 effort, results were limited. 
Sarit's approach to reform was to attack on a broad front. His regime 
acted directly on several of the recommendations of the Mission of the 
IBRD, endeavouring to improve financial planning through the Budget 
Procedures Act of 1959, and the reorganization of the Comptroller- 
General's Department. The setting up of the O&M Division in the 
Budget Bureau was aimed at improving administrative methods in general.
Sarit also established the first ARAC in 1959, to advise on a range of 
administrative topics broader than that considered by Philbun's committee. 
The ARAC undertook its role by recommending the establishment of new 
government agencies and the rearrangement of lines of control, the effect 
being to expand the scope of the Office of the Prime Minister thus 
strengthening Sarit's control of public administration. Recommendations 
were made along the lines that Sarit directed, so if the ARAC did possess
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a strategic outlook it was of little consequence. The ARAC did 
not venture any comprehensive policy of reform, father.it followed 
a broad but uncoordinated approach to its task.
The establishment in 1963 of a Sub-Committee on Staffing Patterns 
was a significant development in the manner in which the ARAC set about 
its duties, stemming from recognition of both the need to research 
proposals and the inability of the ARAC itself to carry this extra 
workload. In subsequent years the ARAC came to rely heavily on Sub­
committees; a total of nine were in operation during the Thanom IV 
period.
Another innovation was the selection during the Sa-ngad II regime 
of members of the main committee by position rather than for any personal 
qualities, thus ensuring representation of 'appropriate' (in the eyes 
of the regime) agencies. Throughout the military regimes the broad 
representation from the civil service, and, with one exception, the 
lack of 'outsiders' on the committee placed constraints on the scope of 
the studies undertaken and the range of strategies available. Generally, 
an incremental strategy was used to secure the cooperation of affected 
agencies in making mainly cosmetic changes to the civil service. The 
one time when the ARAC employed anything near a comprehensive strategy 
was under the Thanom III regime. Thanom had overthrown his previous 
government and during this revolutionary period it was possible to 
take bolder steps towards administrative reform. The ARAC worked 
in secret and did not hold prior discussions with departments under 
examination. Within its own terms of reference as an 'advisory' committee, 
this ARAC achieved more than any other, making recommendations across 
the field of administration. Central to its proposals was the advocacy
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of a 'Master Plan' for public administration which covered composition 
of the civil service, structure of departments, the organization of state 
enterprises and the development of the standards and skills of both 
management and staff. Free from the need to be mindful of departmental 
feelings, this committee was able to consider the fundamental problems 
of the bureaucracy and make sweeping recommendations. This freedom 
however was shortlived, and committees under following governments 
reverted to a directed, piecemeal, cooperative approach to reform.
MEMBERSHIP AND STAFFING INFLUENCE
From Phibun to Sa-ngad each assumption of power by military 
regimes in Thailand has been accompanied by a promise of more efficient 
or effective government. The rulers, faced with the problem of reforming 
the administration and lacking knowledge and skill in this field have 
relied on technocrats and existing administrators to advise on which 
measures are thought necessary. The military regimes in Thailand had 
little recourse to 'interest groups' or politicians who have had scant 
opportunity to develop a basis of operating within the military regimes.
Many of the middle range and senior bureaucrats had gained the 
qualifications and expertise required to specialise in organization, 
personnel administration, manpower planning and financial matters of 
government. The great majority of the members of successive ARACs were 
technocrats, either academics with administration qualifications.or 
administrators from within the bureaucracy. Technocrats played an 
important role on the sub-committees and as supporting staff.
A number of influences acted upon the committees to restrict the 
role of its members. Most importantly, no proposal for reform could
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hope to be accepted unless it was aligned with the aims and methods of 
the regime. Also, a proposal, generally, had to take account of the 
'face' of the subject department. Within these constraints, the advisors 
were able to frame proposals and in most cases to convince the ARAC of 
their value, although the influence of subject departments might lead to 
amendments.
From the evidence and analysis presented in Chapter V, a profile 
of the membership of the advisory committees on administrative reform 
indicates a common pattern. Members of the committees were: 1. university
graduates, many with advanced degrees and overseas study; 2. on average, 
middle-aged men; 3. civil servants or university professors with close 
government links; 4. generally of high rank within their ogranizations; 
and, 5. the advisory committee was of secondary importance to their primary 
place of work; hence, a part-time endeavour for members. Staff support 
for the reform committees were civil servants on secondment from the 
Civil Service Commission who did the analysis and presented findings and 
reports to the committees.
Membership patterns and staffing arrangements for the advisory 
committees influenced significantly the processes by which the committees 
operated. Membership derived from within the system and 'outsiders' with 
wide, varied experience and independence excluded. Thus, unlike the 
administrative reform commissions in a number of other countries, new 
and innovative recommendations and reforms were not forthcoming. Being 
part-time members, there did not seem to be time, for a comprehensive 
analysis of the problems and needs of Thai public administration. The 
committee was dependent upon the analysis and recommendations of 
support staff for details of changes as they had no time to conduct 
such analysis themselves.
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In general, the committees often operated as an interdepartmental 
committee, with accommodation and consensus the mode of decision-making. 
Perceptions and recommendations for reform action depended upon a combination 
of factors: what the particular Prime Minister of the time wanted done,
what the department or agency under review wanted, and what the staff 
personnel analysts recommended. A committee member often played the 
dual roles of ingratiatingly carrying out the wishes of the Prime Minister 
for particular changes and, at the same time, being the 'representative1 
of his department on the committee and thus attempting to enhance the 
powers and status of that department.
However, certain departments appeared more influential than others 
in committee, if the results are a guide. The Office of the Civil 
Service Commission was a major beneficiary of the advisory committee's 
recommendations. In seeking a reorganization, the Office proposed and 
was awarded a structure based on that of the Budget Bureau replete with 
many Divisions. The Office of the Civil Service Commission and the Budget 
Bureau was actively involved in the work of the advisory committee, by 
virtue of membership and support services they provided. The personnel 
analysts and O&M officers who performed examinations for the advisory 
committee retained permanent positions in the Office of the Civil Service 
Commission or the Budget Bureau and these agencies were able to call on 
the experience of their analysis when preparing a request, and when 
presenting a case for reorganization.
Other departments which were generously treated by the advisory 
committee were those belonging to revenue earning Ministry such as 
Finance. All the above mentioned agencies were represented either 
on the advisory committee or a sub-committee under each military regime.
The Thai custom of kreng chai, i.e. of ensuring a colleague does not
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lose face, helped protect those departments or agencies represented 
on the committee. If a representative of a department under examination 
stated a reason why a particular reform would be detrimental to his 
department, then it was usual for no one on the committee to challenge 
his argument. The Ministers of Commerce and Communication had, except 
one period when each ministry was represented, no representatives on the 
advisory committee. They did not fare well, as is evidenced by the 
case of the Department of Aviation.
Since the members of successive advisory committees were well 
educated, middle aged, senior career bureaucrats or technocrats, they 
were insiders reviewing aspects of the organization within which they 
worked. These characteristics and factors suggest careful men whose 
approach to reform would be very cautious. There was no injection of 
enthusiasm or a broader perspective from outsiders that might have 
followed the employment of task forces, research consultants or private 
enterprise.
As insiders, the members had vested interests to protect; it is 
unlikely that radical reform or reform unpalatable to an agency would 
be supported by a member who must return to work there. With each member 
being equally vulnerable on this count, none are disposed towards tough
J
reforms of parent departments.
Almost all members of the advisory committees occupied full-time 
positions in the civil service. As senior officers their workload was 
heavy, consequently they would not be able either to devote time and 
thought to preparation for advisory committee meetings or to lengthen 
the duration of discussion by engaging in protracted debate on reform
measures.
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Of the ways in which a reform study might be initiated, e.g. by 
a direction of the advisory committee or by a request from a government 
department or agency, the latter predominated. In consequence the committee 
at all times had a backlog of requests to consider and process, so there 
was virtually no opportunity for a member to propose an objective 
study i.e. a study independent of the desires of the subject agency.
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES
Details of the various recommendations are presented in Chapters IV 
and VI. In this summary some general comments can be made about 
recommendations made by the ARAC. Recommendations on two items —  staffing 
patterns and organization —  recurred through all the ARACs in accord 
with the aim of introducing 'modern' staffing concepts throughout the 
civil service and of achieving uniform organization in this service.
The recommendations of each ARAC reflected the wishes of the regime 
(usually of the leader). After the revolution which installed the 
third Thanom regime, the range of issues studied, and consequently 
of recommendations, by the ARACs increased greatly.
With few exceptions, recommendations caused no great concern in, 
or disruption to, the civil service. Recommendations generally were 
accepted without change by the regime and when changes were made they 
were minor. This of course follows from the fact that the recommendation 
reflected the aims of the regimes. It was usual for the regime to implement 
the recommendations by passing or amending legislation as necessary.
Departments readily accepted the implementation of the ARACs 
recommendations on staffing patterns as most of these increased the 
levels of specific positions and increased the number of positions 
available. There was little or no rancour on those few occasions when a
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a recommendation reduced the number of positions in an area as occupants 
were permitted to complete their normal tenure before positions were 
abolished. One effect of a reorganization proposal is seen in the 
example of the Office of the Prime Minister. Under Sarit's direction, 
the first AFAC caused an increase in the number of functions controlled 
through this Office by the prime minister. This growth continued until 
the ARAC under the Thanom III regime conducted its review of government 
and made recommendations which eventually trimmed the Office to a 
reasonable size. The Office had grown to be unwieldy in its span of 
control.' Recommendations made by ARACs on staffing patterns were 
directly responsible for the growth of the Thai civil service, which 
increased from around 200,000 staff under Sarit to nearly 800,000 
in the Sa-ngad regime. One recommendation led to beneficial results 
for both civil servants and the service as a whole: that on the pay plan 
during the Sanya regime. This recommendation followed from the investigation 
commenced during the Thanom IV regime, and its implementation resulted - 
in the realignment of pay scales to the cost of living. Another result 
was that for the first time civil servants were responsible for paying 
their own income tax (previously undertaken on their behalf by the 
government). The recommendation also caused salary steps to be percentage-
t t
based, an arrangement attractive to civil servants.
A later ARAC, under the Kriengsak regime, made a recommendation, 
later implemented, that tied salaries to the cost of living. It is 
possible that this would attract better qualified personal to the civil 
service and to ensure that civil service salaries keep pace with those
in the private sector.
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The comprehensive approach to reform adopted by the ARAC during 
the Thanom III period represented a break with past practice, not only 
because it was comprehensive rather than incremental, but because the 
subject departments were not allowed to hinder or influence the work of 
the ARAC and its sub-committees. The blanket of secrecy under which this 
ARAC worked resulted in a few recommendations which were direct and far- 
reaching. For example, one result was the abolition of the Ministry of 
National Development and the allocation of its functions to the appropriate 
departments. Further, the proposal to separate the National Audit 
Council from the Office of the Prime Minister was a first attempt to 
enable this important function to be performed somewhat more independent 
of vested interests and 'insider' control. In this case the ARAC did not 
completely succeed as, although separated, the Council still had to report 
to the prime minister.
EFFECTIVENESS
Any consideration of the effectiveness of the ARACs must take 
into account the constraints within which they had to operate. Firstly, 
the committees were 'advisory'; therefore, their effectiveness could 
be measured by the degree to which their recommendations were accepted.
A more useful measure of effectiveness is the quality of the recommendations, 
and by the amount of government acceptance these recommendations achieved.
The scope of the committees' functions always was limited by the 
policies of the various regimes and by the degree of cooperation given 
by a subject department. This affected the type of recommendation the 
committee might make. Within this context, the ARACs, with the exception 
of that under the Thanom III regime, achieved very limited success.
Results may be summed up as bureau shuffling and expansion of the civil 
service, with marginal success in the readjustment of the pay plan and in
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the introduction in a limited way to the civil service the concepts 
of planning and training.
The reasons for the ineffectiveness of the committees include 
the heavy workloads carried by members in their normal duties, 
the inadequacy of the support received from attached staff (due to both 
lack of trained personnel and the divided responsibilities of the 
attachments), the waning enthusiasm of members (as the ARAC became 
institutionalized), and the vagueness of the directions issuing from 
the militarists. Apart from these factors, the lack of any post­
implementation audit and feedback on previous recommendations did not help 
the committee improve its effectiveness.
On the one occasion when the ARAC was given wide scope by the 
regime and interference from subject departments was not permitted, 
the committee concluded their studies in the short time of one year 
and made far-reaching recommendations, including some leading to 
recognition of the training and planning functions by the civil service. 
This committee was the most effective of the ARACs, although a 
limitation to its effectiveness lacks follow-up in the implementation 
of the recommendations.
In general, the recommendations of the committees concerned 
staffing patterns (and had the effect of increasing rather than reducing 
staff numbers), or reorganization. An example of the eventual 
ineffectiveness of a reorganization proposal was the case of the 
establishment in 1973 of the Office of National Youth Promotion 
Committee in the Office of the Prime Minister. Its role was 
transferred to the Ministry of Education following the recommendations 
of a later ARAC and in 1976 the function was abolished by the Thanin regime
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Under Kriengsak in 1978 the ARAC recommended reestablishment of the function 
under the Office of the Prime Minister, and subsequent implementation 
brought the situation full-cycle to what it had been in 1973. Hence the 
ARACs reputation for 'bureau-shuffling'.
Overall, the ARACs conducted some analysis, inadequate as it sometimes 
was, before the regime took decisions on administrative reform, and 
to that extent it represented an improvement over past practice. Under 
the democratic government of Kukrit, when no ARAC existed, the Council 
of Ministers approved proposals without study or analysis. This led, in 
the case of the ARD, to an unwarranted and significant structural change. 
Thus, mistakes could also occur when there was no advisory committee.
The ARAC served a positive purpose, from the viewpoint of the 
regime, in that it silenced those potential critics who could otherwise 
have drawn attention to the regime's lack of concern for the improvement 
of administration.
In particular the establishment of an advisory committee could be 
seen as evidence that the government was attacking the problems in public 
administration mentioned earlier which were often cited by observers desirous 
to reform. Criticism by some was further reduced by the occasional 
practice of appointing a number of them to the committee. Although 
the committees were small, members were from important government agencies; 
some were invited to give lectures at the universities and executive 
development seminars and it was important to the government that they were 
not openly critical of government policy. Membership of the committees 
sometimes included academics and technocrats and their support staff 
included some of the more highly qualified bureaucrats; the loyalty of 
those individuals and groups thus was to an extent assured. It is
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interesting to note that during the democratic governments of Kukrit and 
Seni Pramot, when no advisory committee was established, the academics, 
technocrats and senior bureaucrats were among the most vocal critics of 
the governments and governmental policies.
REASONS FOR SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES
From the previous chapters, the nature of the reforms set forth 
by the ARAC's were very limited in scope, none involved a comprehensive 
review of the workings of Thai public administration, did not address 
themselves to the fundamental problems of the bureaucracy and used a limited, 
if any, theoretical perspective. The vast majority of the reforms were 
of the nature of redistribution of functions among departments and 
agencies, upgrading (or downgrading) of agencies, offices or departments, 
and renaming of offices and departments.
Viewing reform attempted under the various regimes, elements of 
commonality emerge. Administrative Reform Adviäory Committees under 
all regimes except Thanom III adopted a piecemeal approach using an 
incremental strategy. All reforms of any real consequence originated at 
the top, being directed either by the Prime Minister or the ruling group.
The establishment of the advisory committee and the findings of the 
committee were not made public under any regime.
Sarit initiated the Administrative Reform Advisory Committee 
ostensibly as an adjunct to his plan for national development. However 
the first reform was the reorganization of the Office of the Prime Minister, 
increasing his power in the process. Five years later he established 
a Ministry of National Development, to serve his modernization policy.
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When Thanom succeeded Sarit, he continued his predecessor's 
policies of piecemeal reform using an incremental strategy until 1971. 
Starting with the revolution in that year, an overhaul of the civil 
service was begun on the direction of the NEC which was composed of 
members of the Revolutionary Party. There was no appointed government 
at this time, administration being controlled directly by the NEC.
As a result of this approach, the Ministry of National Development 
was abolished and some changes made by (and since) Sarit were reversed. 
However, many of the advisory committee's recommendations represented 
bureau shuffling. One reform of note was the decision to bring ARD and 
Community Development Department under the one Ministry (Interior); 
although, for political reasons their amalgamation was postponed.
Within the framework of administrative reforms in Thailand between 
1959 and 1979, the reforms under Thanom III regime were the most effective 
A powerful, stable government could effect dramatic reforms. When these 
conditions did not pertain, delays could be introduced to save a
!. 4department recommended for abolition by the advisory committee; 
in other cases a subject department could withdraw its request for 
reorganization when it sensed the committee might recommend against 
it. The Thanom III regime had supreme power backed by military; therefore 
it was able to pursue a more ambitious program of reform.
The Thanom IV, Sanya and Sa-ngad regimes each reverted to the 
earlier incremental strategy. The most significant reform under these 
later regimes was the readjustments effected to the civil service pay 
scales during Sanya and Sa-ngad II regimes.
An example of a 'reform' which amounted to nothing more than a 
change in title is the renaming in 1973 of the Export and Import Formality
292.
Division of the Customs Department, as the Customs Formality Division.
At the same time another retitling in this department concerned the Duty 
Collection Division —  it became the Cashier Division.
Transfer of funtions often posed as reform but could on occasion 
merely be a change in title. For instance, the functions of the 
Secretariat of the Prime Minister were transferred to the Executive 
Office of the Prime Minister in 1959, following the abolition of the 
Secretariat. Later that year, the same functions became the responsibility 
of the newly established Government House. In 1965, the Executive Office 
of the Prime Minister was abolished and its functions also were transferred 
to the Government House. Ten years later Government House was abolished 
and its main functions were transferred to a newly established 
Secretariat of the Prime Minister. In sum, the effect was to merge 
the functions of the original Secretariat and the Executive Office. 
Throughout these 'transfers', staff remained at their original physical 
locations; the only noticeable 'reform' was to the letterheads and rubber 
stamps.
Cases where recommendations by the advisory committee led to 
expansion of an organization include that of the Office of the Civil 
Service Commission. This Office was closely allied to the Administrative 
Reform Advisory Committee as it supplied the committee secretary and 
the technical staff on which the advisory committee relied to conduct 
its studies. Therefore the Secretary-General of the Office knew how to 
go about presenting a case to the advisory committee. As a result of 
an approach for reform during the Sa-ngad I regime, the Office gained 
four additional divisions, with appropriate increases to establishment.
The Positions and Pays Division was reorganized into three divisions and
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the Disciplinary and Transactions Division also into three divisions: 
Disciplinary Actions, Appeals and Grievances, and Rules and Regulations.^ 
The purpose behind this 'reform' was mainly to facilitate promotion of 
existing staff.
As noted, the key problems affecting Thai public administration 
were scarcely examined at all. Characteristics such as corruption, 
incompetence, irresponsibility, and other factors such as the effect 
of traditional education systems and of inadequate training were never 
subjects for examination per se, although, some arose incidentally in 
case studies.
Corruption was, and remains, the single most important 
characteristic to be examined if other reforms are to be given a chance 
to work in Thailand. Some may view bribery, a common form of corruption, 
as an acceptable means of lubricating government administrative machinery 
officers who are not motivated to perform well by a sense-of duty or a 
desire for promotion are often encouraged by the opportunity for quick 
financial gain. It can be argued that bribery helps circulate the 
funds of the wealthy, which are otherwise out of reach of public hands 
due to the effectiveness of tax evasion devices, but bribery is so 
widespread in Thailand it results in a general increase in the prices 
of commodities and therefore affects low income households in particular.
During the Thanom III regime, a recommendation of the advisory 
committee led to the establishment of the Board of Inspection and 
Follow-up of Government Operations, an agency designed to counter 
corruption. Later under Sanya this Board was replaced by the Office 
of the Commission to Counter Corruption. Suthee Argaslerksa the 
Secretary-General of this Office said that his Office was sometimes
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inhibited by the laws in its attempts at reform, citing the case where 
80% of officers had received a housing allowance to which they were 
not entitled. Had he proceeded against them they would have been dismissed 
from the ciyil service and this would have created a new problem —  
instability.a
Speaking to the Advisory Counci], to the Prime Minister —  the name
given the legislative body following the first Sa-ngad coup —  Thanin
Kraivixien observed that lack of law enforcement prevented solution of the
problem of corruption. He gave as an example the fact that a total of only
300 cases of corrupt officials were brought to the court, which was
impossible, there might be more than 300 in one department. He went
on to say that the procedures governing prosecution were unnecessarily
complicated, causing delays during which evidence became 'lost', and
2also allowing wrongdoers to keep 'passing the buck'. Even where the 
law required the quick progression of an investigation, the end result 
was often a punishment of minimal severity which disappointed the 
Commissiort because of its unfairness —  the law appeared to condone 
corruption,. Further, laws aimed at eradicating corruption from the civil 
service were not applicable outside the service, so that officials could 
escape punishment by resigning before the investigation was conducted.
Incompetence is a problem which could be solved by appropriate 
action. It derives principally from inadequate staff recruitment and 
selection techniques, inadequate or non-existent on-the-job training by 
superiors, and insufficient provision of training schools and courses 
within the civil service. The status accorded academic qualifications 
in Thailand directly supports incompetence in that the only training 
recognized as important is that identified by the award of a university
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degree. A good academic record does not necessarily guarantee good 
administrative performance, but the latter may go unrewarded in Thailand. 
The unhelpful attitude of supervisors towards on-the-job training indicates 
a need for the training of supervisors.
The high-handedness of civil servants, who appear to view themselves 
as the 'King's men', rather than as servants to the people, went largely 
unrecognized by the reformers. Outside Bangkok, and especially in the 
poorer rural areas, citizens approach the civil authorities on their 
knees when seeking a service which legally is theirs, and the bureaucrats 
do not dissuade them from this habit. Almost no legitimate service is 
given without the client paying an additional fee, and almost any service, 
legitimate or otherwise, is possible on payment of a sufficient sum.
The traditional attitudes of the Thais are at the heart of another 
problem afflicting the bureaucracy —  the tendency to leave decision­
making to one's superior officer. It is natural for Thais to respect 
their superior at work. An officer's superior at work also is probably 
his superior on the social scale.
Not too long ago senior civil servants were most likely to be members 
of or related to the royal family, and despite the introduction of a 
constitutional monarchy in 1932, Thais revere their king and his family 
with almost religious fervour. The custom of passing matters for judgement 
upwards introduces delays into the system and swamps the daily workload 
of senior officers to the extent that seldom do they have time for review 
of management methods, or of plans and policies. Advisory committees 
made a low-level, piecemeal attack on this problem with negligible 
results. Training sections were established as a result of committee 
recommendations in a number of larger departments such as Customs and
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Revenue, but their potential benefit was not realized as they were staffed 
largely by officers unqualified for the management training role.
There was on attempt at comprehensive reform during the Thanom III 
regime. The opportunity was not grasped and the result was more of the 
usual agency transfers, changes of title and expansion of the civil 
service. There is no evidence of any concerted review of the administrative 
apparatus as a whole. Functional overlap and duplication was not approached 
on a service-wide basis. Availability of funds was not considered until 
after a recommendation for, say, administrative expansion had been accepted 
by government. No serious attempt was made by the advisory committee to 
establish national management training centers with the capacity to 
overcome the deficit in trained managers which existed in the civil 
service. It was not until 1980 under General Prem Tinsulanond that the 
CSC established a training centre for civil service managers.
On those few occasions when challenging problems were placed 
before the committee, it was likely a 'no change' recommendation would 
result. The Civil Aviation Training Center is an example of this 
reluctance to make hard decisions.
Although their reestablishment and retention of members through several 
committees gave an appearance of continuity, there was no follow-up of 
previous recommendations. A report was made listing the recommendations 
of the advisory committee and when this was accepted by the Prime Minister 
or the Council of Ministers that was the end of it from the viewpoint of the 
members. The committee took no part in implementing proposals or in monitoring 
their effect. Faulty recommendations might be repeated without realization 
of their failings. A reform might fail for want of small adjustment. For a 
committee, which for all purposes was a standing committee, the failure to 
seek feedback or to demand a monitoring role is inexcusable.
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THE ROLE OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEES IN THE MILITARY REGIMES
Each military regime since 1959 established an administrative reform 
advisory committee, often composed of the same members, staff and operating 
procedures as the previous committee. Obviously, there were benefits 
to the different regimes from having such committees. The benefits 
appeared to be the utility of using an advisory committee to make 
recommended structural changes the prime minister ofxthe time thought
I
necessary and to give the impression (real or imagined) that each regime 
was concerned about problems of the public bureaucracy. The form, 
membership and operating methods enabled the committees to work in 
secret without public scrutiny, away from criticism from outside 
the regime and public bureaucracy. The members were honored by being 
members of the committee and, thus, displayed their loyalty to the 
Prime Minister and their organizations by dealing in cosmetic reforms 
and protecting their organizational interests. In essence, this was 
bureaucratic reform by bureaucrats in a 'bureaucratic polity'. Reform 
by other types of advisory committees as used in other countries 
(see Chapter II) was unthinkable.
The establishment by Sarit in 1959 of the first Administrative 
Reform Advisory Committee was designed to serve revolutionary purposes. 
Sarit realized that the success of his National Economic Development Plan 
depended on having the services of an effective, efficient administration, 
and the committee was to be the instrument of advice to the government 
on the overhaul and reform of the existing public administrative apparatus.
When Thanom succeeded Sarit in office, he acknowledged the value of 
Sarit's development plan and reestablished the advisory committee to 
continue the reform of government administration. Thanom remained in
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office ten years, throughout which he ensured the continuation of the 
committee. Subsequent regimes with the exception of the elected governments 
of Seni and Kukrit have each reestablished the Administrative Reform 
Advisory Committee. As the elected governments ruled for less than two 
years, and the advisory committee has been set up under all other regimes 
since 1959, the Administrative Reform Advisory Committee can be regarded 
as being 'institutionalized' in Thailand.
Institutionalization implies acceptance of the committee as a component 
of the public administrative apparatus by those in power and by the civil 
service. Reestablishment has demonstrated acceptance by governments; and 
the attitude of the civil service is exemplified by the willingness of 
departments to approach the advisory committee to seek a reorganization or 
other reform, and by the prestige associated with membership on the 
committee. There is no record of any member declining an invitation to 
serve on the committee, despite the additional workload involved.
The Secretary-General of the Office of the Civil Service Commission 
and the Budget Director accepted that a sizeable number of the technical 
manhours available to their agencies would be dedicated to studies conducted 
under the auspices of the advisory committee.
To an incoming regime, the establishment of an advisory committee may 
appear warranted to adjust the administrative machinery so it can better 
cope with proposed changes in policy, or to advise government on the local 
applicability of overseas administrative developments, or for a number 
of other good reasons. Regardless of the existence or otherwise of such good 
reasons, the reestablishment of the advisory committee in Thailand 
carried two benefits to those in power: it enhanced the legitimacy of the
regime and it provided a means of ensuring that important powers were 
centralized in the Office of the Prime Minister.
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A military coup in Thailand is not a revolution in the traditional 
sense. Seldom is there any bloodshed, and the man in the street may not 
observe any change in his own lifestyle. Rather, it represents an 
exchange of leadership amongst a military caste whose members share similar 
views on economic, political and social questions. Nevertheless, the new 
regime values legitimacy, and does not need to look far to find causes 
which will help justify the takeover in the eyes of the populace. The 
need to combat the communist threat is one well-worn argument advanced in 
support of changes of government. There are other less dramatic reasons put 
forward to justify a coup. Thailand is not well served by its bureaucrats; 
most citizens have experienced the high handedness, corruption and lack of 
responsibility shown by civil servants to their clientele. A program of 
reform of the administration is, therefore, one promise made by new regimes 
which is well-received by the public. The establishment of an administrative 
reform advisory committee is evidence of the intention to reform. This is 
not to say that all committees served only as a prop to legitimacy; it appears 
that Sarit, and later the Thanom III regime sought reform of the civil
f
service, but it must be concluded that the method used to initiate reforms 
was counter-productive.
One reform assiduously pursued by the committee was the centralization 
of more power in the hands of the Prime Minister. Sarit realized that to 
function as a strong executive, he needed to centralize power under his 
own office. Acting in accord with Sarit's wishes, the first advisory 
committee made recommendations which helped the Prime Minister expand his 
range of control from authority over eleven departments to authority over 
24 organizations. One new organization which greatly added to his power 
was the Office of the Board of Tax Supervision. This was established in 
1960 on the recommendation of the Administrative Reform Advisory Committee
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acting on Sarit's direction, and enabled the Board to investigate the 
revenue collection departments —  Customs, Excise and Revenue —  which 
were responsible to the Minister of Finance and had previously been out 
of the Prime Minister's reach. Included in the 24 organizations eventually 
controlled by Sarit were four universities. He had not forgotten the 
leading part played by students in the overthrow of Phibun and wished to 
establish his authority over the seats of higher learning.
Under Thanom the advisory committee made recommendations which led 
to the Office of the Board of Investment being established in the Office 
of the Prime Minister rather than in the Ministry of Industry where more 
logically it might operate. The committee reorganized the Office of the 
Prime Minister, extending and strengthening the powers of the component 
agencies. However, when the agencies under his direct control totalled 29, 
Thanom recognized that the continuing build-up could result in a structure
t
too large for the Prime Minister to manage effectively, so on the advice 
of the advisory committee he transferred a number of less influential 
agencies to other ministries.
During Sanya's term of office from October 1973 to February 1975, the 
power of the Prime Minister again increased with the establishment within 
his office of new agencies, the Office of the National Environment Board
4and the Secretariat of the Prime Minister. He also hurriedly submitted the 
Bill on Anti-Grafts and Corruption Practice to the National Legislative
Assembly before he left his office, which led to the establishment of
/the Office of Commission to Counter Corruption. The Sa-ngad I regime, 
under Thanin, centralized still more power in the Office of the Prime 
Minister with the establishment of an Office of the Narcotic Control Board. 
Objections in the national legislative body to its placement in the Office 
of the Prime Minister were overruled by Thanin who was to be the chairman
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of the new Board. Further centralization occurred under Kriengsak —  
the Sa-ngad II regime —  when the defunct Office of Youth Promotion 
previously located in the Ministry of Education was reestablished as 
the Office of Youth Promotion and Coordination Commission and located 
in the Office of the Prime Minister.
The Administrative Reform Advisory Committee was involved in all 
the above cases and made recommendations either to establish a new 
agency, to transfer an existing body, or to reorganize a structure.
There is no evidence that the advisory committee ever objected to the 
directions it received from the Prime Minister or from government.
The advisory committee allowed itself to be dominated by politics; members 
were civil service functionaries rather than independent individuals and 
acted as the hands of their superiors; their policies were determined 
by vested interests.
THAI ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
In Chapter II there was a brief examination of reform committees 
or commissions in four democratic countries (U.S.A., Canada, Australia 
and U.K.) and three countries (Pakistan, Indonesia and Republic of Korea) 
under military rule at the time of the attempts at reform. The major 
aspects of administrative reform endeavours in each of the four 
democratic countries studied had much in common: the examination was
comprehensive; the committees/commissions included experts and non­
administrators from outside the civil service; research was carried 
out by professionals (e.g. in task forces, research institutions, 
universities) who welcomed public discussion of the issues; proposals 
were embodied in a formal report; the report was prepared within a 
specified time and was made public.. As a result of these enquiries, a
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large number of the recommendation put forward in the U.S.A., Canada 
and U.K. were implemented with significant effect. In all four countries, 
the enquiries met with general public approval —  acclaim in the case of 
the Hoover and Glassco studies.
Korea, Pakistan and Indonesia presented a far different background 
to the administrative reformer than did Thailand or the four democracies 
mentioned above. Each of these military dictatorships faced not only 
problems in general administration but economic conditions that were 
chaotic, and a civil service that was corrupt, or run-down, or both.
A comprehensive strategy was adopted in all cases by the committees of 
enquiry set up by government. Membership was drawn from government or 
military services with some input from academics recruited for task 
(Korea), reports were submitted to the regime within given time 
constraints and many of the recommendations were implemented.
Although each of the three military-dominated countries viewed their 
reform enquiries and measures as successful, it is noted that the 
economic and administrative conditions prevailing at the times of the 
enquiries were so bad that perhaps any change would be beneficial.
Compared to the above enquiries which either had or claimed fairly 
dramatic results, the ARACs in Thailand appear to be regular civil 
service bodies doing routine work. The approach they adopted to their task 
was, with the exception of Thanom III regime, secretive and piecemeal.
The general attitude to reform by the members of the various ARACs is 
neatly summed by Dr. Amorn Raksasat (himself a committee member under 
many governments) to the effect that, although previous committees 
did not pull their weight, members of the committee appointed on 21 May 
1980 by General Prem Thinnasulanon, the prime minister, would take the
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job seriously. Due to the nature of the regime and of the committee, 
this may be impossible.
Coups in Thailand represented a change in the top leadership but 
not in the political philosophy of governments, who generally seem to 
have had little intention of conducting widespread reforms of public 
administration. In the case of the committees, the workload placed 
on members was additional to the burden of their regular tasks, 
consequently most were unable to perform their role efficiently.
In Thailand, the pedestrian performance of the advisory committees, 
their failure to display any understanding of overall needs (or concern 
for the effects of the few changes they did propose) is disappointing 
when viewed in historical perspective. Twice during the past the Thai 
administrative system had been completely overturned in pursuit of 
reform —  during the reign of Trailok and more recently of Chulalongkorn. 
Thais obviously can adapt to such dramatic changes. The current 
system has need of substantial reform, but to date the efforts at 
improvement have been piecemeal and generally unsatisfactory in 
resolving the well known problems of Thai public administration. The
t
advisory committees are a part of the political and administrative processes 
of the Thai military regimes and, as such, effective administrative 
reform by the advisory committees as they have been constituted is 
impossible.
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FOOTNOTES
1. RTGG, Vol. 94, 14 July 1977, pp. 7-10.
2. Siamrath Weekly, Vol. 23, 7 November 1976, pp. 10, 19.
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